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HOW EFFECTIVE ARE POLICE?
THE PROBLEM OF CLEARANCE RATES AND
CRIMINAL ACCOUNTABILITY
Shima Baradaran Baughman*
In recent years, the national conversation in criminaljustice has centered on police. Are police using
excessive foree? Should they be monitored more closely? Do technology and artificial intelligence improve
policing? The implied core question across these national debates is whether police are effective at their
jobs. Yet we have not explored how effective police are or determined how best to measure police
effectiveness.
This Article endeavors to measure how effectively police peform at their core function-solving crime.
The metric most commonly used to measurepolice effectiveness at crime-solving is a "clearance rate:" the
proportion of reportedcrimesfor which police armst aperson and refer themforprosecution. But clearance
rates are inadequate for many reasons, including thefact that thy are highy manpulable. This Article
therefore provides a set of new metrics that have never been used systematically to study police
effectiveness-referredto as "criminalaccountability" metrics. Criminal accountability examines thefull
course of a crime to determine whetherpolice detect and ultimatey resolve committed crime. Taking into
account the prevalence and the number of crimespolice solve, the proportion of crimes solved in America
is dramatically lower than we realize. Only with a clearer conversation, rooted in accurate data about the
effectiveness oftheAmericanpolice system, can we attempt apath toward increased criminal accountability
andpublic safety.

INTRODUCTION
We are accustomed to believing that people get caught for committing
crimes.1 If you commit murder and leave DNA behind, you are certain to get

* Associate Dean of Faculty Research and Development, Professor of Law and Presidential Scholar,
University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law. Special thanks to Ryan Baughman, Sandra Mayson, Paul
Robinson, Barry Friedman, Elizabeth Joh, L. Song Richardson, Benjamin Levin, Seth Stoughton, Jenny
Carroll, Paul Cassell, Chris Slobogin, Ronald Allen, Paul Gowder, Sheila Bedi, Daniel Epps, Andrew
Ferguson, Carissa Hessick, Cathy Hwang, David Ball, Chad Flanders, Lauryn Gouldin, Bennett Capers,Jenia
Turner, Cecilia Klingele, John Rappaport,Justin Murray, Eve Primus, Julian Clarke, Florence Finkle,Jennifer
Laurin, Eric Miller, RonNell Anderson Jones, Christopher Griffin, and Anna Roberts for invaluable
assistance and contributions to this piece. Special thanks to the contributors at CrimFest 2018 who provided
helpful comments, the NACOLE Policing Conference at University of Texas, and University of Arizona Law
School and Northwestern University Law School for hosting me and providing excellent feedback on this
research. I am indebted to Melissa Bernstein, Valerie Craigle, Alicia Brillon, Ross McPhail, Eli LeCates, Olivia
Ortiz,Joshua Loader, Zachary Scott,Jacqueine Rosen, and Haden Gobel for research support, and especially
to Jessica Morrill, for data gathering and empirical work. I am also grateful to Mindy Kidd and the editors at
the Alabama Law Review for their excellent editing on this piece.
1. The exception to this belief is the Blackstone principle, which underlies a recognition that some
guilty defendants will indeed go free. See 4 WIILAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 352. For an excellent
argument that we should stop reciting Blackstone as a "mantra," see Daniel Epps, The Consequences ofErmrin
Criminaljustice, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1072 (2015).
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caught.2 If you leave your fingerprints anywhere or are detected by a camera
during a burglary, the police will come knocking at your door. 3 If you push your
husband off a cliff to be with your lover, the detectives will eventually figure it
out.4 We assume or expect that police generally solve crimes, and the unsolved
mystery is the exception. People express outrage when prosecutors are unable
to convict an individual whom the public believes is guilty.5 People are appalled
when justice is not served or when the public determines that an individual who
has harmed someone is not held accountable for those crimes.6 Society

2. Seegenerally Natalie Ram, Genetic Privacy After Carpenter, 105 VA. L. REv. 1357, 1408 (2019) (noting
that genealogy websites 23andMe and Ancestr will share genetic information with law enforcement when
"compelled by valid legal process[es]" or when required to "comply with a valid subpoena or a court-ordered
request").
3. Seegeneral/y Patrick Sawer, Poice Use Glo Prints to Catch Criminals,THE TELEGRAPH (Dec. 13, 2008),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/3740688/Police-use-glove-prints-to-catchcriminals.html (noting that, in addition to using fingerprints as a means for catching criminals, forensic
officers are beginning to compile thousands of prints from gloves, "allowing [officers] to match a set of prints
from one crime to those found at the scene of another"). See also Clive Thompson, The Myth of Fingerprints,
SMITHSONIAN MAG., (Apr. 2019), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/myth-fingerprints180971640 (recognizing the increased use of DNA evidence in investigating crimes). Even small and local
police stations are utilizing DNA to "solve ho-hum burglaries." Id. Police send swabs to crime labs, where
the DNA swabs are run through a "'rapid DNA' machine," and minutes later, a match to the DNA is
produced. Id Seegeneraly Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, PredictiePolicing Theory, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK
OF POLICING IN THE U.S. 491, 491 (Tamara Rice Lave & Eric J. Miller eds., 2019) (discussing "how police
can choose between prioritizing additional police presence, targeting environmental vulnerabilities, and/or
establishing a community problem-solving approach as a different means of achieving crime reduction"). But
see Todd S. Purdum, Burglars:A Long Shot to Arrest, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 1986), https://www.nytimes.com/
1986/08/17/nyregion/burglars-fingerprints-a-long-shot-to-arrest.html (reporting that one experienced
officer has "successfully identified 31 suspects in the 11 years he has been taking prints").
4. Jack Hannah, Montana Newywed JordanLinn Graham Gets 30 Years in Husband's Murder, CNN (Mar.
28, 2014, 6:14 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2014/03/27/justice/montana-newlywed-sentenced/index.html
(discussing the case of Jordan Graham, a woman convicted of second-degree murder in December of 2013,
after "admitting to luring her new husband ... to Glacier National Park and pushing him off a cliff").
5. See Lizette Alvarez & Cara Buckley, Zimmerman Is Acquittedin Travon Martin Killing, N.Y. TIMES (July
13, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/us/george-zimmeman-verdict-trayvon-martin.html
(discussing the public outrage following the not guilty verdict of George Zimmerman, whom the public
believed to have been guilty of the murder of Trayvon Martin). But see Alia E. Dastagir, SurprisingNo One:
What Loi Loughlin and Michael Jackson Uproar Teaches Us About Denial, USA TODAY (Mar. 18, 2019),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/investigations/2019/03/14/lori-loughlin-college-admissionsmichael-jackson-leaving-neverland-catholic-abuse-denial-outrage/3152770002 ("Catholics don't want to
think their church protected pedophiles. MichaelJackson fans don't want to associate music that brought joy
at weddings and school dances with accusations of child molestation. ... White people don't want to believe
that police protect them but abuse black people.").
6. Two prominent examples of this from both sides of the aisle include the public's reaction to
allegations against Presidents Trump and Clinton. See Amber Phillips, Why Are PoliTcians Essentialy Shrugging
at the Latest Sexual Assault Allegations Against Trmp?, THE WASH. POST (June 26, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/06/26/why-are-politicians-essentially-shrugging-latestsexual-assault-allegations-against-trump (quoting U.S. Senator Richard Durbin as saying, "There's so many
allegations of sexual harassment and other things on this president.... I wouldn't dismiss it, but let's be
honest, he's going to deny it and little is going to come of it"); Eyder Peralta, A Brief History ofJuanita
Broaddrick, The Woman Accusing Bill Clinton of Rape, NPR (Oct. 9, 2016), https://www.npr.org/2016/10/09/
497291071/a-brief-history-of-juanita-broaddrick-the-woman-accusing-bill-clinton-of-rape
(noting that,
almost forty years ago, President Clinton was accused of raping Juanita Broaddrick, who alleged that "Hillary
Clinton helped him cover it up").
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generally assumes that when serious crimes are committed, justice is served. In
other words, the conventional wisdom is that police are generally effective at
solving crimes. But do we know that they are?
Strangely, there has not been any challenge in the legal literature of this
conventional wisdom, and there has been little discussion of police
effectiveness. Much of the scholarly discussion of police has focused on racial
9
bias,8 self-defense doctrine, monitoring police behavior and preventing

7. See Rick Muir, Gnat Expectations: What Do the Pubc Wantfmm the Police?, THE POLICE FOUND (Sept.
23, 2016), http://www.police-foundation.org.uk/2016/09/great-expectations-what-do-the-public-wantfrom-the-police ("The police are expected to prevent crime, to help those in immediate danger, to investigate
offences, to catch criminals, to sustain public order and to protect people, particularly vulnerable people,
from harm."). The exception to this general rule may be with rape. See Katharine K. Baker, Once a Rapist?
MotivationalEidence and Relevangy in Rape Law, 110 HIARV. L. REV. 563, 584 (1997) (recognizing that "because
rape is a significantly underreported crime, the truth is that even if rape allegations could be easily made, most
are not made at all") (footnotes omitted).
8. See, e.g., Julian R. Murphy, Is It Recordng?-Racial Bias, Police Accountability, and the Body-Worn Camera
Activation Policies of the Ten Largest Metropolitan Police Departments in the USA, 9 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 141, 14849 (2018) ("In the policing context, a paradigmatic example [of racial profiling] is the practice of some United
States police departments in the 1980s and 1990s of purposefully targeting Black and Latinx people for
drug-related investigation, a practice illuminated by the mention of race in police department training
materials."); Paul J. Larkin, Jr. & David L. Rosenthal, Fght, Race, and Tery Stops: Commonwealth v. Warren,
16 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 163, 205 (2018) ("Discrimination, both when it occurs and when it mistakenly
appears to have occurred, exacerbates any police-citizen tensions that already exist within a community and
dissuades the victims of crime in those neighborhoods from cooperating with the police."); Elias R. Feldman,
Strict Tort Liabilityfor Polce Misconduct, 53 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 89, 100 (2019) ("It is also fair to assume
policing's risk of wrongful harm falls disproportionately upon racial minorities given what is known about
how unconscious racial biases affect police decision-making.").
9. See, e.g., Rachel A. Harmon, When Is Polce Violence Justified?, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1119, 1174 (2008)
("In the context of policing, officers should be required to use their special training and skills to avoid force
or minimize its harm.. .. [S]elf-defense training ... is ever-present in evaluating whether a police officer's
use of force is necessary.").
One of the most politically polarizing types of cases involves police who claim self-defense in
shooting an African American victim.... The litany of cases involving police officers who shot
unarmed African Americans, claimed self-defense, and then were later acquitted, gives credence
to a perception of bigotry among law enforcement and the legal system that often refuses to hold
them accountable.
Aaron Goldstein, Race, Reasonableness, and the Rule of Law, 17 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1195 (2003). Rachel A.
Harmon, The Problem ofPolicing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 804 n.174 (2012) ("State and federal civil and criminal
suits are also subject to defenses, such as self-defense ... which can set limits on police conduct.").
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misconduct, 0 improving community and law enforcement relationships," and
artificial intelligence in policing.' 2 The scholarly discussion has focused on how
police are doing crime solving: With too much force? With the right
monitoring? With proper technology? These discussions assume that police are
solving crimes. The prior scholarship has also tackled police performance in
specific arenas' 3 but has not examined how to measure whether police are
effective at their jobs.

10. See, e.g., Benjamin Levin, What's Wrong with Poice Unions?, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1333, 1340-43
(discussing the role of police unions in monitoring police behavior); John Rappaport, How Private Insurers
Regulate PublicPolice, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1595-1601 (2017) (discussing the role police liability insurance
might play in preventing police misconduct); Seth Stoughton, Poice Body-Worn Cameras, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1363,
1378-99 (2018) (discussing police use of body cameras as a means to monitor police behavior); Jocelyn
Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CAL L. REV. 391, 407-20 (2016) (suggesting that private organized groups can
help monitor police behavior).
In addition to the positive behavioral changes that police body cameras may bring, it is also
apparent that police body cameras are more favorable than using mass, indiscriminate surveillance
such as street cameras and audio detectors in public places-an option which stands on the other
end of the spectrum of tools to record police behavior.
&

Joey Dhillon, Police Body-Mounted Cameras: Balancing the Interests of Citizens and the State, 25 S. CAL REV. L.
SOC. JUST. 69, 74 (2015). Considering Police Body Cameras, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1794, 1799-1800 (2015)
(explaining that the rise of police officers wearing body cameras may have been due to its "potential to expose
officer misconduct and exonerate civilians whose actions have been falsely characterized by the police"); L.
Song Richardson, Poice Racial Violence: Lessons from Social Psycholgy, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2961 (2015)
(discussing the phenomenon of police killing unarmed black men). Seegeneraly Rachel Harmon, PromotingCivil
Roghts Though Proactive PolicingReform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1,2 (2009) ("Countering the systemic causes of police
misconduct requires doing more than punishing individual officers."); MICHAEL AVERY ET AL, POLICE
MISCONDUCT AND LITIGATION 587-616 (3d ed. 2014); Mary D. Fan, Justice VisuahiZed: Courts and the Body

Camera Revolution, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 897, 907-08 (2017) (describing a police "[c]amera [c]ultural
[r]evolution").
11. See, e.g., Anthony A. Braga, Better Policing Can Improve Legitimay and Reduce Mass Incarceration, 129
HARV. L. REV. F. 233, 238-39 (2016) ("Developing close relationships with community members would help
the police gather information about crime and disorder problems, understand the nature of these problems,
and solve specific crimes."); Tracey L. Meares, The Path Forward- Improving the Dynamics of Community-Poice
Relationships to Achieve Effective Law Enforcement Policies, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1355, 1365 (2017) (stating that
trust and legitimacy were the most important areas in need of improvement, as the President's Task Force
on 21st Century Policing pointed out to President Obama); Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and
Community Poling, 90 CAL L. REV. 1513, 1527-30 (2002) (discussing new community police initiatives to
improve public and police relationships); Rachel Abanonu, De-Escaating Police-CitiZen Encounters, 27 S. CAL.
REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 239, 241 (2018) (finding that "public awareness and education about constitutional
rights during police encounters can reduce police-citizen confrontations"); Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Prosecutors,
Race Defenders, 89 GEO. L.J. 2227, 2245 (2001) (noting that community outreach and police training assist in
establishing "monitoring, compliance, and enforcement structures with the active participation of citizens of
color").
12.

See, e.g., Elizabeth Job, Automated Policing, 15 OHIO ST.

J.

CRIM. L 559 (2018) (discussing the

challenges police face when using artificial intelligence). See generall ANDREW GURTHRIE FERGUSON, THE
RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING 14-33 (2017).

13. Prior literature has tackled clearance rates, unresolved crime in minority communities, and the lack
of crime reporting
* Clearance rates: See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda and Clearance Rates, 91 NW. U. L. Rev. 278, 294
(1996); Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Still Handcuffing the CopsA Review of Fify Years of EmpiricalEvidence
ofMiranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 97 B.U. L. REV. 685, 706-08 (2017) (discussing the effect of
Miranda on clearance rates); Hyunseok Jang, Larry T. Hoover & Brian A. Lawton, Effect of Broken Windows
Enforcement on ClearanceRates, 36 J. CRIM. JUST. 529, 536 (2008); Charles Wellford & James Cronin, ClearingUp
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This Article takes this question on. It considers how to measure whether
police are effective at solving crimes. It is truly a first step in the legal literature,
and it generates more questions than answers. The Article's modest goal is to
answer a question that remains largely neglected: What is the best way to
determine police effectiveness? In answering this question, this Article reviews
data on police effectiveness from the last fifty years.
Fundamentally, a police officer is charged with maintaining public order,
14
detecting crime, and enforcing the law. To determine whether police are
successful at two principle functions-detecting crime and enforcing the lawwe need to measure how effective police are at solving crime. The most
commonly used measure of police effectiveness is clearance rates-the
proportion of reported crime for which police arrest a person and refer them
15
for prosecution. In examining whether clearance rates are the appropriate

Homicide Clearance Rates, 243 NAT'L INST. JUST. J. 2, 6-7 (2000); Graham C. Ousey & Matthew R. Lee, To Know
the Unknown: The Declinein Homicide ClearanceRates, 1980-2000, 35 CRIM. JUST. REV. 141, 153 (2010).
- Unresolved crime: See, e.g., JILL LEOVY, GHETTOSIDE: A TRUE STORY OF MURDER IN AMERICA 8-12

(2015) (describing that police's failure to solve black homicide has led to an increase in endemic violence);
Deborah Tuerkheimer, CriminalJustice and the Mattering of Lives, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1153-54 (2018)
(explaining that "race-based underenforcement" has led to a lower clearance rate for homicides involving a
black victim than homicides involving a white victim).
- Lack of reporting: See, e.g., Robert F. Kidd & Ellen F. Chayet, Why Do Victims Failto Report? The Psychology of

CriminalVictimization, 40 J. SOC. ISSUES 39, 39 (1984) ("[N]onreporting is the result of three factors acting
singly or in concert: (a) victim fear, (b) feelings of helplessness and the perceived powerlessness of police,
and (c) the threat of further victimization from authorities."); Heike Goudriaan, James P. Lynch & Paul
Nieuwbeerta, Reporting to the Police in Western Nations:A TheoreticalAnaysisof the Effects ofSocial Context, 21 JUST.
Q. 933, 955-69 (2004) (finding that the perceived competence of the police determines whether property
crimes are reported); Heike Goudriaan, Karen Witterbrood & Paul Nieuwbeerta, NeighbourhoodCharacteristics
andReporting Crime, 46 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 719, 719-42 (2006); MARTIN GREENBERG & BARRY RUBACK,
AFTER THE CRIME: VICTIM DECISION MAKING 99-100 (1992) (discussing findings of twenty studies
involving more than 5,000 people and exploring the decision to report and the immediate aftermath of a
victimization); Stephen Schnebly, The Influence of Communift-OrientedPolicingon Crime-Reporting Behavior, 25 JUST.

Q. 223, 223-51 (2008).
Elizabeth E. Job, The Consequences of Automating and Deskilling the Police, 67 UCLA L. REV.
14.
DISCOURSE 134, 138 (2019) ("To be sure, the police are tasked with enforcing the law, investigating crimes,
and maintaining social order in sometimes unpredictable and violent situations."); see alsoJACK R. GREENE,
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLICE SCIENCE 217-18 (3d ed. 2007); WILLARD OLIVER, COMMUNITYORIENTED POLICING: A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO POLICING 10-12 (4th ed. 2001) (explaining that
policing functions boil down to enforcing the law and maintaining order); Matthew C. Waxman, National
Security Federalism in the Age of Terror, 64 STAN. L. REV. 289, 304 (2012) (finding that "local police functions
include preventing and investigating crime as well as maintaining order, patrolling, and providing services");
Harmon, PromotingCivil Rights Through Proactive PolicingReform, supra note 9, at 8 ("Instead, [police departments]
exist to prevent crime, protect life, enforce law, and maintain order."); Orin S. Kerr, An Economic Understanding
of Search and Seizure Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 598 (2016) ("The modem approach to enforcing criminal
laws is through investigations by police officers, detectives, and agents, who are government employees
tasked with collecting evidence.").
15.

A. KEITH BOTOMLEY & KEN PEASE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 42-49 (1994). See also GREENE,

supra note 14, at 182 (citations omitted):
The clearance rate is used as a measure [of police effectiveness] for a variety of reasons. Most
importantly, it provides direct assessment of the goal of 'crime management'-dealing with crime
that has occurred and is reported. This measure also reflects the internal goals of police
departments and investigators. As such, this measure is highly valued by practitioners.
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measure of police performance, we start by asking: Should police performance

be measured by how many people police arrest and turn over to prosecutors?
If the key is solving crime, we may need more information to determine
whether police are effective. Indeed, clearance rates disregard any of the
following pieces of information: How many individuals are victims of a crime
but failed to report it to police? How often do police arrest the right people?
Which crimes are police most likely to make arrests for? How many police
clearances result in a conviction? How many crimes did police not make arrests
for but resolved in other ways? None of this information is tracked. And on
top of that, a reported crime that does not result in an arrest is a failure by police
as it lowers the clearance rate.
The questions left unanswered by clearance rates lead us to a new concept
that this Article refers to as "criminal accountability." Criminal accountability
examines the full course of a crime to determine whether police detect and solve
a committed crime-whether by reporting, arresting, convicting, or resolving
outside of the criminal justice system. The rate of criminal accountability
provides a more comprehensive way to determine the effectiveness of police in
the United States.
This Article makes two essential contributions, one empirical and one
theoretical. First, it relies on independently analyzed national crime data from
the last fifty years to establish empirically that police are ineffective at solving
major crimes. It establishes through this analysis that police are much less
effective than we might think at solving all major crimes and have not
significantly improved in the last thirty years." Second, this Article explores
how to best determine whether police are doing a good job, examines the
current approach, and considers if there is a better way to measure police
effectiveness.
Part I begins with an introductory discussion of the primary approach to
tracking police effectiveness-clearance rates. Part I.B defines clearance rates
and explores their use as the current measure of police effectiveness. It
demonstrates that a crime cleared does not necessarily indicate that the
perpetrator has been caught or convicted. A cleared case can mean that a
suspect is identified but is later released (thus, the crime is not solved), or that a
suspect is arrested and then, due to faulty evidence, released, or that the crime
is solved-but can mean any of the three without any clarity from simply
Furthermore, clearance data has been systematically collected through the Unform Crime Reports
(UCR), permitting long-term trend analysis.

&

Id; LARRY J. SIEGEL, CRIMINOLOGY: THE CORE 33-34 (7th ed. 2017); JAY ROBERT NASH, DICTIONARY
OF CRIME 68 (1992). For a study of clearance rates and police effectiveness, see CHARLES WELLFORD
JAMES CRONIN, AN ANALYSIS OF VARIABLES AFFECTING THE CLEARANCE OF HOMICIDES: A MULTISTATE

STUDY (1999). SeegeneraIy WASHINGTON DC: JUSTICE RESEARCH AND STATISTICS ASSOCIATION.
16. See infra Appendix Tables 1-8 (showing arrest, clearance, and conviction rates in the last thirty years
remaining stable). But see infra Figures 4 and 5 (discussing a reduction in crime rates, which may indicate that
police have improved).
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7
looking at the statistics. Part I.C explores the challenges of clearance rates as
a measure of police effectiveness. These include the reasons for clearance rate
errors, including police motivations to exaggerate or misreport, clearance rates
advantaging certain groups over others, and the central data points missing in
clearance rates. These challenges are important in considering alternatives for
measuring police performance. Part I.D introduces the concept of criminal
accountability. Clearance rates do not account for the overwhelming number

of crimes not reported to police, individuals who are apprehended but not
turned over to prosecutors, or crimes resolved without arrest through
alternative means. Criminal accountability considers all of these measures and
determines police effectiveness in solving crimes.
Part II explores whether criminal accountability constitutes a better way to
track police performance, using thirty to fifty years of national data to inform
the discussion. Determining the rate of criminal accountability is a complicated
endeavor. It includes accounting for the large swath of crimes not reported to
police and also considers conviction, incarceration, and other crime resolution
rates. Part II.A considers crime reporting more carefully and the discrepancy

between "known crimes" and "reported crimes." In simpler terms, it
demonstrates empirically the large number of crimes that occur that are not

reported to police. Part II.B applies these more complete data metrics to the
major crimes (murder, burglary, rape, robbery, etc.) and examines how effective
police have been at solving these crimes in the last thirty years. The police

effectiveness numbers are surprising and demonstrate that police are worse at
solving crime than we may have thought. In uncovering these numbers, this
Article does not intend to condemn police or even prosecutors, nor does it

intend to recommend any particular remedy to increase reports, arrests, or
convictions. There are important reasons why people are not reporting crimes
to the police or that police are not arresting individuals, including police practice
and strategy, police resource constraints, race and cultural issues, and police
accountability. While all of these are (and should be) important considerations
in criminal decisions, they are not dissected here. This Article simply reveals the
data on police effectiveness for the major crimes and explains how best to
measure police effectiveness.
Part III moves beyond the data to discuss the implications of a new
measure of police. Part III.B provides insights that may improve the study of
police effectiveness and in turn improve criminal accountability. One of these
insights includes additional points of data that should be collected each year at
local and national levels. It also discusses how we may consider the whole
course of crime, improve police reporting rates, and consider arrest and
conviction rates in a way that avoids siloing police and prosecutors. This new
approach may reduce police incentives to fraudulently report arrest numbers or

17.

See Greene, supra note 14, at 182-83.
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misrepresent clearance rates. Finally, it addresses counterarguments regarding
whether criminal accountability is an improvement to the current approach.
The observations in this Article about police effectiveness may be
unsettling. One may not sleep soundly knowing that 97% of burglars, 88% of
rapists, and over 50% of murderers get away with their crimes.s Indeed, we live
in a world where, much more often than not, crimes go unsolved and
unaccounted for. This Article operates under the assumption that providing
this information will not exacerbate crime but instead motivate a critical
conversation.19

I.

How TO MEASURE POLICE EFFECTIVENESS

To measure the effectiveness of police, we must narrow the police
functions we are considering and define the terms used in this Article: "crime"
and "solve." We ignore the police function of maintaining public order and
focus on the function of preventing and solving crime. Though this could lead
to a broader, more complicated, and controversial discussion, for the purposes
of this Article, we are concerned with measuring the proportion of major crimes
committed that are ultimately solved. 20 The definition of a crime may be
ambiguous and involve some debate, but without entering the foray of these
debates, this Article relies on the legal definition of a crime. A crime is behavior
prohibited by law and subject to criminal sanction under political authority of
the state. 21 This Article does not focus on all crime but relies on major crimes,
with the presumption that there is little dispute about the need for police
involvement in major crimes. The major crimes this Article considers are
murder, rape, burglary, robbery, aggravated assault, larceny, and motor vehicle
theft.22

18.

See infra Appendix Table 6 for true conviction rates.

19.

Tom Tyler's research is reassuring on this point. TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 57-

64 (2006) (finding that people obey the law because it is legitimate, not because they fear punishment).
20.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS ON URBAN POLICE FUNCTION
1-2.2 (1997),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal-justice/publications/criminaljustice-section_archive/cri
mjust-standards_urbanpolice/ (articulating a classic conception of police responsibilities); see also HERMAN
GOLDSTEIN, POLICING A FREE SOCIETY 21 (1990) ("Anyone attempting to construct a workable definition

of the police role will typically come away with old images shattered and with a [newfound] appreciation for
the intricacies of police work.").
21. For the purposes of this Article, I adopt the traditional legal definition of a crime. Ronald C.
Kramer, Defining the Concept of Crime: A Humanistic Perspective, 12 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 469, 470 (1985);
Ronald C. Kramer, The Debate Over the Definition of Crime: Paradigms, ValueJudgments, and CriminologicalWork, in
ETHICS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND CRIMINALJUSTICE 33, 55-57 (N. Browne & F. Elliston eds., 1982) (articulating
the debate over the definition of crime).
22. Given that the scope of larceny can vary, larceny may not be a major crime. "The average dollar
loss per burglary offense was $2,799 [in 2018]." FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES,
2018,
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2018/crime-in-the-u.s.-2018/topic-pages/burglary
[hereinafter FBI,
2018] (burglary). "The average value of property taken during larceny-thefts was $1,153 per offense [in 2018]."
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There are several ways to define solving a crime. One way is to consider a
"clearance" a solving of a crime. Clearance involves police arresting an
23
individual and turning them over to prosecution for a reported crime. At this
point, arguably, police have done all that they can do and all that is technically
in their jurisdiction to do. However, clearance does not mean that police have
found the true culprit, so for the purposes of this Article, a clearance is not
24
solving a crime. An acceptable definition for solving a crime could be when a
25
defendant is convicted of a crime. This way, the person who committed the
crime is arguably held accountable. Another way to solve a crime would be what
I refer to as "resolving a crime," or solving a case without a conviction through
alternative means. That is to say, the police know who to hold accountable and
hold that person accountable without a traditional conviction. This way to solve
or resolve a crime will be discussed in Part I.C, which introduces criminal
accountability. So, for purposes of this Article, solving a crime will mean a
conviction or resolution by alternative means. I recognize that criminal
conviction is not in the hands of police alone; criminal conviction is also

impacted by prosecutors and other factors. However, for the purposes of
determining whether police are effective and whether clearance rates are

accurate, conviction rates must be compared to clearance and arrest rates.
Part L.A goes on to define the most commonly used data point currently
used to measure police effectiveness: clearance rates. Part I.B discusses some
of the problems with clearance rates as the primary measure of police
effectiveness. And finally, Part I.C discusses an alternative measure for police
effectiveness: criminal accountability.
A.

Defining ClearanceRates

Now that we have defined the terms used when discussing police
effectiveness, we must consider how police effectiveness is measured. There
are four key empirical measures of police performance. These are certainly not
the best measures but the most common. These four main data points include:

FBI, 2018, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2018/crime-in-the-u.s.-2018/topic-pages/larceny-theft
(larceny-theft).
23. Floyd Feeney, Police Clearances:A Poor Way to Measure the Impact of Miranda on the Police, 32 RUTGERS
L.J. 1, 11-13 (2000).
24. Parts I.B and I.C give greater insight over why this is the case and deal with some problems with
clearance rates.
25. There are sometimes doubts when a person is convicted of a crime as to whether they actually
committed that crime as a legal conviction does not mean factual guilt. See generally D. Michael Risinger,
Innocents Convicted- An EmpiricallyJustifiedFactual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761
(2007).
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(1) clearance rates; (2) reported crimes; 26 (3) number of arrests, stop and frisks,
and fines; and (4) response time after a call.27 The fourth measure, response
time, is one that deals mostly with maintaining public order and responding to
emergencies (some arguably criminal), but nonetheless we do not deal with it
here. Similarly, we do not deal with stop and frisk measures, which more directly
involve crime prevention. 28 We also do not deal with fines here, even though
they have important implications for justice. 29 The other three measures of

police performance-arrest rates, clearance rates, and reported crime ratesare critical to the empirical analysis in Part II. The Article turns first to defining
the most common measure of police performance: clearance rates.
Clearance rates are a commonly used measure of police effectiveness. 30 As
noted above, clearance rates typically refer to crimes reported to police which
result in arrest of a suspect who is tumed over for prosecution. 3 1 However, the
term is not always defined this way. By some accounts, clearance rates are "[t]he
percentage of crimes [solved by arrest] by a police department or a specific
division of a police department." 32 Clearance rates are also sometimes referred
to as the proportion of recorded offenses that have been "cleared-up." 33 For
the purposes of this Article, the relevant definition of clearance rates is the one
used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The FBI tracks clearance rates by
the nation's police departments.
The official FBI definition of clearance rates includes offenses cleared by
arrest or by exceptional means. 34 These are two distinct ways to clear a crime.
The first (and what should be the most common way) is by arrest. To clear a
crime by arrest, a crime must fulfill three specific conditions according to the

26. Malcom K. Sparrow, Measuring Performance in a Modern Police Organization, NAT'L INST.JUST. 2 (Mar.
2015) (Police are most measured by "[r]eductions in the number of serious crimes reported, most commonly
presented as local comparisons against an immediately preceding time period.").
27.

ANTON MASLOV, MEASURING THE PERFORMANCE OF THE POLICE: THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE

PUBLIC 1 (2015); Sparrow, supra note 26, at 2.
28. See general/y Barry Friedman & Elizabeth Janszky, Policing's Information Problem (L. & Econ. Rsch.
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 19-33, 2019) (arguing that we have not measured the impact policing
practices have on individuals and need more information on the provision of public safety). Indeed, we should
be careful because police overfocusing on their duty to solve crimes may cause a disconnect between police
and public that could result in police becoming less effective at preventing crime. Debra Livingston, Police
Discretion and the Quaity of Life in Public Places:Court, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 551,
631-32 (1997).
29. See Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 686-91 (2019) (holding that excessive fines violate the Eighth
Amendment).
30.

Greene, supra note 14; see also DEAN

J.

CHAMPION, THE AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF CRIMINAL

JUSTICE 46 (3d ed. 2005).
31.

CHAMPION, supra note 30, at 46.

32.

NASH, supra note 15, at 68; see also GREENE, supra note 14, at 182.

33.

BOTFOMLEY & PEASE, supranote 15, at 42.

34. FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2017 [hereinafter FBI, 2017], https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-inthe-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/topic-pages/clearances (clearances).
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FBI: at least one person must be (1) arrested, (2) charged with the commission
of the offense, and (3) turned over to the court for prosecution (whether
35
following arrest, by court summons, or by police notice). It is important to

note that clearance rates are different from arrest rates, because to clear a crime,
there must be an arrest, a charge, and turning over of the case to prosecution.
This is not the only way to clear a crime, however.
According to the FBI, the second way police can clear a crime is by
"exceptional means." Exceptional means is basically an exception to arrest that
allows police to clear a crime. It is supposed to encompass situations when the
police have done all they can do but cannot obtain a suspect, despite their best
efforts. 36 For a law enforcement agency to clear a crime by exceptional means
under FBI standards, the law enforcement agency must have done all of the

following:
"
"
"
"

Identified the offender.
Gathered enough evidence to support an
and turn over the offender to the court for
Identified the offender's exact location so
be taken into custody immediately.
Encountered a circumstance outside

arrest, make a charge,
prosecution.
that the suspect could
the

control

of

law

enforcement that prohibits the agency from arresting, charging,
37
and prosecuting the offender.
Examples of exceptional means are where the offender is killed, "the victim[]
refus[es] to cooperate . .. after the offender has been identified[,]" or the
38
offender cannot be extradited from a foreign jurisdiction. There are key
differences between crimes cleared by arrest and those cleared by exceptional
means. 39 Again, this should be the less common way to clear a crime and an
exception to the primary method: arrest. However, as discussed in the next
Subpart, this exception is exploited to inflate police clearance rates.

Id
36. Id According to the FBI, crimes can be cleared by exceptional means when "elements beyond law
enforcement's control prevent the agency from arresting and formally charging the offender." Id
35.

37.

Id

38.

Id

39. John P. Jarvis & Wendy C. Regoeczi, Homicides Clearances: An Analysis of Arrest Versus Exceptional
Outcomes, 13(2) HOMiCIDE STUD. 174, 183-86 (2009). Jarvis and Regoeczi completed a study comparing
arrest versus exceptional clearance outcomes that identified important implications for measuring clearance
rates. The study used data from the FBI's National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) to "analyze
all incidents of murder and nonnegligent manslaughter reported . . . between 1996 and 2002." Id at 179. The
NIBRS data was employed in a logistic regression analysis to examine the impact of independent variables,
such as victim characteristics or weapon use, on the outcome variable of cases cleared by arrest or
exceptionally cleared. Id at 180-81. The study concluded that "a number of factors ... influence the clearance
categories differently," and "that exceptional clearances are not simply a residual category of clearance
outcomes that may be either included or excluded at the discretion of the policing agency or the researcher."
Id at 183, 186.
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B.

The Problems of ClearanceRates

Clearance rates, alone, are not an effective measure of police performance.
They miss critical data points, as discussed more fully in the next Subpart.40
Aside from the incompleteness of clearance rates, there are other problems with
relying on clearance rates to measure police performance. This Subpart
discusses the various problems with accuracy of clearance rates. First, clearance
rates are not accurately measured from year to year. Second, they are not a
useful measure of police performance and effectiveness unless they take into
account the specific characteristics of the jurisdiction and crime under
consideration. Third, clearance rates may lead police to overemphasize arrest
rather than other ways to deal with crime or to focus on arrests of some crimes
over others. 41 Finally, clearance rates can be manipulated by police or even
fraudulently collected to distort the appearance of criminal activity in the

jurisdiction.
Clearance rates are often not accurately measured from year to year. 42
Clearance rates are rarely comprehensive or accurate.4 3 Some claim they are not
useful data points.44 Clearance rates can also be manipulated because of the
ability of law enforcement officers to double count clearances and report
clearance upon warrants for arrest. 45 Specifically, murders that occur in a prior
year and are solved in the current year count toward the current year's clearance

40. Clearance rates are difficult to measure accurately, so they may receive less emphasis. See Sparrow,
supra note 26, at 18-19.
41. Even though we are dealing with major crimes and there is an argument that all of them should
lead to arrest and conviction, there are some victims that are not interested in working with police toward
that outcome, even with violent crimes. LYNN LANGTON ET AL., DEP'T OF JUST., VICTIZATIONS NOT
REPORTED TO THE POLICE, 2006-2010, at 2 (Aug. 2012).

42. William Gregory Kennedy, The Impact of Police Agency Size on Crime Clearance Rates 56 (2009)
(Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. N.C. at Charlotte) (https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/ef68/be7e585cf7a0c83fec2b
a2ed9249d93f4e79.pdf) ("[T]he use of clearance rates is not without issues and there have been several
concems about the validity of their use. A major concern is that clearance rates may not be very accurate. In
many instances, clearance rates can be either artificially improved or they can be misleading[ly] low."); see also
GREENE, supra note 14, at 182; Jeff Asher & Ben Horwitz, The Missing Numbers in Preventing Murders, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/28/upshot/preventing-murders-missing-data
.html.
43.

Kennedy, supra note 42, at 56; GREENE, supra note 14, at 182; Asher & Horwitz, supra note 42.

44. This is because police forces employ different methods of measuring clearance rates. See MASLOv,
supra note 27, at 10 (studying performance of police in the U.S., Canada, and Europe, and finding that,
although clearance rates are a classic mechanism to measure police performance, "[they are] prone to
definition and measurement errors, making cross-comparisons difficult").
45. Matthew Clarke, U.S. Murder Clearance Rates Among Lowest in the World, CRIM. LEGAL NEWS, Mar.
2018, at 22; see also Kevin Rector, 2017 Homicide Data Provide Insight into Baltimore's Gun Wars, Pole Say, THE
BALT. SUN (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/bs-md-ci-2017-homicide-databreakdown-20180103-story.html (claiming that, in part, cases closed by exception and cases closed in
previous years allowed the Baltimore Police Department to raise clearance rates from 30% in 2015 to over
50% in 2017). See infra note 83 for further evidence of Baltimore's clearance manipulation.
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46
rate, which can skew numbers. Also, in New Orleans, a warrant issued in one
year and an arrest in the following year allow a murder to count as being
"cleared twice." 47 Taking this discrepancy into account, the reported clearance
rate for murder in New Orleans in 2016 was 41 %, but should actually have been

29.9%.48
Clearance rates may lead to an overfocus on arrests and on certain crimes

over others. Clearance rates may change in response to police departments
49
Using
"trying to create incentives for individual officers to control crime."
clearance rates as a job performance measure may actually encourage officers
50
to value making more arrests, not necessarily solving crimes. Police may also
be incentivized to arrest an individual when other avenues of crime-solving may

be more appropriate or lead to a better result. Prosecutors sometimes pressure
police to arrest individuals in certain cases, adding to the problem. A police
officer is less likely to work out restorative outcomes with victims and
perpetrators if the officer is measured by the number of arrests in relation to
5
the number of reports brought into the office. 1 Police may also focus on certain
crimes to protect clearance numbers, when other crimes pose an equal threat
to the public. For instance, police may be overfocused on gun violence resulting
in death. However, victims report nonfatal gunfire incidents at significantly
53
lower rates, 52 and less than a third of all shooting victims die. If a police
department solves only fatal shootings at a high percentage, a significant
segment of gun violence cases will remain unsolved. While it is understandable
that police emphasize fatal over nonfatal shootings, whether a shooting results
54
in a death is largely a matter of chance. Police may also prioritize murders

46.

Asher & Horwitz, supra note 42.

47.

Clarke, supra note 45, at 22.

48. Id "[Tlhe official murder clearance rate issued by the New Orleans police for 2016 is 41.0%, but
the actual percentage of 2016 murders cleared is 29.9%, or 52 of the 174 murders that occurred in the city in
2016." Id.
49. Richard H. McAdams, The PokticalEconomy of Entrapment, 96 J. OF CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY
107, 132 (2005).
50. Id. at 132-33. Indeed, the studies demonstrate that most crimes are not cleared and police do a lot
unrelated to solving crimes. GREENE, supra note 14, at 183-84.
51. See McAdams, supra note 48, at 132 (discussing arrest rates as a metric by which to judge police
performance).
52. See Jillian B. Carr & Jennifer L. Doleac, The Geography, Incidence, and Underreportingof Gun Violence:
Ne Evidence Using Shotspotter Data, BROOKINGS INST., 1, 2 (Apr. 27, 2016), https://www.brooldngs.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/07/CarrDoleacgunfire-underreporting.pdf.
53. Jeff Asher, Why Are Shootings Deadlier in Some Cities Than Others?, FIvETHIRTYEIGHT (Feb. 21,
2017), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-are-shootings-deadlier-in-some-cities-than-others.
54.

Id
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involving white victims and perpetrators; however, according to one study, 75%
of unsolved murders involved African-American victims. 55
In order to be useful, clearance rates may have to be adjusted based on
jurisdictional and incident characteristics. 56 Without these adjustments,
clearance rates alone are not a fair or appropriate measure of police
effectiveness. For instance, one study of eighty-five law enforcement agencies
considered variables such as police workload, firearm use, distant victimoffender relationship, and low visibility/exposure incident time. 57 The study
concluded that raw homicide clearance rates do not accurately measure police
performance because an increase in those incident and jurisdictional variables,
especially those impeding collection of evidence or increasing workloads, may
lower clearance rates despite being out of police control. 58 Clearance rates
without adjustments based on jurisdictional and incident characteristics are
incomplete measures of police performance.
Variations in how clearance rates are recorded by individual police
departments make it difficult to compare agencies with each other.59 Agencies
also define arrest differently, making it even more problematic to track
clearance rates between agencies. 60 Particular local practices are cited as
offensive distortions of murder clearance rates. While in New Orleans, police
consider a murder cleared when a suspect is identified and a warrant is issued
for arrest, the FBI does not recognize issuing warrants as clearance of a crime. 6 1
Additionally, Columbus, Ohio reportedly used "warrant clearance" for
homicides to improve numbers. Columbus had an official clearance rate for
murders of 41% but an adjusted clearance rate of only 34% when taking into
account warrant clearances.6 2 These sorts of misrepresentations in reporting can
make police departments appear to be solving more crimes than they actually
are.

55. Asher & Horwitz, supra note 42 ("The Washington Post reviewed almost 55,000 murders in
America's largest cities over the last decade. Nearly 26,000 of those murders were unsolved, and about 75
percent of the victims were African-Americans in these unsolved cases.").
56. Aki Roberts, Adjusting Rates of Homicide Clearanceby Arrestfor Invstigation Difficulty: Modeling IncidentandJurisdiction-LeelObstacles, 19(3) HOMICIDE STUD. 273, 274 (2015). Roberts argues that adjusted homicide
clearance rates better measure police agency performance than raw rates because the adjusted level accounts
for jurisdictional and incident characteristics related to investigation of crimes. Id at 293. The study
"calculate[d] difficulty-adjusted homicide clearance measures and rates for 85 U.S. [law enforcement]
agencies" to create "a multi-level logistic regression model that examines incident- and jurisdiction-level
variables as predictors of homicide clearance." Id at 279.
57.

Id at 281-82.

58.

Id at 292-94.

59.

GREENE, supranote 14, at 183.

60.

Id at 183; LAWRENCE SHERMAN & BARRY GLICK, NAT'L. CRIM. JUST. REF. SERV., 2 POLICE

FOUNDATION REPORTS: THE QUALITY OF POLICE ARREST STATISTICS 1, 2 (1984).

61.

Clarke, supra note 45, at 22.

62.

Id

ALABAMA LAW REVIEW

62

[Vol. 72:1:47

There is intense pressure in certain police departments to pad or even
falsify clearance rate numbers-either internally or to the FBI. Even police
funding is linked to crime clearance and could lead to both over-arresting and
manipulation of rates. 63 In New Orleans, the police department reported a
murder clearance rate of 15% to the FBI in 2012, but the department's internal
64
records indicate a murder clearance rate of over 45% that year. Another study
indicated that the reported 94% clearance rate of the Tulare Police Department
in California was incorrect, and that the number was closer to 70% in some
65
years and 50% in other years. Particular clearance rate numbers may be called
into question due to the incentives that commanding officers or public officials
may give to police officers. For example, officers from Biscayne Park in Miami,
Florida admitted to targeting random individuals with charges in order to
66
Commanding officers at the
improve the department's clearance rate.
Biscayne Park Police Department allegedly told police officers to pin random
blacks for open cases such as burglaries in order to close the cases and improve
clearance rates. 67 One police chief in particular had a record of 29 out of 30
burglary cases solved during his tenure as chief, but 0 out of 19 cases solved the
68
year following his departure. Out of the burglary arrests documented, nearly
all involved black males, and in some cases, the prosecution simply dropped the
charges after the Biscayne police failed to cooperate.69
Similarly, in Los Angeles, police allegedly misclassified cases to manipulate
clearance rates. The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) has had a number
of high-ranking officers charged with purposefully misclassifying cases as less
70
serious offenses in order to manipulate public outlook. In particular, police

underreported aggravated assaults in 2016 and 2017 by about 10% and
63. A source indicated that this may be the case in Alabama and potentially other states, though it is
difficult to verify without additional research. Comment fromJenny E. Carroll, Professor of Law, University
of Alabama School of Law, to author (Mar. 2020) (on file with the author).
64. Asher & Horwitz, supra note 42 (noting that a 2012 report from New Orleans to the FBI indicated
a murder clearance rate of 15%, while the New Orleans Police Department actually cleared at least 45% of
its murder cases that year).
65. Eric Witzig, Murder Clearance Rates Decline at Most Major Police Agencies, MURDER ACCOUNTABILITY
PROJECT 1, 3-4 (June 12, 2017), http://www.gutnviolence.issuelab.org/resources/27695/27695.pdf
(reporting that a source close to the Tulare County Sheriff's Department indicated "that the data reported to
the FBI were incorrect," and finding that, instead of a 94% clearance rate in the last decade, the county had
0
"an average clearance rate of 70 /a for the last two and a half years and about a 50% clearance rate for the
decade before that").
66. Charles Rabin et al., The Chief Wanted Perfect States, So Cops Were Told to Pin Crimes on Black People,4
Probe Found, MIAMI HERALD (July 12, 2018), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/crime/article2l36
7764.html.
67.

Id

68.

Id

69.

Id

Matt Hamilton, L APD Captain Accuses Department of Twisting Crime Statistics to Make City Seem Safer,
L.A. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-In-lapd-crime-stats-claim20171103-story.html.
70.
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misclassified them as less serious offenses. 71 Another report documented the
LAPD's misclassification of nearly 1,200 violent crimes in a one-year span that
ended in September 2013. The 2013 report found that if the LAPD correctly
classified the numerous beatings, stabbings, and robberies as aggravated
assaults, then the rates for aggravated assault would have been nearly 14%
higher.72 It turns out that the LAPD misclassified nearly 14,000 aggravated
assaults as lesser offenses, effectively lowering the violent crime rate by 7% and
the serious assault rate by 16% for the period of 2005 to fall of 2012.73 Indeed,
an LAPD internal audit in 2015 estimated a misclassification of over 25,000
crimes from 2008 to 2014.74
In yet more underreporting, it seems that Chicago has also majorly
underreported violent crimes to skew perceptions of public safety.75 In a twelvemonth study from 2013, individuals "who were beaten, burned," or shot were
"downgraded to more minor crimes ... for... unclear reasons." 76 Some crimes

actually disappeared from the police records. 77 During this period, Chicago
experienced a "dramatic crime reduction," while the department also curiously
lost many officers. 78 An independent city audit in 2012 found that the Chicago
Police Department "undercounted aggravated assaults and batteries by more
than 24 percent" during this period. 79 Indeed, police misreporting clearance

rates can dramatically change public perceptions of police effectiveness.
Many agencies across the country also use the cleared-by-exceptionalmeans category to misrepresent clearance rates. Police departments can use
exceptional means to report crimes in the cleared category because they are
often not considered separately. The majority of police reporting systems (more
than 60%) still do not require agencies to declare how many of their cases are

71. Id (noting that Commanding Officer Carranza, who lodged the complaint, conducted an analysis
that closely mirrored a report the Los Angeles Times wrote documenting massive misclassification of aggravated
assaults).
72. Ben Poston & Joel Rubin, Times Investigatdon: LAPD MisclassifedNearly 1,200 Violent Crimes as Minor
Offenses, L.A. TIMEs (Aug. 9, 2014), https://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-crimestats-lapd-20140810story.html.
73.

Hamilton, supranote 70.

74. Ben Poston & Joel Rubin, LAPD MisclassiiedMore than 25,000 Serious Crimes as Minor, Audit Finds,
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2015), https://www.latimes.com/local/crime/la-me-lapd-audit-20151206-story.html.
75. David Bernstein & Noah Isackson, The Truth About Chicago's Crime Rates, CHI. MAG. (May 2014),
https:/ /www.latimes.com/local/la-me-crimestats-lapd-20140810-story.html.
76. Id. Shockingly, the study "identified 10 people ... who were beaten, burned, suffocated, or shot
to death in 2013 andwhose cases were reclassified as death investigations, downgraded to more minor crimes,
or even closed as noncriminal incidents-all for illogical or, at best, unclear reasons." Id
77. Id (explaining that Chicago's crime statistics were altered, as murders and "dozens of other
crimes . .. were misclassified, downgraded to wrist-slap offenses, or made to vanish altogether").
78.

Id

79.

Id
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80
cleared by exceptional means. One study compared the FBI Uniform Crime
Report (UCR) numbers with those of the FBI's National Incident-Based
Reporting Systems (NIBRS), which does require law enforcement to disclose
arrests and exceptional clearances separately, demonstrating overinflated
81
clearance rate numbers. A study compared rape data from 103 national police
82
agencies to see whether clearance rates were accurate. It compared how many
rape cases were resolved by arrest or exceptional means against total rape
counts and asked agencies to explain the difference. The study found that

"[a]cross the country, dozens of law enforcement agencies are making it appear
as though they have solved a significant share of their rape cases when they
simply have closed them ... ."83 This is because the agencies declare cases as
cleared through exceptional means "when they have enough evidence to make
an arrest and know who and where the suspect is, but can't make an arrest for
84
reasons outside their control." Specifically, the study found that "[n]early half
of the law enforcement agencies that provided records cleared more rapes
through exceptional means than by actually arresting a suspect in 2016 .... "85
Around a dozen police departments that gave reporting information included
twice as many exceptional clearances than arrests, resulting in agencies
reporting nearly three times as many solved rape cases as compared to actual
arrests. 86 One extreme example was the Baltimore County Police Department,
which reported a 7 0 % clearance rate for rape cases in 2016 but only made

80.
Mark Fahey, How We Analyzed Rape Clearance Rates, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 15, 2018),
https://www.propublica.org/article/how-we-analyzed-rape-clearance-rates ("More than 60 percent of law
enforcement agencies reporting to the UCR program still use the older summary system, which does not
distinguish between the two types of clearance."). This article sought "to uncover the arrest and exceptional
clearance rates previously hidden from the public by requesting data from police internal case management
systems." Id.
81.

Id NIBRS aims to provide more detailed information about the incidents cleared by police. See

FBI, NATIONAL INCIDENT-BASED REPORTING SYSTEM (NIBRS), https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ucr/

nibrs.
82. Fahey, supranote 80. Authors sent requests under state open-records law to 103 different agencies,
77 of which were summary UCR reporters and 26 were NIBRS reporters. Roughly 70 responses were
received, though some responses were missing some data. Not all agencies were willing to communicate, but
from those that did the study was able to
identif[y] the fields that contained case dispositions, including those that aligned with arrests and
exceptional clearances, and calculated clearance rates by dividing the total number of cases cleared
by arrest and exceptional means in the data by the total number of what the FBI calls 'actual'
rapes-reported rapes minus any unfounded cases.
Id
83. Bernice Yeung et al., When It Comes to Rape, Just Because a Case Is Cleared Doesn't Mean It's Sold,
PROPUBLICA (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.propublica.org/article/when-it-comes-to-rape-just-because-acase-is-cleared-does-not-mean-solved.
84.

Id.

85.

Id

86.

Id
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arrests about 30% of the time. 87 Rather than using exceptional means as a minor

exception, some police departments are using it as a way to inflate clearance
numbers.
In sum, clearance rates provide an imperfect measure of police
effectiveness, as they are difficult to measure accurately and may be exaggerated.
They may lead to police incentives to arrest individuals rather than deal with
crimes in alternative ways. Rather than focusing on improving public safety,
police may be motivated to make certain arrests over others to help clearance
numbers. Police may also be motivated to make crimes appear solved when
they are actually not.
A meaningful evaluation of police effectiveness will require attention to
other measures. This is not to say that clearance rates are irrelevant. Although
clearance rates may not provide a full picture, they do give us good insight into
how much crime police solve. Other factors are also important in determining
whether police are effective, as discussed in the next Subpart.
C.

"CriminalAccountability":Police Effectiveness at Solving Crime

The classic measures of police effectiveness are missing several data points.
These classic measures include clearance rates, "reported crimes," and arrest
rates. 88 A clearance rate is an important-albeit flawed-measure of police
effectiveness. As previously discussed, clearance rates consider the proportion
of crimes reported to police that are followed by an arrest and referral to

prosecution. 89 Reported crimes consider how often people report crimes to
police and are important in determining the level of public trust in police. Arrest
rates are integral in determining clearance rates, as arrest is a prerequisite to
clearance. To be clear, there is currently no national systematic way that all three
of these data points are used to measure police performance. 90 These three
measures will be introduced to measure police effectiveness along with four

additional data points: known crimes, conviction rates, imprisonment rates, and
crime resolution rates. This constitutes the first attempt at creating a criminal
accountability measure that includes seven data points.

87. Id As evidence of the possible negative effects of clearing rape incidents by exceptional means,
the study cites an unfortunate incident involving a thirteen-year-old girl whose case was referred to and closed
by the Baltimore County Police Department. The department closed her case by exceptional means despite
police never interviewing the suspect or attempting to arrest him simply because the detective had not heard
back from the girl. The suspect went on to be accused of raping another underage girl in Wisconsin. Id
88.

See Sparrow, supra note 26, at 17-18.

89. Crimes cleared by exceptional means are also part of this consideration. These should be a small
number of crimes in which police are unable to make arrests for reasons out of their control. However, as
we see in Part IA, this is an exception that sometimes swallows the rule.
90.

See Jarvis & Regoeczi, supra note 39.
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Acknowledging up front that there is no perfect measure to judge police,
this Article undertakes the task of creating one that is better than the classic
measure. The term criminal accountability refers to the overall measure of
police effectiveness at solving crime. It attempts to consider the entire course
of a crime and in doing so considers seven data points. It considers what

happens before a crime is reported to police and after police clear a crime.
Criminal accountability considers all of the data from the time a crime occurs
(or is known to the public) to when a person is imprisoned or a crime is resolved
in an alternative way. Currently, we are not recording, in any nationally

coordinated way, the complete sequence of a crime. Police departments are
typically not considering at all the following four data points: known crimes,
conviction rates, imprisonment rates, and resolved crime rates. Two of these
measures are new ones-known crimes and resolved crimes. The next Subparts

consider each of the four measures in order.
1.

Known Crimes

Many crimes that occur will never result in police reports. Simply put, the
victim never reports the crime to police. These are what this Article refers to as

"known crimes." These crimes are discovered because people admit in
confidential surveys that they have been a victim of a particular crime in a given
91
year but never report these crimes to police. These national victims' surveys

may provide a better measure of how many crimes are actually known to have
2
occurred than the number of crimes reported to police.9 These surveys
demonstrate that quite a large percentage of crimes are not reported. The
intricacies of this reporting are discussed in Part II.A. We acknowledge as well

that some crimes may never be reported to anyone and remain unaccounted
for.

When a crime is not reported, it is important for police to consider why it
is not reported. The crimes reported to police are referred to as reported
crimes.9 3 There are many reasons why individuals may not report a crime to the

.

See OFF. JUST. PROGRAMS, DEPT OF JUST., DATA COLLECTION: NATIONAL CRIME
91.
VICTIMIZATION SURVEY (NCVS), https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=245.
92. While it is unclear whether NCVS or UCR numbers are more accurate, it may be assumed that
NCVS numbers provide a more accurate picture of crime. See Marvin E. Wolfgang, Uniform Crime Reports: A
CriticalAppraisal,111 U. PA. L. REv. 708, 715 (1963) ("Perhaps a more damaging and direct criticism of the
UCR is the fact that the number of crimes recorded as 'known to the police' may be only a proportion of the
crimes actually known to them.").
While the goal of the NCVS and UCR data is to provide an accurate picture of violent and
property crime in America, one needs to be mindful that they cover distinct subsets of crime...
NCVS counts of violent and property crime tend to be far higher than the UCR measures.
See also John J. Donohue, Comey, Trump, and the Puling Patternof Crime in 2015 and Beyond, 117 COLUM. L.
REv. 1297, 1304 (2017)
93.

See infra Part IlA for a complete discussion of reported crimes.
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police. The individual may: (1) fear that police will not address the problem; (2)
feel police are ineffective; 94 (3) fear retribution, blaming, or charges by police
for their own behavior; or (4) fear reporting a crime to police will somehow
make their situation or even the perpetrator's situation worse. 95 The victim of a
larceny, for instance, may not want the perpetrator of the crime to be arrested
but may just want her iPhone back. A rape victim who was using drugs before
the rape may not want to report the rape for fear that the police will file drug
charges against him. A study of violent crime between 1994 and 2010 revealed
that individuals who did not report their crimes to police dealt with them in
three main ways. The majority of individuals (between 30%-40%) dealt with
the crime independently, as they considered it a "personal matter." 96 Another
2 %
0 or so did not report the crime because the victim felt it was not important
enough to report to police. 97 And finally, about 30%-40% of individuals did

not report because they believed that police would not or could not help, feared
reprisal, or feared getting the offender in trouble if they reported. 98 We
acknowledge here that 100% reporting of crime to police is not our goal. Given
that some people do not report to police because they chose to address crimes
personally, it is possible that a portion of crimes may best be mediated or

resolved individually without the assistance of police. Still, it is important to
track the reasons people fail to report to police, particularly when individuals
fail to report because they fear police will not help or fear that reporting will
make their situation worse. The factors that go into why an individual does not
report a crime are important; if police understood the reasons, they may be able
to make improvements.
Police could potentially improve the way they handle crime or community
perceptions to increase reporting rates. When the public perceives police as a
part of the community, rather than an outside force, crime reporting becomes
more natural. 99 When individuals trust that police follow fair processes, they are

94. A 2006-2010 study demonstrated that, when it came to burglary, motor vehicle theft, and theft,
36% of people did not report to the police because they believed that the police could not or would not help.
LANGTON ET AL., supra note 41, at 4. Another 15% dealt with the crime in another way. Id
95. See id at 1-3; see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 20, at 30-31. Particularly in heavily policed, lowincome communities, victims may worry about what happens when the police get involved, and this could
be a major deterrent to reporting. This might have to do with police-community relationships, but it may
also have to do with different understandings of the criminal system and its costs.
96.

LANGTON ET AL., supra note 41, at 2.

97.

Id

98. Id The percentage of violent crime victimizations not reported, because the victim believed the
police would not or could not help, doubled from 1994 to 2010. Id
99. See Tom R. Tyler, From Harm Reduction to Community Engagement: Redefining the Goals of American
Po/icingin the Twenty-FirstCentury, 111 NW. U. L. REv. 1537, 1549 (2017) ("The police could use this discretion
to lower the rates of investigatory contact with the public, particularly the large portions of the public not
involved in serious criminal activity.").
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much more likely to report crimes to police.100 It is possible that changes in

police practice and policy could lead to more trust and in turn result in people
1 01 A desire for restitution rather than
feeling more comfortable to report crimes.

arrest and punishment may also be a reason why people do not turn to police
10 2
when a crime has been committed. Police using discretion not to arrest may
also improve reporting rates. Police should not be responsible for individuals'
choices not to report crimes or for their refusal to help convict perpetrators.
These situations should be accounted for. The focus of police should be on
systematically improving reporting numbers, which will increase when there is
more trust of police in a community. Improved police relationships should

eventually lead to more crime reporting and higher criminal accountability
overall.
Comparing known crime numbers with reported numbers helps validate
the accuracy of police reporting. There have been instances where police report
a crime in a way to make their community seem safer-by underrepresenting
03
violent crime or classifying a serious crime as a minor one.1 If we consider
both reported crimes and known crimes, this can be mitigated because we can
cross-check these crime reports to hold police accountable. Police may be less
likely to underreport violent crime if they expect that known crimes will be
considered alongside reported crimes. Police departments could also consider

100. Tom Tyler's research demonstrates that when communities believe that police follow fair
processes when exercising authority, individuals are more likely to cooperate with police. See Jason Sunshine
& Tom Tyler, The Role ofProcedural Justice and Legitimaqy in Shaping Pubc Supportfor PoLicing, 37 L. & SOC'Y REV.
513, 519-36 (2003) (explaining that procedural justice is the term given to represent the community's
perceptions of legitimacy, which is based primarily on concerns about the fairness of processes that police
follow when exercising authority); see also Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do
People Help the Po/ice Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 267 (2008) (interviewing
individuals both before and after their personal experiences with police, and finding empirical evidence
supporting their conclusion that "[c]ooperation increases not only when the public views the police as
effective in controlling crime and maintaining social order, but also when citizens see the police as legitimate
authorities").
101. See Anthony A. Braga & Desiree Dusseault, Can Homicide DetectiesImprove Homicide ClearanceRates?,
64 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 283, 305-06 (2018) (showing how, with interventions, Boston's clearance rate
improved between 10% and 20% over a few years); see also Anthony Williams, Poice Aren't Getting Better at
Solving Murders, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (June 26, 2017), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2017/06/policearent-getting-better-at-solving-murders/531642) (discussing Santa Ana's increase in homicide clearance from
28% in 1993 to 83% in 2012).
102. See R. Barry Ruback, The Benefits and Costs of Economic Sanctions: Consideringthe Victim, the Offender,
andSociety, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1791 (2015) ("[M]any scholars and practitioners alike support restitution
because it forces offenders to confront the harms they caused victims, makes them responsible for correcting
those harms, and gives them a sense of accomplishment when they have paid the restitution."). In that same
line of thinking, there is research that suggests "victims prefer restitution from the offender
overcompensation from the state because restitution means that the offender must acknowledge the harm
that was inflicted." Id; see alto Stephen P. Garvey, PunishmentasAtonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801,1846 (1999)
("Victims do indeed rightly desire ... restitution for the harm they've suffered.").
103. See Poston & Rubin, supra note 72; Poston et al., supra note 74; Bernstein & Isackson, supra note
75. Underreports of violent crimes are less likely to happen if we expect to compare NCVS data with police
reports.
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all of the reasons individuals do not report crimes to the police and work hard
to improve reporting numbers. Indeed, a victim is more likely to report a crime
if she believes that police can and will address it.104 Part II.B addresses the issue
of reported versus known crimes in more detail. For now, it is sufficient to
simply acknowledge that known crimes are an important indicator of police
effectiveness.
2.

Conviction Rates

A key aspect of measuring police effectiveness is tracking national rates of
conviction. While police are certainly not to be held singularly accountable for
conviction rates, they are a key piece of data for measuring police effectiveness.
In order to determine if arrest rates are accurate, it is best to simultaneously
consider conviction rates. As demonstrated in Part I.C, many police
departments have manipulated and fraudulently reported higher clearance
numbers than are accurate. 105 Police cannot manipulate convictions in quite the
same way because a person is either convicted of a crime or not. It is not like
clearance where police can use the exceptional means exception, 106 double
count clearances for a given year, 107 or claim that arrest warrants are equal to
clearance. 108 A conviction is something that only happens once for a particular
crime. Certainly police have less to do with conviction than prosecutors, 109 but
it is important to know how many police arrests lead to convictions.
There are two reasons to track convictions as a measure of police
performance. First, if police are pressured to arrest more individuals to increase
clearance rate numbers, the conviction rate in a jurisdiction will likely be much
lower than what is typical. 1 o If this is the case, it will be an indication that a

police department should evaluate arresting practices and policies to investigate
properly before an arrest. It can also indicate that the department is under too
much pressure from leadership to arrest individuals and that the department

104.

See LANGTON ET AL., supra note 41, at 8.

105.

See supra notes 70-79 (discussing Los Angeles and Chicago police departments).

106. This can be a major loophole for police to clear crimes that are not actually resolved. See Fahey,
supra note 80.
107. See Clarke, supra note 45. It is not possible to double count clearance rates if police have to
reconcile arrest, clearance, and conviction rates.
108.

See BOTrOMLEY & PEASE, supra note 15; FBI 2017, supra note 34.

109. Prosecutors' decisions and behavior are integral to criminal justice. For a broader discussion of
how prosecutors fit in criminal justice decision-making, see Shima B. Baughman, Subconstitutional Checks, 92
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1071,1108-21 (2017).
110. And yet there are also plenty of other reasons that conviction rates may vary by jurisdiction. For
instance, some jurisdictions require a guilty plea for diversion, and others do not. See Shaila Dwan & Andrew
W. Lehren, No Money, No Merry: After a Crime, The Price of a Second Chance, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/12/us/crime-criminal-justice-reform-diversion.html. Some
prosecutors' offices are more committed to convictions than others.
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may be over-arresting or not as careful in arresting the right individuals. Police
are not provided the best incentives when they fail to consider conviction rates.
When conviction (rather than clearance) is the goal, police concerns for Fourth
Amendment compliance are improved, especially in drug cases. 11 Focusing on
arrest, clearance, and conviction may reduce the current incentive in some police
1 2
Also, as
departments to arrest random individuals just to improve clearance.

with clearance rates, it is important to consider unique jurisdictional
characteristics-like workload or incident time-to ensure that police are
13
judged fairly on all of these measures.'
Second, wrongful convictions can result if police arrest without proper

evidence and prosecutors continue to convict based on the same flawed
evidence. The enormous pressure on police to arrest individuals-particularly
4
after a violent crime-can lead to wrongful convictions." It is important to
remember that crime is difficult to solve. Police are working hard and yet are
5
not solving most crimes." With this realization, there should be a decreased
emphasis on arrest and clearance to mitigate bad police incentives that result in

convicting the wrong people. The appropriate measurement should be to
convict a higher percentage of the individuals arrested and cleared so that
clearance is not the end goal. This is not to say that prosecutors should convict
all of the people police arrest or that they should increase arrest rates or even
conviction rates. However, in judging police, it is important to consider the

percentage of defendants convicted as compared to those arrested and cleared.
This percentage should be higher where police are careful in arresting the right
people.
3.

ImprisonmentRates

Imprisonment rates are also important in tracking overall criminal
accountability. Imprisonment rates have very little to do with police
effectiveness; however, in order to meaningfully track criminal accountability,
the final metric must be imprisonment. A smaller percentage of people who are

111.

See JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC

SOCIETY 253 (4th ed. 2011).
112. For discussions of arrests for the sake of improving clearance, including the Biscayne and Tulare
police departments, see GREENE, supra note 14; see also Roberts, supra note 56; SHERMAN & GLICK, supranote
60.
113. See Rabin, supra note 66. Police are not incentivized to conduct careful searches when they fail to
consider conviction rates. When conviction (rather than clearance) is the goal, police concerns for Fourth
Amendment compliance are improved. See Jerome H. Skolnick, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL- LAW
ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 253 (4th ed. 2011) (stating that Fourth Amendment compliance
is improved when both conviction and clearance are considered, especially in drug cases).
114.

Jennifer E. Lauren, Still Convicting the Innocent, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1473, 1492-94 (2012).

115.

See infra Part 1.B.
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convicted are imprisoned.' 1 6 In order to track the full course of a crime, it is
important to consider how many people end up imprisoned for each major
crime. This is the end of criminal accountability. I acknowledge here that police
have very little to do with whether a convicted person ends up with a prison
sentence. However, the number of people we imprison and for what crimes we

imprison them are important considerations in guiding broader public
conversations on who police should be arresting or holding accountable for
crimes. Further, whether people are imprisoned after they are convicted may in
some cases demonstrate the unnecessary nature of their convictions. This may
be contestable, but arguably, if a person did not need to serve prison time, what
purpose did it serve for them to be convicted of a crime? Or arrested? Could
police have dealt with the crime in an alternative way that did not result in a

formal record? One could certainly also argue that imprisonment often serves
no deterrent or retributive aim,1 7 and thus using it as often as we do is equally
unnecessary.118 Imprisonment numbers are key data points in criminal
accountability, though less directly relevant to police effectiveness.
4.

Crime Resolution Rates

A potentially important data point to track is an alternative way to solve

crimes, or "crime resolution rates." As discussed above, this Article defines
police effectiveness as crimes solved by conviction or by "resolution in an
alternative way." Criminal accountability does not require an arrest, and if police

are able to find the perpetrator and either mediate the dispute, send the
perpetrator for drug or mental health treatment, or otherwise settle the issue
between the perpetrator and victim, the case should be considered resolved.11 9
Police officers maintain discretion to resolve crimes in various ways,120 but this

116.

See infra Figure 4.

117.

This is a topic I will leave until another day. See MICHAEL H. TONRY, WHY PUNISH? How

MUCH?: A READER ON PUNISHMENT 29 (2011):

.

For [Kant, Hegel, and Bentham], proportionality in punishment was essential in a just system of
punishment. Kant and Hegel famously insisted that punishments be apportioned to the degree of
the offender's wrongdoing. Bentham's insistence on proportionality is less well known. His
proportionality principles[ [were] based on the premise that no more punishment should be
imposed than is absolutely necessary...
118. Seegenerally ALEX KARAKATSANIS, UNUSUAL CRUELTY: THE COMPLICITY OF LAWYERS IN THE
CRIMINAL INJUSTICE SYSTEM (2019).

119. Tyler, supranote 99, at 1549 ("[Police] can use diversionary approaches, such as directing people
toward counseling or support services and avoiding arrests whenever possible. Instead of arresting a mentally
ill person, for example, the police can take them to a mental health clinic.").
120. Rachel A. Harmon, WhyArrest?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 307, 346 (2016) (finding that "police officer[s]
can often prevent someone from continuing a crime by removing him from the scene of the incident briefly
rather than by an arrest"); Tyler, supra note 99, at 1549 ("[P]olice have huge amounts of discretion over how
they handle low-level crimes."); Christopher Cooper, Training Patrol Officers to Mediate Disputes, 69 FBI L.
ENFORCEMENT BULL. 7, 7 (2000) (noting that the use of mediation can "drastically reduce repeat calls for
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is just not measured in any meaningful way. For data tracking purposes, there
could be a category of "cases resolved" that measures all cases "resolved
without arrest" and potentially subcategories of crimes "resolved by mediation
or restitution" or "resolved through treatment." This way, cases in which
criminal accountability is achieved are accounted for-even if there was no
arrest. This Article does not provide a comprehensive list of ways police can
resolve crimes; it instead leaves this task to the creativity of particular police
departments and their individual community needs. A broader national
12
agreement on these categories is important for data tracking purposes. 1 The
only unifying theme of crimes resolved is that they are not resolved with
22

arrest.1
Many police departments have had success in resolving crimes using
123
Communities are better
methods that do not involve arrest and punishment.
24
As such, it is important
members.1
trusted
are
able to solve crimes when police
resolve such crimes.
to
ability
in measuring police performance to track police
If police are not arresting certain individuals after a report, it is possible they
are doing so to comply with a victim's wishes or because the officer is using

other methods to prevent future crime and appease both parties. Police
certainly exercise discretion and do not arrest all individuals who violate the
law. 125 This should be understood and accounted for-and to say it in another
way-police should not be penalized in measures of performance for instances
26
in which they resolve crimes without an arrest.1 None of these considerations
are currently accounted for in police performance.

of
service"). Further, evidence reveals that mediation "represents a substantive, not superficial, treatment
interpersonal disputes." Id
121. Potentially, the FBI, through the UCR, could ask local police for rates of criminal resolution
(without arrest).
122. There are certainly cases that may start with an arrest that police later resolve without clearance
or conviction. These numbers should also be tracked separately.
123. See, e.g., Aaron Chalfin & Justin McCrary, CriminalDeterrence:A Review of the Literature, 55 J. ECON.
LrTERATURE 5,19-23 (2017) (recognizing that the traditional approach by police after a crime was committed
was to arrest and punish, but there is a new trend towards a "proactive approach.") More recently, police are
place.
seeking out alternatives to punishment-alternatives that can prevent crime from occurring in the first
The goal is to lower crime by increasing communities' economic and social vitality. Id; see also Fahey, supra
note 82.
Tyler, supra note 99, at 1559:
For example, officers become more appreciative [that] ... in high-crime neighborhoods, almost
all of the residents are not involved in criminal activity. When officers deal primarily with a
neighborhood because they are responding to calls, they view the people in the neighborhood as
those who either need help or cause problems. They have little everyday contact with people who
are law-abiding and would potentially be willing to help the police.
125. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 20, at 23 (discussing a study revealing that police "exercised a great deal
of discretion in deciding whether or not to arrest and prosecute in situations in which there was ample
evidence that a criminal law had been violated").
124.

126.

See Fahey, supranote 80.
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By considering the entire cycle of a crime-from occurrence until
imprisonment or a different resolution-it is possible to deemphasize arrest
and clearance as the only way to solve a crime. A resolved case can be one where

a perpetrator receives treatment, a warning, or both parties agree to a
restitutionary punishment. When the only way to solve a crime is clearance or
conviction, police initiatives to resolve crimes in alternative ways are not
considered appropriately. If the focus is not simply on clearance, but also on

improving reporting rates and crime resolution rates, police may be incentivized
to think more broadly about how to earn community trust to improve reporting
and resolve crimes rather than simply arresting more people. 127
In sum, tracking criminal accountability numbers may help create a more
comprehensive measure of police effectiveness and avoid some of the
temptations to manipulate numbers that exist when examining clearance rates
alone. First, considering criminal victimizations not reported to police helps us
understand the number of crimes police never hear about and thus are unable
to address. Second, conviction rates at the state and federal level show that an
even smaller percentage of crimes that make up clearance rate numbers end in
convictions and give us a better understanding of how effective the police work
was leading to arrest. Imprisonment rates provide further insight on how many
offenders are ultimately held accountable. Finally, resolved crime rates track and
give credit to police for considering alternative ways to solve crimes. Collecting
national data and considering all relevant data points are critical to get an
accurate picture of crime trends, the relationship of communities with police,
and how effective police are at solving crime. 128 However, it is also important
to remember in tracking this data that individual police departments have
unique challenges that may make it difficult for them to solve crimes. 129 For this
reason, comparing police departments against themselves over time may be the
best way to track police performance. Even with careful measurements,
criminal resolution numbers may be subject to manipulation or fraud. 130
II. MEASURING CRIMINAL ACCOUNTABILITY
This Part undertakes the first attempt to empirically measure criminal
accountability. The extent to which we currently measure criminal
accountability is limited. It is important to acknowledge at the outset that this
measure of criminal accountability is incomplete for several reasons. First, there

127.

See MASLOV, supra note 27, at 2; Kennedy, supra note 42, at 56-57.

128. A uniform way to track between departments on the seven data points discussed here is needed
to get an accurate picture of crime and the effectiveness of police. See supranotes 49-54 and accompanying
text.
129.
130.

Considering unique police department factors is important. See supra notes 40-42.
These could be compared to crime victims resolution numbers for cross-verification. See, e.g.,

LANGTON ET AL.,

supra note 41,

at 9.
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is no national data on crimes resolved without arrest, which is a key datapoint
31
in measuring police performance.1 Second, there is no data on conviction and
imprisonment rates after 2006.132 Until 2006, even though these numbers were
not tracked together to measure police performance, we at least had national

data on known crimes, reported crimes, arrest rates, clearance rates, conviction
0 06
33
we lack data on
rates, and imprisonment rates.1 Unfortunately, post-2
our ability to
confounds
This
rates.
imprisonment
conviction rates and
effectively measure police performance. The first step to criminal accountability
is making sure all seven data points are tracked each year on a national level:

known crime, reported crime, arrest rates, clearance rates, conviction rates,
imprisonment rates, and crime resolution rates.
This empirical analysis begins with the question: What percentage of crimes
are reported to police? Part II.A considers crime reporting more carefully and
explores the discrepancy between known crimes and reported crimes. In simple
terms, it empirically demonstrates the large number of crimes that occur that
are not reported to police. This analysis covers almost fifty years of data. The
large number of unreported crimes is significant to consider in measuring police
effectiveness. Part II.B then delves into the numbers to see how effective police
are and have been for the last thirty years. It explores major crimes and how
often they occur (known crimes), how often they are reported (reported
134
Known
crimes), and how often they are followed by arrest or conviction.
conviction
and
rates,
clearance
rates,
arrest
of
crimes will inform measurement
rates in Part II.B.135 We operate under the assumption that known crimes get
us closer to determining true criminal accountability, that is to say, what
percentage of the time police are able to solve crimes. Considering all of these

measures helps provide a more comprehensive account of police effectiveness.
The first Subpart further articulates the case for why the full sequence of a
crime needs to be considered-particularly known crimes. Without considering
all of the crimes committed and comparing them to police reports, we may miss
up to half of the crimes committed.

A. Reported and Known Crimes
One of the classic metrics used to determine police effectiveness is reported
crime. Where there are higher crime rates in a given neighborhood, there is a

131.

See supra notes 81 and 100-101 for discussions of alternative ways to resolve crimes.

132.

See BUREAU OF JUST. STATs., DATA COLLECTION: NATIONAL JUDICIAL REPORTING PROGRAM

(NJRP), https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=241.
133.

Id

134. Although crime resolution by alternative means is also considered a key data measure in criminal
accountability, we currently do not have these numbers; therefore, this data measure is not tracked here.
135. These are referred to below in Part II.B 2, 4, 6, and 7 as true arrest, true clearance, true conviction,
and true accountability rates.
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presumption that the police are less effective. This reasoning is probably heavily
flawed, but I will not address that here. Police departments focus more on
reducing reports of serious crimes than on any other data measure. 136 Police

consider a

low reported rate of serious crime as a positive measure, one that

shows that police are controlling crime. 137 This may not be the case, however.
Indeed, reported crime numbers are missing a large category of known

crimes-crimes that occur but are simply not reported. Indeed, a jurisdiction
with low crime rates may actually be a lot more dangerous than it appears
because of high levels of known crimes.
There are two data sources used to obtain information on reported crimes.
Reported crimes are defined for the purposes of this Article as those where an
individual visits a police station and files a formal report. These crimes are
reported to individual police departments and then collected by the FBI each
year in the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). The UCR includes information
collected by the FBI about violent crime offenses (murder and nonnegligent

manslaughter, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault) and property crime
offenses (burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson). 138 The UCR
tracks reported crimes, clearance rates, and arrests. 139 Another source for
reported crimes is the National Criminal Victimization Survey (NCVS). The
NCVS is a self-reported survey that the Bureau of Justice Statistics administers
to determine crimes that are reported and not reported to police.1 40 The survey
asks individuals about the number and type of crimes they experienced during
the previous six months, and the crimes are classified by year. 141 The NCVS
collects information on nonfatal crimes including rape, robbery, aggravated
assault, larceny, and household property crimes (burglary and motor-vehicle
theft). 142 Each victimization, according to the survey, represents one person or

136. Sparrow, supra note 26, at 2 ("[R]eductions in the number of serious crime reports tend[] to
dominate many departments' internal and external claims of success, being the closest thing available to a
genuine crime-control outcome measure.").
137.

Id

138. FBI, 2018 (Sept. 2019), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2018/crime-in-the-u.s.-2018/topicpages/about- (About CIUS).
139.

Id.

140.

BUREAU JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE U.S.: 1973-78 TRENDS iii (Dec. 1980),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvus78t.pdf ("This report presents information on trends in crime
rates from 1973 through 1978, using data obtained from the National Crime Survey... . Since its inception
in 1972, the National Crime Survey has been conducted for the Department ofJustice by the U.S. Bureau of
the Census."); RACHEL E. MORGAN & BARBARA A. OUDEKERK, DEP'T OF JUST., CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION, 2018 2 (Sept. 2019), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvl8.pdf.

141.

MORGAN & OUDEKERK, supra note 140, at 2 ("Crimes are classified by the year of survey and

not by the year of the crime."); BUREAU JUST. STATS., DEP'T OF JUST., DATA COLLECTION: NATIONAL

CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY (NCVS), https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=245 ("Each
year, data are obtained from a nationally representative sample of about 240,000 interviews on criminal
victimization, involving 160,000 unique persons in about 95,000 households. Persons are interviewed on the
frequency, characteristics, and consequences of criminal victimization in the United States.").
142.

BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., supra note 141.
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one household affected by a crime, so that each household is counted as having
a single victim.143 The NCVS has reported victimization data from 1972144 until
the latest survey in 2018.145 Both of these sources provide information on
crimes reported to police. The numbers from the UCR and the NCVS are often
146
demonstrating the importance of checking
close but not an exact match,
147
definitions in a particular year and being careful in relying on exact numbers.
The UCR and the NCVS also collect data on different crimes. For example, the
NCVS violent crime classifications include rape or sexual assault, 148 robbery,
149
aggravated assault, and simple assault. The UCR violent crime figures include
151
150
These
robbery, and aggravated assault.
the offenses of murder, rape,
different definitions provide a challenge, but we can still directly compare the
UCR and the NCVS reported crimes for robbery and aggravated assault and
use both data sources to check each other.
A known crime is one where a crime occurs but is not reported to police.
52
These crimes are tracked yearly by the NCVS.1 It is important to consider
known crimes carefully in determining how they affect police effectiveness. The
only yearly national source for known crimes is the NCVS as the UCR does not
track this information.
Known crime numbers-like any reporting numbers-come with an
important caveat. The NCVS estimates are not perfect, as individuals may
misrepresent information in reports. As indicated above, known crime numbers
differ meaningfully from reported crime numbers. These numbers have to be
considered carefully because, arguably on the one hand, some may not admit

143.

MORGAN & OUDEKERK, supra note 140, at 21.

144.

BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., supra note 140, at

145.

MORGAN & OUDEKERK, supra note

iii.

140.

146. The definition of rape has changed dramatically over the years. See Appendix and notes 7, 81,
and 83 for some comparisons.
147. There are many reasons why UCR and NCVS reporting numbers may not match in a given year.
The definitions of crimes differ slightly between the FBI (UCR) and the Bureau ofJustice Statistics (NCVS).
MORGAN & OUDEKERK, supra note 140, at 7. These definitions have also changed over time. The NCVS
also changed its method of collection in 2006 and 2016, so it is hard to compare crime estimates from year
to year. See BUREAU OFJUST. STATS., supra note 140. However, 2006 is also the latest year for state conviction
data, so it is used to get a general sense of criminal accountability over the years. The actual numbers of
victimizations reported have varied through the years, and the survey itself has been redesigned multiple times
since its conception. See, e.g., LISA BASTIAN, DEP'T OF JUST. CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 1993 6 (May 1995),

https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/Cv93.pdf; MICHAEL RAND & SHANNAN CATALANO, CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION, 2006 7-11 (Dec. 2007), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv06.pdf.
148.

MORGAN & OUDEKERK, supra note 140, at 1-2.

149.

Id at 4; infra Table 1.

150. FBI, 2018, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2018/crime-in-the-u s.-2018/topic-pages/
clearances (note murder, rape).
151. FBI, 2018, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2018/crime-in-the-u.s.-2018/topic-pages/
clearances (note robbery, aggravated assault).
152.

See, e.g., JENNIFER L. TRUMAN

&

RACHEL E. MORGAN,

DEP'T OF JUST., CRIMINAL

VICTIMIZATIONS, 2015 4 (revised Mar. 2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv15.pdf.
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crimes even to the NCVS. Therefore, such crimes may not ever be accounted
for, and the total crime numbers could actually be a lot higher. On the other
hand, someone can report a crime to the NCVS that has no basis in fact without
any of the repercussions that may exist when falsely reporting a crime to
police.1 53 This Article therefore uses NCVS numbers with the assumption that
there is a percentage of false reports and that some individuals who were victims
of crimes never report such crimes to anyone, including the NCVS. There is no
way to prove how many false reports, exaggerated reports, or nonreports exist
in known crime numbers or whether they may balance each other out or skew
numbers in one direction or another. While NCVS numbers are far from
perfect, they may be the best source for national data on how many crimes
occur each year in America.
Reported crimes only capture a small portion of crimes that occur each
year. Typically, "[o]nly about half of the violent crimes and a third of the
property crimes that occur in the United States each year are reported to
police."1 54 According to the most recent NCVS report in 2018, individuals only
reported 42.6% of violent victimizations and only 34.1% of property crime
victimizations to police.1 55 Underreporting is a larger problem for rape as
compared to other violent crimes. From current research, victims claim they do

not report because they do not believe that it will be responded to appropriately
or that anything will be done about it.156 This is especially the case with sexual
assault,1 57 but the principles apply to other crimes.
In the last fifty years, only about half of violent crimes were reported to
police.1 58 Figure 1 represents reporting to police of violent victimizations in the

153.

See supra note 147 for a comparison of NCVS and UCR numbers.

154. John Gramlich, Most Violent and Propery Crimes in the U.S. Go Unsolved, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Mar. 1,
2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/03/01/most-violent-and-property-crimes-in-the-u-sgo-unsolved (noting that "among violent crimes, just a third of rapes and sexual assaults were reported to
police in 2015").
155. MORGAN & OUDEKERK, supra note 140, at 8 tbl.5. It may be interesting to note that serious
violent crime is reported to the police 49.9% of the time. Serious violent crime does not include simple
assault. Id at 3.
156.

Gramlich, supranote 154.

157. Carter Sherman, One Violent Crime in the U.S. Keeps Trending Up While Others Drop:Rape, VICE (Sept.
30, 2019), https://www.vice.com/enus/article/a35nde/one-violent-crime-in-the-us-keeps-trending-upwhile-others-drop-rape. The Bureau of Justice Statistics released its National Crime Victimization survey
which estimated 734,630 people had been raped or sexually assaulted in 2018. Id. A spokesperson for the
National Sexual Violence Resource Center stated:
We have to keep in mind the criminal court system is a reflection of the communities that it
operates in. It's real easy to sit on the outside and say the police need to do better or the
prosecutors need to do better but ultimately they can't and they won't if we don't all do better.
They need to believe that a jury in that community will convict.
Id See also supra Subpart I.C.1.
158. It would be more accurate to create a discount rate for police reporting. There is a good
percentage of people who do not report to police for personal reasons, not because they believe police are
ineffective or will not help the situation. All of these reporting numbers should be discounted for each of the

78AB\'lA

78

LA\\' REVmL\

|Vol. 72:1:47

last forty-four years according to NCVS reports.159 It demonstrates that in most
years, less than half of overall violent crime is reported to the police. Individuals
report robberies and aggravated assaults between 50% to 7 0 % of the time.
There is a lot more fluctuation with rape; it ranges from 2 5 % to nearly 60%
reporting in some years. In 2018, the most recent year the NCVS provides
data, 11 roughly half of all serious violent crimes-rape, aggravated assault, and
robbery-were reported to police.16 1 Overall, about half of violent crimes are

reported to police.
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Reporting numbers are not better for property crimes. Figure 2
demonstrates that in the last fifty years less than 40% of property crimes were
reported to police.16 2 The NCVS property data demonstrates a remarkable
degree of consistency over the years, with notable drops in reporting of
property crimes in 1992 and 2010. Some of these changes in reporting numbers

years discussed for a more accurate determination of police effectiveness. Police effectiveness is only
implicated when people do not report to police for nonpersonal reasons. However, surveys are not perfect,
and "personal reasons" can involve a lack of trust in police. Seegeneraly LANGTON ET AL., supranote 41, at 2
(discussing the reasons people do not report serious crimes to police).
159.

See infra Appendix Figure 1 for sources.

160.

MORGAN & OUDEKERK, supranote 140, at 8 tbl.5.

161.

Id

162.

See infra Figure 2 and Appendix Figure 1 n.97 for sources.
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may be due to changes in definitions over the years. 163 People are most likely to
report motor vehicle theft as they have 70%-80% reporting rates. Larcenies are
least likely to be reported to police, ranging between 20%-30% reported to
police. Overall, nearly 30%-40% of property crimes are reported to police.
Comparing known crimes (from the NCVS) and reported crimes (from the
UCR) helps us determine whether people are turning to police and why they
may not be. 164 If we know how many crimes are not reported to police and that
certain types of crimes are reported less than others, we can determine how to
address the underlying issues with police. Also, examining the dips in reporting
for certain types of crime is helpful in targeting improvement in reporting. For
instance, national police saw a dip in reporting of motor vehicle theft from 2014
(83%) to 2015 (69%).165 If this was not caused by definitional changes (e.g.,
including snowmobiles with motor vehicles in one year and not in the next),
then police can know that there may be gaps they can address within their
communities. It may also be helpful for police to examine why only about 50%60% of burglaries are reported to police nationally. Would it improve
community safety or trust in the police to know about the remaining burglaries?
Why are these individuals not turning to police with these crimes?

Understanding why people are not reporting crimes is critical to improving
police effectiveness. Police departments typically do not consider known crimes

but considering these numbers and why people are not reporting might improve
reporting rates.

163. See Appendix and notes 34, 82, and 140 for discussions on differences in motor vehicle theft
definitions.
164. Similar Figures considering FBI reported offenses and NCVS known crimes (Figure 2 and Figure
3) are reported in the Appendix.
165. TRUMAN & MORGAN, supra note 152, at 4, 6 tbl.4. The differences in reporting were partly due
to different definitions by the UCR and NCVS. Id at 4; see also RACHEL E. MORGAN & GRACE KENA, DEP'T
OFJUST., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATIONS, 2016 7 tbl.4 (revised Oct. 2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/cvl6.pdf.
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Figure 2 - Percentage of Property Victimization

Reported to Police 1973-2018 (NCVS)
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The overall reporting numbers in the last thirty years show that in most years,
less than half of crimes that occur are reported to police. Figure 3 below
demonstrates overall crime reporting rates in the last thirty years using NCVS
and UCR data. 166 The Appendix includes data for individual reporting numbers
67 One of the biggest
by year for selected years in the last thirty years.1
fluctuations in reporting numbers over the years may be as a result of changes
78 73
. % of rapes/sexual assaults
in the definition and reporting of rape. In 1990,
168
7 32
Part of the reason
were reported, while in 2018 only 1 . % were reported.
for such a low percentage reported in 2018 may be due to a drastic increase in
the number of victimizations reported in the NCVS. In 2018, 734,630
victimizations were reported compared to 284,350 in 2014 and 393,980 in
2017.169 Either there were dramatically more sexual assaults in 2018, or the

166.

In general, percentages were calculated as follows: FBI Number of Offenses Reported / NCVS

Number Known = Percent Reported. See infra Appendix Table 4 for sources and calculations, starting at
note 65.

167. See infra Appendix Tables 1-3 for data on years 1990, 2006, and 2018. Tables for 1995, 1998,
2004, 2009, and 2014 are on file with the author.
See infra Table 1.
MORGAN & OUDEKERK, supra note 140, 4 tbl.1, 6 tbl.4. The NCVS did not give an explanation
169.
for the sudden increase in 2018. In addition, while the number of rape/sexual assault offenses reported
according to the FBI usually ranged from 70,000 to 80,000, in 2014 the number reported jumped to 99,765
168.
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"#MeToo" movement and policing initiatives seem to have influenced the
willingness of individuals to both report sexual assault to police and in NCVS
surveys. 170 The major fluctuations in rape reporting demonstrate that cultural
shifts in relation to crime may affect reporting. Again, if police departments
considered known and reported crimes, they would be able to track dips in

crime reporting and attempt to improve them.

Figure 3 - Percent of Victimizations Reported to Police
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To get a more detailed look at where reporting problems lie, it is helpful to
look at individual crime reporting over the last thirty years. Table 1 below
demonstrates the percentage of major crimes reported to the police over a
sample of years from 1990 to 2018. From 1990 to 2018, the total percent of
crimes reported for this collection of crimes ranged from 47.21% in 1990 to
49.04% in 2018. The percentage of crimes reported to police has remained
consistently below 50% for the last thirty years. Slight changes can result due to

and then jumped in 2018 again to 127,258. FBI, 2018 tbl.25, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-theu.s/2018/crime-in-the-u s.-2018/topic-pages/tables/table-25. However, these increases were not as large as
the changes in the numbers reported to the NCVS, meaning the percent reported decreased overall. The
change in definition over time may be a reason for these changes in numbers, rather than an actual increase
in the number of rapes/sexual assaults committed.
170. See Deborah Tuerkheimer, UnderenforcementAs UnequalProtection, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1287, 1329-30
(2016) (noting that, after new police policies and procedures were implemented, "[m]ore rape victims were
apparently disclosing the crime to police and choosing to pursue their complaint" (footnotes omitted)); Karen
Oehme et. al., A Deficieng in Addressing Campus Sexual Assault The Lack of Women Law Enforcement Officers, 38
HARV. J. L. & GENDER 337, 357 (2015) ("[L]arge-scale studies indicate that the presence of women law
enforcement officers actually increases the number of reported sexual assault cases.").
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dips or spikes in reporting, but overall, reporting of crime rarely reached above
50% in the selected years between 1990 to 2018. Overall reporting numbers,
except for 2009, demonstrate a less than 50% reporting rate for all crimes and
much less than 50% in 1998 and 1995. Murder is not included in this analysis
because the NCVS does not gather data on murder, and it is assumed that the
murder reporting rate to police agencies matches the known number of

murders.
Table 1 - Percent of Crimes Reported to Police

1 71

1990

1995

1998

2004

2006

2009

2014

2018

47.21%

37.22%

37.15%

46.44%

47.69%

54.88%

49.59%

49.04%

78.73%

24.25%

21.37%

31.65%

29.54%

60.57%

35.09%

17.32%

Robbery

55.60%

44.0 %

39.59%

53.47%

54.08%

65.97%

44.84%

45.49%

Aggravated
Assault

65.9%

49.31%

44.41%

51.36%

56.15%

85.08%

61.78%

70.44%

LarcenyTheft

38.49%

30.94%

31.81%

40.63%

40.70%

47.46%

45.08%

46.59%

Burglary

59.71%

45.97%

44.14%

51.62%

55.26%

62.45%

52.57%

42.75%

83.14%

78.73%

86.51%

101.45%

109.13%

97.06%

119.72%

131.24%

Total
Rape and

Sexual
Assault

0

MotorVehicle
Theft

So far, we have learned that the number of known crimes is much higher
72
than the number of reported crimes-often double.1 In other words, over the
last thirty-year period, individuals are not reporting half of the crimes that are
occurring. For violent crime, reporting to police has fluctuated dramatically
over the years for rape and fluctuated in smaller amounts for other types of

violent crime. For property crimes, reporting rates have been between 30% and
40% in most years. Given the low reporting rates, it may not be accurate to base
clearance and conviction numbers on just the proportion of crimes reported.
People often do not report crimes largely because they fear that police either
173
It is possible for
cannot help or will respond inappropriately to a situation.
community. If
the
of
trust
by
improving
numbers
police to improve reporting

police use discretion not to arrest in some instances, reporting may increase,

171. In general, percentages were calculated as follows: FBI Number of Offenses Reported / NCVS
Number Known = Percent Reported. See infra Appendix Table 4 for sources and calculations, starting at
note 65.
172.

See Figures 1-3, Table 1, and Appendix for further support.

173.

See supra notes 94-104.
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and police may be able to better assist individuals in these communities. If
police improve in solving crimes, this could also improve reporting. The point
is, if the public perceives that police might be able to solve the crime or respond
appropriately, they may be more likely to report a crime. If we want a full picture
of how effective police are at their jobs, we need to determine whether
individuals in the community trust police enough to report major crimes to
them. Known crimes are critical in this determination. This Article
acknowledges that police do not have ultimate control over known crimesand never will-but we also find this a useful measure to examine whether
police can improve over time. Presumably, the more crimes police know about,
the more crimes they may be able to solve. As such, in order to have a
comprehensive look at policing, we must take into account as many crimes as
are committed in all of the data points. This is why the next Subpart carefully
reviews the crime numbers-with true rates considering the known crimes

rather than just the reported crimes.
B.

True CriminalAccountability Rates

To understand what percentage of offenders police are able to arrest, clear,
convict, and hold accountable, we need to first understand the important
consideration missing from all of the standard calculations. For instance, the
standard way to evaluate arrest rates considers the number of crimes reported
to the police and the arrests based on those reports. The standard way to
consider clearance of a crime is by comparing reported crimes to police with
the number of individuals arrested and turned over for prosecution or cleared
by exceptional means. Similarly, conviction rates typically consider the number

of crimes reported to police compared to the number convicted for that
particular crime. This is the standard way to calculate the major data metrics.
All of the standard calculations are determined by starting with reported crimes.
Instead, this Article argues that to determine true criminal accountabilityor how effective police are at solving crime-we should begin with known
crimes. The reasons why people are not reporting crimes to the police are
important ones. Just looking at the range of rapes reported to police and to the
NCVS in the last thirty years will demonstrate this; individuals are much more
likely to report rape to police and to victims surveys depending on the climate
toward victims in that particular year.1 74 A large portion of individuals do not

report to police because they fear reprisal or that police cannot address the
crime.175 It is possible that known crime numbers could be more accurate than
UCR reporting numbers because the NCVS collects numbers without any

174. See supra notes 169-170 and supporting text for further discussion of the changes in reporting
due to the #MeToo movement
175.

See supra notes 94-104 for further discussion.

84

ALABAMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:1:47

identifying information and without any potential repercussions upon report.
These numbers have always been higher than UCR numbers. It is well known
that over the years many crimes are reported to the NCVS that are not reported
to police.1 76 In considering police effectiveness, the NCVS numbers are most
177
likely a more accurate count of total crime.
Even before we get to any calculations of these crimes, it is important to
recognize that the total crime picture is unknown and is likely bleaker than it
may seem. Many offenses are not even tallied in the crime data. These crimes
are among the ones we know about: identity theft, sexual exploitation,
ransomware attacks, drug purchases over the dark web, human trafficking for
78
sex or labor, revenge porn, credit card fraud, and child exploitation.1 To many
observers, motor vehicle theft and burglary may seem like relics that have been
replaced with a modern era of crime that takes place exclusively on the internet.
While it may be the case that crimes have changed, unfortunately these new
crimes are not fully captured in law enforcement's reporting system. Thus, an
observer may be surprised to discover that not only do police lack a handle on
traditional crime, but they are often even worse at solving digital crime. The
lack of systematic national tracking for digital crimes may be part of the
problem. 179 A police department focused on keeping clearance rates high may
not focus on digital crimes that are not tracked nationally. It is also difficult to
keep track of cybercrimes because they can become easily outdated and change
quickly. Nonetheless, it is important in the next sections of this Subpart to keep
in mind that we are not moving towards a full picture of crime because so many
newer crimes are not accounted for. The clearance rate and accountability rates
for identity theft, credit card fraud, and revenge porn, for instance, will be much
worse than those for larceny and rape, which are considered below. These
crimes are not considered here due to a lack of data but are vital to consider
180
given the serious costs of these crimes to society and the individual victims.

176.

See supranotes 93-104.

177.

Consider the caveat for known crime numbers. See supra notes 152-153 and accompanying text.

178. Al Baker, An Iceberg'of Unseen Crimes: Many Cyber Offenses Go Unreported, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/05/nyegion/cyber-crimes-unreported.html.
See id
180. Mary Anne Franks, "Revenge Pom"Reform:A Viewfrom the FrontLines, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1251, 126164 (2017) (describing harm from revenge porn with privacy implications, impact on employment and identity,
significant emotional distress and suicidal thoughts, and harassment); Jennifer Lynch, Identiy Theft in
Cyberspace: Crime ContraiMethods and Their Effectiveness in Combating PhishingAttacks, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
259, 263-64 (2005):
[Identity theft] []osses average $10,200 per identity theft case for businesses and $1,180 for
consumers; however, these costs fail to depict the full scope of the problem. In addition to
monetary losses, victims report suffering non-monetary harm including emotional distress from
feeling personally violated by the theft, being harassed by creditors and collection agencies for
debts they did not incur, being turned down for a loan or new account, or even being arrested for
crimes committed by someone else in their name (footnotes omitted).
179.
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However, to get a baseline of police effectiveness, we will consider the
traditional major crimes.
The remainder of this Subpart calculates "standard" and "true" rates for

arrest, clearance, and conviction rates. Standard rates rely on reported crimes,
and true rates rely on known crimes. Standard rates are demonstrated for
comparison purposes in Parts II.C.1 (arrest), II.C.3 (clearance), and II.C.5
(conviction). The known crimes will help calculate the "true rates" in Parts
II.C.2 (arrest), II.C.4 (clearance), and II.C.6 (conviction). Given the caveats

above, it is important to recognize that true arrest and true conviction numbers
may not actually represent the number of crimes committed but arguably come
closer than the number reported to police.181 The known crimes are also the
basis of the overall criminal accountability numbers reported in Part II.C.7.
Criminal accountability encompasses all of the important data measures that
will help us judge the effectiveness of police-number of crimes known,
reported, true arrest rates, true clearance rates, true conviction rates, and, when
there is data for it, crimes resolved without arrest. The criminal accountability
numbers below take us through almost the entire course of a crime starting at
arrest and following until conviction.18 2
1.

StandardArrest Rates

Standard arrest rates consider the number of arrests based on the number
of crimes reported to police (FBI UCR numbers).1 83 For example, in 1990,
police arrested individuals for 15.98% of all reported crimes.1 84 For 1995 and
1998, the total standard percent arrested went up to 2 4 .4 9 %1 85 and 25.72%,

Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theog of Data-Breach Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV.
737, 756 (2018) (discussing the compelling harms resulting from data breaches); Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Identity
Theft: Making the Known Unknowns Known, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 97, 102-03 (2007) (echoing reputational
harm and emotional distress).
181.

See supra notes 103-110 for further discussion.

182. Arguably, this Part does not provide full criminal accountability numbers. Part III.B traces all the
way to imprisonment for full criminal accountability. See infra Figure 4.
183. Calculation: Standard Percent Arrested = FBI Number Arrested / FBI Number Reported.
According to the FBI Report:
The FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program counts one arrest for each separate instance
in which a person is arrested, cited, or summoned for an offense .... Because a person may be
arrested multiple times during a year, the UCR arrest figures do not reflect the number of
individuals who have been arrested; rather, the arrest data show the number of times that persons
are arrested, as reported by law enforcement agencies to the UCR Program.
FBI, 2018 (Fall 2019), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2018/crime-in-the-u.s.-2018/topic-pages/
persons-arrested.
184. See infra Appendix Table 1 - 1990 (Part I) for sources and calculations. The same calculation
method is used for all years.
185.
FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 1995 199 tbl.25, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-theu.s/1995/95sec3.pdf [hereinafter FBI, 1995] (Crime Index Offenses Cleared); FBI, 1995 208 tbl.29,
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/1995/95sec4.pdf (Persons Arrested).
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respectively.1 86 In 2004 and 2006, the total standard percent arrested was
88
21.98%187 and 21.16%, respectively.1 In 2009, the total percent arrested went

up slightly to 24.52%,189 and in 2014, it was 23.76%.190 In 2018, the standard
percent arrested overall was 21.55%.191 Overall, standard arrest rates in the last
thirty years range from a low of 15% in 1990 to about 20%-25% in most
years.19 2 This is certainly a revelation to most people who would have never
thought that, on a good year, police only make arrests in 2 5 % of the reported
cases. The next Subpart considers true arrest rates that consider the arrests of

known crimes, not just reported crimes.
2.

True Arrest Rates

The true arrest rates below consider the known crimes compared to the
193
These numbers will demonstrate that police are
arrest rates for those crimes.
solving even less crimes than we may have thought in the last Part. In fact,
overall, a 10% arrest rate is typical for the major crimes combined-murder,
rape/sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault, larceny-theft, burglary, and
motor vehicle theft.

FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 1998 201 tbl.25, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the186.
u.s/1998/98sec3.pdf [hereinafter FBI, 1998] (Crime Index Offenses Cleared); FBI, 1998 210 tbl.29,
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/1998/98sec4.pdf (Persons Arrested).

.

187. FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2004 tbl.25, https://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_04/offenses_
cleared/table_25.html [hereinafter FBI, 2004] (Percent of Offenses Cleared by Arrest or Exceptional Means);
29
FBI, 2004 tbl.29 (updated Feb. 17, 2006), https://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_04/personsarrested/table_
html (Estimated Number of Arrests).
188.

See infra Appendix Table 2 - 2006 (Part I) for sources.

189. FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2009 tbl.25, https://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/data/
table_25.html [hereinafter FBI, 2009] (Percent of Offenses Cleared by Arrest or Exceptional Means); FBI,
2009 tbl.25, https://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/data/table_29.html (Estimated Number of Arrests).
See FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2014 tbl.25, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the190.
u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/tables/table-25 [hereinafter FBI, 2014]; FBI, 2014 tbl.29, https://ucr.fbi.
gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/tables/table-29.
See infra Appendix Table 3 - 2018 (Part I).
192. See infra Appendix Table 1 -1990, Table 2 - 2006, and Table 3 - 2018 for standard percentages.
Full charts for 1995, 1998, 2004, 2009, and 2014 are on file with the author.
193. Note that murder has the same percent arrested for standard and true because there is no NCVS
Known Total for murder.
191.
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Table 2 - Percent of Crimes Known Where Police Make Arrest
(True Percent Arrested)' 9 4
1990

1995

1998

2004

2006

2009

2014

2018

7.54%

9.12%

9.55%

10.21%

10.09%

13.46%

11.78%

10.57%

Non-Negligent
Manslaughter

78.06%

115.86%

132.86%

98.57%

89.88%

93.78%

82.08%

80.95%

Rape and
Sexual Assault

23.77%

10.18%

9.34%

10.19%

9.01%

17.00%

7.39%

3.43%

Robbery

11.86%

15.05%

13.63%

17.68%

17.65%

23.74%

14.21%

15.38%

Aggravated
Assault

23.55%

30.19%

30.27%

30.88%

33.06%

51.16%

34.13%

37.41%

Larceny-Theft

6.01%

6.95%

7.38%

8.05%

7.57%

11.40%

10.53%

8.59%

Burglary

6.63%

8.01%

8.16%

8.19/

8.61%

9.55%

7.95%

6.77%

Motor Vehicle
Theft

8.56%

11.60%

13.24%

13.89%

13.86%

11.12%

12.80%

17.16%

Total

Murder and

Overall, the true percent arrested stayed in the 10% range largely between
1990 to 2018. Even with some fluctuations of crimes known through surveys,
police still made similar proportions.of arrests from year to year. For instance,
while the number of arrests has remained consistently in the 20,000 to 30,000
range for rape/sexual assault, the number of victimizations reported to NCVS
has fluctuated.1 95 In 1990, there were an estimated 130,260 rapes committed. 196

In 2009 and 2014, there were 125,920 and 284,350, respectively.

97

But in 2018,

there were more than double that-an estimated 734,630 rapes/sexual assaults
committed. 198 While the numbers of arrests remained consistent, the estimated
number of rapes/sexual assaults has skyrocketed, meaning the percent arrested

194. See infra Appendix Table 5 for detailed sources and calculations. In general, percentages were
calculated by taking FBI Number of Estimated Arrests / NCVS Total Crime = % of Crimes Known Where
Police Make Arrest.
195.

See infra Tables 1-3.

196.

See

197.

JENNIFER L. TRUMAN, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2010

infra Appendix Table

1 - 1990 (Part I).

tbl.1

(Sept.

2011), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv10.pdf; JENNIFER L. TRUMAN & LYNN LANGTON,
BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2014 tbls. 1 & 3 (Sept. 2015), https://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/cvl4.pdf.
198.

See infra Appendix Table 3 - 2018 (Part I).
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199
The example of sexual assault simply
has actually fallen for this crime.
known crimes, and considering
considering
of
demonstrates the importance
crimes individually in measuring police performance. In just looking at overall

true arrest numbers, it would appear that police have remained consistent in
their arrest rates. Yet, considering individual crimes, it looks like police only
arrested 3% of known rapes in 2018 but arrested 23% in 1990. The number of

crimes known and reported for individual crimes are both important in
measuring how effective police are at solving crimes.

3.

StandardClearance Rate

The typical method of determining the number of crimes cleared by police
200
Under the UCR, the FBI will only count
is through using the UCR numbers.
an offense as cleared for statistical purposes if it is either cleared by arrest or by
201
The FBI finds the percentage of crimes cleared by arrest
exceptional means.
or exceptional means by dividing the number of offenses cleared by the number
202
So, of offenses reported, an estimate of the percent of
of offenses reported.
criminals that are not cleared by arrest or exceptional means may provide an
203
initial estimate of the percent of offenders who go free.
Turning to standard clearance rates in 1990, the overall percent cleared was
21.25%.204 In 1995 and 1998, the standard clearance rates were similar at

It is possible that the #MeToo movement has been partially responsible for this recent
199.
development, either in increasing the likelihood that these crimes are properly categorized or in increasing
the likelihood that individuals feel comfortable reporting such crimes. Also of note is that robbery
in 2018.
experienced a general trend upward in the percent of arrest from 11.86% in 1990 to 15.38%
Larceny2018.
in
37.41%
at
ended
and
2009,
in
51.16%
to
1990,
in
Aggravated assault jumped from 23.55%
6.01%
theft mostly stayed the same over the period of 1990-2018. The percent arrested for larceny went from
in 1990 up to 11.4% in 2009, then back down to 8.59% in 2018. Burglary stayed the same over the years from
6.63% in 1990 to 6.77% in 2018. Finally, arrests for motor vehicle theft rose steadily from 8.56% in 1990, to
sources
13.89% in 2004, to 17.16% in 2018. See infra Appendix Table 5 - True Percent Arrested for detailed
and calculations.
200. See FBI, 2018, supra note 138.
201. FBI, 2018, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/
clearances (Clearance).

2

018/crime-in-the-u.s.-2018/topic-pages/

202. FBI, 2018 tbl.25, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2018/crime-in-the-u.s.-2018/tables/table25/table-25.xls/@@template-layout-view?override-view=data-declaration (data declaration).
203. This can be calculated by subtracting the "percent cleared" from 100% to give us "percent not
cleared."
It was 67.20% for murder, 51.80/s for rape/sexual assault, 24.30% for robbery, 56.50% for
204.
theft. See
aggravated assault, 20.30% for larceny-theft, 13.50% for burglary, and 13.90% for motor vehicle
clearance rates.
infra Appendix Table 1 - 1990 (Part II) as an example of how to calculate overall standard
Individual clearance rates come straight from the FBI Tables for 2006 and 2018 and are also in the Appendix,
and 1995, 1998, 2004, 2009, and 2014 Tables are on file with the author. See also BUREAU OF JUST. STATS.,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS, 1992 450 tbl.4.19, https://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/scis
92.pdf.
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21.170205 and 21.32%, respectively. 2 06 In 2004 and 2006, the overall standard
percentages cleared were 19.94%207 and 19.26%, respectively. 2 08 In 2009 and
2014, the overall percentages cleared were 22.04%209 and 23.61%,
respectively. 210 The overall standard clearance rate, comparing total crimes
reported to police with clearance rates in 2018, is 21.64%, meaning 78.36% of
crimes are not cleared. 211 It is interesting to note here that standard clearance
rates are very similar to standard arrest rates-all between 20% to 25%. Simply
put, police cleared almost as many crimes as they arrested in most years. 212
However, the true clearance rates are lower, as discussed in the next Subpart.

205. See infra Appendix Table 1 - 1990 (Part II) as an example of how to calculate overall standard
clearance rates. Individual clearance rates come straight from the FBI. See FBI, 1995, supra note 185, at tbl.25.
Turning to individual crimes, 64.80% of murders, 51.10% of rape/sexual assault, 24.70% of robberies,
55.70% of aggravated assault, 19.60% of larceny-theft, 13.40% of burglary, and 14.10% of motor vehicle theft
were cleared.
206. See infra Appendix Table 1 - 1990 (Part II) as an example of how to calculate overall standard
clearance rates. Individual clearance rates come straight from the FBI. FBI, 1998, supra note 186, at tbl.25.
For murder, clearance was 68.70%. Rape/sexual assault was 49.90%. Robbery was 28.40%. Aggravated
assault was 58.50%. Larceny-theft was 19.20%. Burglary was 13.60%. Motor vehicle theft was 14.20/o.
207. See infra Appendix Table 1 - 1990 (Part II) as an example of how to calculate overall standard
clearance rates. Individual clearance rates come straight from the FBI. FBI, 2004, supra note 187, at tbl.25.
For murder, clearance was 6 2 .6 0%. Rape/sexual assault was 41.80%. Robbery was 2 6 .2 0%. Aggravated
assault was 55.60%. Larceny-theft was 18.30/6. Burglary was 12.90%. And motor vehicle theft was 13.00/o.
208. See infra Appendix Table 2 - 2006 (Part II) for overall calculation. See a/so FBI, CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES, 2006 tbl.2, https://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2006/data/table 25.html [hereinafter FBI,
2006]. Focusing on individual crimes, clearance was 60.70% for murder, 40.90% for rape/sexual assault,
25.20/o for robbery, 54% for aggravated assault, 17.40% for burglary, 12.60/o for larceny-theft, and 12.60%
for motor vehicle theft.
209. See infra Appendix Table 1 - 1990 (Part II) as an example of how to calculate overall standard
clearance rates. Individual clearance rates come straight from the FBI. See FBI, 2009, supranote 189, at tbl.25.
Murder was 66.60%. Rape/sexual assault was 41.20%. Robbery was 28.20%. Aggravated assault was 56.80%.
Larceny-theft was 21.50%. Burglary was 12.50%. Motor vehicle theft was 12.40%.
210. See infra Appendix Table 1 - 1990 (Part II) as an example of how to calculate overall standard
clearance rates. Individual clearance rates come straight from the FBI. FBI, 2014, supra note 190, at tbl.25.
The percent cleared for murder was 64.50%. It was 38.63% for rape/sexual assault, 29.60% for robbery,
56.30% for aggravated assault, 23% for larceny-theft, 13.60% for burglary, and 12.80% for motor vehicle
theft.

%

%

211. See infra Appendix Table 3 - 2018 (Part II) for overall calculation. For 2018, it would mean:
37.7% of murder and nonnegligent manslaughter offenders go free; 66.6% of rape offenders go free; 6 9 .6
of robbery offenders go free; 47.5% of aggravated assault offenders go free; 86.1% of burglary offenders go
free; 81.1% of larceny offenders go free; and 86.2% of motor vehicle theft offenders go free. (Calculation:
NOT Cleared = 100% - FBI % Cleared).
212. This could be due to misreported clearance due to improper definitions, misrepresentation, or
faulty counting. See supraPart I.B.
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True ClearanceRates

Here we examine true clearance rates-a potentially more accurate measure
213
To calculate true clearance
of clearance rates that considers known crimes.
number of crimes cleared
the
with
crimes
known
NCVS
the
consider
we
rates,
214
consider a large swath
presumably
rates
clearance
according to the FBI. True
of crimes that could be reported to police but are not. Starting in 1990, the
overall true percent of crimes cleared was 10.03%.21s In 1998, the true percent
cleared was 7.92%.216 For 2004 and 2006, the overall true percent cleared was
218
9
For 2009, police improved clearance to
9.26%217 and .19%, respectively.
219
12.10% of overall crimes, and in 2014, it was 11.71%.220 Finally, in 2018 the
22
overall true percent cleared went back down to 10.61%. 1 Overall, true
1
clearance rates in the last thirty years remained around 0%.

Comparing standard clearance rates to true clearance rates demonstrates a

4
disparity. In 2018, the overall standard percent cleared was 21.6 %, while the

213. See infraAppendix Table 1 - 1990 (Part II) as an example of how to calculate true clearance rates
for other years. Tables for 2006 and 2018 are also in the Appendix, and 1995, 1998, 2004, 2009, and 2014
tables are on file with the author.
214. See infra Appendix Table 1 - 1990 (Part II) and supra note 18 as an example. The Number Cleared
Crimes
is calculated by taking Percent Cleared by Arrest (as a decimal). FBI Reported Crimes = Number of
Cleared. The True Clearance Rate is calculated by Number of Crimes Cleared / NCVS Known Crimes. Note,
for murder, the standard and true percent cleared are the same since NCVS does not measure murder.
215. See infra Appendix Table 1 - 1990 (Part II) for sources and calculations. For individual crimes,
the true percent cleared was 64.8% for murder, 12.39% for rape, 10.87% for robbery, 27.47% for aggravated
assault, 6.06% for larceny-theft, 6.16% for burglary, and 11.10% for motor vehicle theft.
See DEPT OF JUST., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1998 STATISTICAL
216.
9
tbl.25.
TABLES 2 tbl.1, https://www.bis.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvus 8.pdf; FBI, 1998, supra note 186, at
6
True clearance rates were 68.70% for murder, 10.6 % for rape, 11.24% for robbery, 25.98% for aggravated
assault, 6.11% for larceny-theft, 6.00% for burglary, and 12.28% for motor vehicle theft.
217. See FBI, 2004, supra note 187, at tbl.25. Individual crimes were 62.6% for murder, 13.23% for
rape, 14.01% for robbery, 28.55% for aggravated assault, 7.44% for larceny-theft, 6.66% for burglary, and
13.19% for motor vehicle theft. The true percent cleared for motor vehicle theft was higher than the standard
percent cleared in 2004, 2006, 2014, and 2018 because the number reported to police was higher than the
NCVS number known. We are not sure why people reported fewer crimes to the NCVS than to the police.
2
But see infra Appendix Table 4 nn.69-7 for possible explanations due to differences in definition.
218. See FBI, 2006, supranote 208, at tbl.25 and infra Appendix Table 2 - 2006 (Part II) for sources
and calculations. Looking at 2006 individual crimes, murder was 60.7%, rape was 12.08%, robbery was
13.63%, aggravated assault was 30.32%, larceny-theft was 7.08%, burglary was 6.96%, and motor vehicle
theft was 13.75%.
189, at tbl.25. For individual crimes,
219. See TRUMAN & RAND, supra note 197; FBI, 2009, supra note
6
6
the true percent cleared was 66. 0% for murder, 24.96% for rape, 18. % for robbery, 48.32% for aggravated
assault, 10.20% for larceny-theft, 7.81% for burglary, and 12.04% for motor vehicle theft.
220. See TRUMAN & LANGTON, supra note 197; FBI, 2014, supra note 190, at tbl.25. For individual
crimes, 64.5% of murders, 13.55% of rapes, 13.27% of robberies, 34.78% of aggravated assaults, 10.37% of
2
larceny-thefts, 7.15% of burglaries, and 15.3 % of motor vehicle thefts were cleared.
221. See FBI, 2018, supra note 169, at tbl.25 and infra Appendix Table 3 - 2018 (Part II) for sources
and calculations. Breaking that down by individual crimes, the percent cleared for each was 62.30% for
murder, 5.79% for rape, 13.83% for robbery, 36.98% for aggravated assault, 8.81% for larceny-theft, 5.94%
for burglary, and 18.11% for motor vehicle theft.
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overall true percent cleared was 10.61%.222 Considering a few individual crimes,
the standard percent cleared was 30.4% for robbery, while the true clearance
was 13.83%.223 For burglary in 2018, the standard clearance rate was 13.9%, and
the true rate was 5.94%.224 These numbers demonstrate that police are clearing
less crimes when we consider the number of crimes that are not reported to
police. Although we certainly do not hold police accountable to clear crimes
they do not know about, we could determine whether police can increase
reporting for these crimes. Considering true clearance also helps to provide a
more accurate perspective of the total crimes solved by police.
To step out of the weeds for a minute, the standard clearance rates for
violent crimes in general are around 45% from 1995 to 2018.225 And for
property crimes, standard clearance rates are typically between 15%-20%.226
For instance, in 2018, the average standard clearance rate for property crimes
was 17.5% (excluding arson). 227 These numbers are much lower than the public
might expect, as discussed further below.
This next Subpart addresses conviction rates. Going beyond clearance to
conviction, as discussed above, is a more accurate measure of how good the
initial arrests police made were and whether the police gathered appropriate
witnesses and information during the arrests. These two measures-standard
conviction rates and true conviction rates-are actually both more
comprehensive than considering clearance rates alone for measuring police
effectiveness.

222.

See infra Appendix Table 3 - 2018 (Part II).

223.

See infra Appendix Table 3 - 2018 (Part II).

-

224. See infraAppendix Table 3 - 2018 (Part II). Of the number of burglaries reported to the police in
2006, 12.6% were cleared according to standard clearance, which means 246,478 burglaries were cleared. See
FBI, 2006, supra note 208, at tbl.25. Calculation: 0.126 (FBI - Table 25, Clearance Rate) x 1,956,175 (FBI
Table 25, Known Offenses) = 246,478.05 (Number Cleared). Even though the reported clearance rate for
burglaries for 2006 was 12.6%, due to the fact that there were many who did not even report their crimes to
the police (and we only know about them from crime victims' surveys), in actuality, only 6.96% of the
burglaries were truly cleared by police. See id; RAND & CATALANO, supra note 147, at 3, 5. Calculation:
246,478.05 (Number Cleared) / 3,539,769 (NCVS - Table 2, Number of Victimizations) = 6.96% or 7%.
225. See FBI, 1995, supra note 185, at tbl.25; FBI, 2018, supra note 169, at tbl.25 (It increased from
45.4% in 1995 to only 45.5% in 2018.). For example, percent of violent crimes cleared are as follows: in 2004,
46.3%; 2009, 47.1%; 2014, 47.4%; and 2018, 45.5%. See a/so FBI, 2004, supra note 187, at tbl.25; FBI, 2009,
supra note 189, at tbl.25; FBI, 2014, supra note 190, at tbl.25; FBI, 2018, supra note 169, at tbl.25.
226. For example, percent of property crimes cleared are as follows: in 2004, 16.5%; 2009, 18.6%;
2014, 20.2%; and 2018, 17.6%. See FBI, 2004, supra note 187, at tbl.25; FBI, 2009, supra note 189, at tbl.25;
FBI, 2014, supra note 190, at tbl.25; FBI, 2018, supra note 169, at tbl.25. Note, the FBI includes arson in
overall property crime calculations, but the effect is small. See infra Appendix Table 1 - 1990 (Part I).
227. The FBI, which includes arson, has the percent of property crimes cleared at 17.6%. See FBI,
2018, supra note 169, at tbl.25. Excluding arson, the average standard clearance rate is calculated at 17.51%.
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Standard Conviction Rates

"Standard conviction rates" take the number of convictions (state and
federal) 228 and divide them by the number of crimes reported to the FBI (UCR
numbers). This is the standard way to measure the percentage of individuals

who are convicted of crimes. It goes beyond the standard measure of clearance
rates (comparing reported crime to offenses cleared) because it considers
reported crime and conviction rates. We only have conviction numbers up to

2006.229
For standard conviction rates, we start with reported numbers and compare
them with conviction numbers. In 1990, the standard percent convicted for
63
murder was 47.05%.230 For other crimes, it was 17.72% for rape, 7. % for
robbery, 5.15% for aggravated assault, 1.19% for larceny-theft, 3.57% for
231
burglary, and 1.30% for motor vehicle theft. In 1998, the conviction numbers

were 72.56% for murder, 42.64% for rape, 11.54% for robbery, 9.6% for
aggravated assault, 1.68% for larceny-theft, 4.92% for burglary, and 1.48% for
motor vehicle theft.232 And for 2004, the standard percent convicted for crimes

was 62.88% for murder, 13.14% for rape, 6.53% for robbery, 6.69% for
aggravated assault, 0.70% for larceny-theft, 2.61% for burglary, and 1.59% for
233
motor vehicle theft.
Standard conviction rates for 2006 may provide an estimate on the
percentage of crimes solved by police. In 2006, there were 14,948 reported

228. The estimated percent of crimes where someone was held responsible can be calculated using
conviction data. The National Judicial Reporting Program (NJRP) provides estimates for the number of
felony convictions in state courts. The NJRP collected data on felony sentencing from a nationally
representative sample of state courts in 300 counties. The NJRP collected data biannually from 1986 to 2006.
The FederalJustice Statistics Program (FJSP) reports the number convicted of a felony in U.S. district courts
each year. See DEPT OF JUST., DATA COLLECTION: FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS PROGRAM (FJSP) (2018),
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=262#Documentation; DEP'T OF JUST., FEDERAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS, 2006, https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/html/fjsst/2006/fjs6st.pdf. Adding these numbers
together gives the estimated number of felony convictions in both state and federal court. Taking the
estimated number convicted for the crime and dividing by the estimated number of total crimes committed
results in the estimated percent of crimes where there was a conviction. See infra Appendix Tables 1 (Parts
I-III), 2 (Parts I-III), and 6 for calculations along with the data sources.
229. The last year the NJRP produced data on state court convictions was 2006. See Data Collection:
NationalJudicialReporting Program (NJRP), BUREAU OF JUST. STATS. (2006), https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?
ty=dcdetail&iid=241 (last visited Sept. 15, 2020).
230.

See infra Appendix Table 1 - 1990 (Part III) for sources and calculations.

See infra Appendix Table 1 - 1990 (Part III).
232. See infra Appendix Table 1 -1990 (Parts I-III) as an example for calculations. See infra Appendix
Table 1, note 2 for a list of tables on file with the author.
231.

233. See infra Appendix Table 1 - 1990 as an example for calculations. See infra Appendix Table 1,
note 2 for list of tables on file with the author. The true percent convicted for motor vehicle theft was higher
in 2004 and 2006 than the standard percent convicted because the number reported to police was higher than
the NCVS number known. We are not sure why people reported fewer crimes to the NCVS than to the
police, but see infra Appendix Table 4 and accompanying notes 69-72 for possible explanations.
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murders, and of those, 8,845 people were convicted (federal and state), 234 so
that is a total of 59% of murders resulting in a conviction. 235 So, said differently,
41 % of murderers got away with murder. 236 For other crimes, it is a lot worse.
If there were a total of 760,753 reported aggravated assaults in 2006 and 101,108
aggravated assault convictions,237 that means that only 13% of individuals who
committed assault were held responsible. In other words, 87% of people who
committed aggravated assault were not convicted.2 38 Similarly, in 2006 for
burglary, 1,956,175 burglaries were reported to the FBI, and there were only
99,964 convictions in the same year. 239 So only 5% of burglars were held
accountable and 95% got away with burglary. 240 For rape, there were 80,440
reported and 33,618 convictions, meaning the standard percent convicted was
42%, and 58% of rapists got away.2 41 And finally, with robbery, in 2006 there
were 384,844 reported robbery offenses and 43,059 convictions for

robberies; 242 therefore, 11% of people were held accountable for robbery and
89% got away with it.243 We cannot get too attached to these numbers because
they only include the reported crimes and therefore do not consider other
known crimes (as reported to NCVS). However, it is a measure to consider as
possibly the lower range of actual crimes if the truth in crime numbers is
somewhere between the numbers reported to police and those reported to

NCVS.
6.

True Conviction Rates

The true conviction measure takes the number of convictions (state and
federal) and divides them by the number of known crimes, or NCVS's
estimated number of total crimes. It considers both conviction rates (which are
better measures than arrest or clearance rates) and known crimes reported to
NCVS rather than those reported to police, which are presumably more

comprehensive.
Table 3 below demonstrates the percentage of crimes in a sample of years
where an individual was held accountable. For instance, in 1990, the estimated

234.

See infra Appendix Table 2 - 2006 (Part III) for sources and calculations.

235.

See infra Appendix Table 2 - 2006 (Part III).

236.

100% - 59% = 41%.

237.

See FBI, 2006, supra note 208, at tb.25; infra Appendix Table 2 - 2006 (Part III).

238. See infra Appendix Table 2 - 2006 (Part III). With assault, it may be that police are resolving these
crimes in other ways, and we do not have evidence of this. This is why we need to better track criminal
resolution that does not end in an arrest or conviction.
239.

See FBI, 2006, supranote 208 (Part III); infra Appendix Table 2 - 2006 (Part III).

240.

See FBI, 2006, supra note 208, at tbl.25; infra Appendix Table 2 - 2006 (Part III).

241.

See FBI, 2006, supranote 208, at tbl.25; infra Appendix Table 2 - 2006 (Part III).

242.

See FBI, 2006, sepra note 208, at tbl.25; infraAppendix Table 2 - 2006 (Part III).

243.

See FBI, 2006, supranote 208, at tbl.25; infraAppendix Table 2 - 2006 (Part III).
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percent of crimes where police convicted an individual was 47.05% of the time
for murder, 13.95% for rape, 4.24% for robbery, 3.39% for aggravated assault,
0.46% for larceny-theft, 2.13% for burglary, and 1.08% for motor vehicle
2 95
theft.2 44 That is to say, murderers escaped police 5 . % of the time, and
burglars escaped 97.87% of the time. These are dramatically low numbers of
individuals convicted for very basic felony offenses. Keep in mind that the
245
numbers for internet and misdemeanor offenses are presumably.much worse.

In considering the overall true conviction rate, there is a very small number
of convictions in the sample years considered. These numbers consider the total
number of known crimes in the particular year-including murder, rape,
aggravated assault, burglary, robbery, larceny, and motor vehicle theftcompared to the number of convictions. These numbers are largely skewed
because theft offenses are rarely solved (particularly larceny, robbery, burglary,
2
and motor vehicle theft). The true conviction rate was 1. 4% in 1990,246 1.35%

in 1998,247 1.81% in 2004,248 and 1.95% in 2006.249 That is to say that the
conviction rate for the major crimes in these sample years is less than 2% per
year. Table 3 provides a visual comparison of true conviction rates for a sample

of years from 1990 to 2006.

See infra Appendix Table 1 - 1990 (Part III) for sources and calculations.
245. See FBI, 1995, supranote 185, at tbl.25; FBI, 1998, supranote 186, at tbl.25; FBI, 2004, supra note
187, at tbl.25; FBI, 2006, supra note 208, at tbl.25; FBI, 2009, supra note 189, at tbl.25; FBI, 2014, supra note
190, at tbl.25; FBI, 2018, supra note 169, at tbl.25.
246. See infra Appendix Table 6. See infra Appendix Table 1 - 1990 (Part III) for sources and
244.

calculations.
247. See infra Appendix Table 6. See infra Appendix Table 1 - 1990 (Part III) for sources and
calculations. See note 2 on the Table for a list of tables on file with the author.
248.

See infra Appendix Table 6.

249.

See infra Appendix Table 6; infra Appendix Table 2 - 2006 (Part III).
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Table 3 - True Conviction Comparison (Considering NCVS Known Crime and
25 0
FBI Conviction Rates)

1990

1998

2004

200 6 2¶

Total

1.24%

1.35%

1.81%

1.95%

Murder and Non-Negligent
Manslaughter

47.05%

72.56%

62.88%

59.17%

Rape and Sexual Assault

13.95%

9.11%

13.14%

12.34%

Robbery

4.24%

4.57%

6.53%

6.05%

Aggravated Assault

3.39%

4.26%

6.69%

7.46%

Larceny-Theft

0.46%

0.53%

0.7%

0.75%

Burglary

2.13%

2.17%

2.61%

2.82%

Motor Vehicle Theft

1.08%

1.28%

1.59%

1.88%

Overall, there are two important points to consider with true conviction
numbers. First, prosecutors (In collaboration with police) are convicting
individuals only about 2 % of the time for serious crimes. 25 2 Second, murder is
the priority with the highest conviction rates at up to 72% in some years but
down to only 47% in other years. Convictions for larceny, motor vehicle theft,
and burglary are the lowest, and signify that these are the crimes most difficult
(or of lowest priority) for police to solve.
The next Part puts the data from the previous six Parts together to measure
criminal accountability, or the effectiveness of police in solving crime.
7.

CriminalAccountability

Criminal accountability is the comprehensive term that encompasses all of
the important data measures used to judge the effectiveness of police-number
of crimes known, reported, true arrest rates, true clearance rates, true conviction
rates, and, when there is data for it, crimes resolved. These criminal
accountability numbers take us through the entire course of a crime, starting at
known crimes and ending at conviction or resolution without arrest. The tables
in this Part put together the data from the previous six Parts to give perspective
on how effective police are at solving crimes. The one piece of data that is
missing in these numbers is a category of crimes resolved without arrest. Ideally,

250. See infra Appendix Table 1 - 1990 (Parts I-I)
sources and calculations.

and Appendix Table 2 - 2006 (Parts I-III) for

251. The last year that NJRP produced data on state court convictions was 2006. See DEPT OFJUST.,
supra note 229.
252.

Again, this is probably even lower because these crimes do not consider serious internet cimes.
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to track criminal accountability, police departments will track all crimes resolved
in an alternative way so that these are also accounted for-this way, a success
is not necessarily only clearance or conviction, but any resolution.
The criminal accountability data in this Part gathers information for the

major crimes to help put into perspective how effective police are. Table 4
expresses the full criminal accountability data for 2006.253 A few examples are
illuminating. In 2006, according to the FBI, there were 384,844 robberies
reported to police. 25 4 But NCVS estimated that there was actually a total of
711,570 robberies, meaning that about 306,687 robberies were not reported to
police. 255 Of the total number of known robberies, 43.1% were not reported to
the police. 25 6 Of the number of robberies reported to the police, only 25.2% of
25 7
those were cleared, which means the number cleared was 96,980 robberies.
However, due to the fact that there were many who did not even report their
3 63
crimes to the police, in actuality, only 1 . % of the total number of robberies
258
And, of those robberies cleared in 2006, only
were actually cleared by police.
25 9
6.05% of all robberies were resolved by conviction. Or, to think of it another
way, more than 93% of robbers in the U.S. got away with their crime in true
260
criminal accountability numbers.
The picture is equally bleak when we consider burglaries and murders in

2006. Of the total number of 3.54 million burglaries in 2006, 1.78 million were
26
not reported to the police, which was more than 50% of burglaries. 1 During

253. This criminal accountability chart with full references is infra Appendix Table 7. The Appendix
includes criminal accountability charts for 1990, 2006, and 2018. See infra Appendix Tables 1, 2, & 3. Full
criminal accountability data including conviction information for 1998 is on file with the author. There is no
conviction data for 2018, so it is not a full criminal accountability chart. See infra Appendix Table 3 - 2018
(Parts I-II).
254.

FBI, 2006, supra note 208, at tbl.25.

-

255. RAND & CATALANO, supra note 247, at 3 tbl.2; FBI, 2006, supra note 208, at tbl.26. Calculation:
(.569)(NCVS - Table 8, % Reported to Police) x 711,570 (NCVS - Table 2, Number of Victimizations) =
404,883 (number of robberies reported to police); 711,570 (NCVS - Table 2, Number of Victimizations)
404,883 (number of robberies reported to police) = 306,687 (estimated number of robberies not reported to
police).
256. This is according to NCVS reporting numbers, not FBI reporting numbers. RAND & CATALANO,
supranote 147, at 5 tbl.8. Calculation: 100% - 56.9 (% reported to police) = 43.1% (estimated % not reported
to police).
257.

See infra Appendix Table 2 - 2006 (Part II).

258.

See infra Appendix Table 2 - 2006 (Part II).

See infra Appendix Table 2 - 2006 (Part III).
260. See infra Appendix Table 2 - 2006 (Part III). Calculation: 100% - 6.05% = 93.93% or 94%
(estimated % held responsible).
261. See RAND & CATALANO, supranote 147, at 3, 5 tbls.2 & 8. Calculation: 3,539,760 (NCVS - Table
2, Number of Victimizations) - 1,755,720.96 (number of burglaries reported to police) = 1,784,048.04
(estimated number of burglaries not reported to police). Then we take 1,784,048.04 (estimated number of
burglaries not reported to police) / 3,539,760 (NCVS - Table 2, Number of Victimizations) = 50.4%
(estimated percent of burglaries not reported to the police).
259.
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that year, 6.96% of burglaries were cleared by police. 262 And, of those burglaries
cleared, only 2.82% of people who were burglarized had their perpetrator held
responsible by conviction. 263 That is to say, more than 97% of burglars in the
U.S. got away with their crime when considering the criminal accountability
numbers. In 2006, 14,948 people were murdered in the United States. 264 The
number of people arrested for murder in 2006 was 13,435.265 Police cleared
9,073 murders in 2006.266 There were 8,845 convictions for murder in state and
federal court,267 meaning 59.17% of murderers were held responsible. 268 So, in
other words, in 2006, police never captured 40.83% of murderers. 269 The full
criminal accountability chart for 2006 is illustrated in Table 4 below.2 70

262.

See infra Appendix Table 2 - 2006 (Part II).

263. See infra Appendix Table 2 - 2006 (Part III). By way of comparison, the federal conviction rate is
much higher, especially for violent crime. In 2012, the federal overall conviction rate was 93%. DEP'T OF
JUST.,

UNITED

STATES

ATTORNEYS'

ANNUAL

STATISTICAL

REPORT

8

(Oct.

28,

2013),

https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2013/10/28/12statrpt.pdf. This has gone up
federally from 75% to 85% between 1972 and 1992. Sara Sun Beale, Federa!ZingCrime: Assessing the Impact on
the FederalCourts, 543 ANNALS OF THE AM, ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SC. 39, 50 (1996).
264. See infra Appendix Table 2 - 2006 (Part I) for sources and calculations.
265. See infra Appendix Table 2 - 2006 (Part I) for sources and calculations.
266. See infra Appendix Table 2 - 2006 (Part II) for sources and calculations. According to the Murder
Accountability Project, the number of murders cleared is slightly higher at 9. MURDER ACCOUNTABILITY
PROJECT, UNIFORM CRIME TABLE FOR HOMICIDES 1965-2018 (2019), http://www.murderdata.org/p/blog
-page.html (last accessed Feb 16, 2020).
267. See infra Appendix Table 2 - 2006 (Part III) for sources and calculations.
268. See infra Appendix Table 2 - 2006 (Part III) for sources and calculations.
-

269. See infra Appendix Table 2 - 2006 (Part III) for sources and calculations. Calculation: 100%
59.17% = 40. 83%.

270. See citations and explanations of all calculations in this chart infra Appendix Table 2 - 2006 (Parts
I-III).
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Table 4 - Cminal Accountability - 2006
(a)
Number
Known

Types of
Offenses

(b)
Percent
Reported

(c)
True
Percent

(FBI)
(% of col. a)

Arrested
(% of col. a)

9

(d)
True Percent
Cleared
(% of col. a)

(e)
True Percent
Convicted
(% of col. a)

21,162,438

47.6 %

10.09%

9.19%

1.95%

Non-Negligent
Manslaughter

NA

NA

89.88%

60.70%

59.17%

Rape and
Sexual Assault

272,350

29.54%

9.01%

12.08%

12.34%

Robbery

711,570

54.08%

17.65%

13.63%

6.05%

Aggravated
Assault

1,354,750

56.15%

33.06%

30.32%

7.46%

Larceny-Theft

14,275,150

40.70%

7.57%

7.08%

0.75%

Burglary

3,539,760

55.26%

8.610/

6.96%

2.82%

Motor-Vehicle
Theft

993,910

109.13%

13.86%

13.75%

1.88%

Total
Murder and

Overall, the criminal accountability numbers teach us a few things. First,
for most of the major crimes there are more known crimes (NCVS) than crimes

reported to police (UCR). Indeed, this reiterates what was illustrated in
Part ILA, that less than half of crimes are reported to police. An exception to
this is motor vehicle theft. More people report motor vehicle theft to police
than to NCVS victims' surveys. This demonstrates the importance of having

both numbers in order to understand why people report some crimes to police
more than others. Second, it is also important to track crimes resolved without
arrest. An example of motor vehicle theft is fitting here. Even though police
are able to convict individuals for motor vehicle theft in only 1.88% of cases,
the cases resolved are much higher. The Department of Transportation
271
estimates that 59% of stolen cars are recovered each year. Police play a major
role in these efforts, which may be why reporting for motor vehicle theft is
272
But clearance rates and conviction rates do not take
disproportionately high.
these efforts into account and, in this instance, make the overall crime picture
look worse than it is. And finally, the overall criminal accountability picture is
much worse than we might have thought. There are less than 7% conviction

rates for all crimes besides murder and rape, and a less than 2% true conviction

271.

DEP'T OF TRANSP., VEHICLE THEFT PROTECTION, www.nhtsa.gov (last accessed Feb. 16, 2020).
VEHICLE THEFT PREVENTION, https://www.nhtsa.gov/road-safety/vehicle-theft-

DEP'T OF TRANSP.,

prevention#37641 (last accessed Aug. 18, 2020) (see "Safety Facts" box for statistic and source).
272. Id It is over 100% due to definitional differences between the FBI and NCVS. See infraAppendix
Table 2 - 2006 (Part I) note 37 for further details.
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rate overall. Potentially, tracking crimes resolved without arrest may improve
this picture for other crimes. Some crimes may also be resolved after arrest but
not with conviction. These must also be accounted for. In sum, it is important
to simply understand how low criminal accountability numbers are. The neglect
of these numbers and the potential path forward, as well as counterarguments,
are addressed in the next Part.
III. THE PATH FORWARD FOR CRIM[NAL ACCOUNTABILITY

We learn from the data in the last Part that for all major crimes, criminal
accountability is low-and crimes are often not solved either by arrest,
clearance, or later conviction. Police apprehend very few of the individuals who
commit crimes. This Part is about what needs to change in order for us to
measure criminal accountability more effectively and ultimately improve police
performance. Part III.A delves into the neglect of criminal accountability and
explores how this has been ignored by scholars and media. Criminal
commentary has neglected discussion of low clearance and conviction rates and
low criminal accountability. It also demonstrates, with Figures 4 and 5, the low
criminal accountability in America with a "crime funnel." Part III.B addresses
the areas of potential reform in tracking police effectiveness and
counterarguments against potential changes.

A.

The Neglect of CrimeAccountabikty

Scholars and commentators have been largely silent on how few crimes are
addressed by police. It is understandable that there has not been a discussion
of low criminal accountability, but there is also a similar neglect in discussion
of police clearance rates in the scholarly literature and media. 273 There is very
little focus on the low rate of clearance or conviction for crimes nationally. 274

273. Clearance rate articles have focused on the decrease in clearance rates over time, without
discussion on what low clearance rates mean for police effectiveness or how they affect public safety. But see
German Lopez, There's a Neary 40 PercentChance You'll GetAway with Murder in America, VOX (Sept. 24, 2018),
https://www.vox.com/2018/9/24/17896034/murder-crime-clearance-fbi-report
(explaining that police
should do more and dedicate more resources to solving crimes rather than focusing on preventative
measures).

274. While very few commentators have noticed low clearance rates, German Lopez noted bleakly in
2017, "If you murder someone in America, there's a nearly 40 percent chance you'll get away with it." Id; see
also Anthony Williams, Police Aren't Getting Better at Solving Murders: Why is the Clearance Rate in U.S. Cities so
Low?, CITYLAB (Jun. 26, 2017), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2017/06/police-arent-getting-better-atsolving-murders/531642/ (lamenting that U.S. law enforcement "is the worst in the Western world at solving
crimes" and citing clearance rate statistics like one-eighth of burglaries leading to arrest, or only one-third for
rape, and two-thirds for murder); Martin Kaste, Open Cases: Why One-Third of MurdersIn America Go Unresolved,
NPR (March 30, 2015), https://www.npr.org/2015/03/30/395069137/open-cases-why-one-third-ofmurders-in-america-go-unresolved ("If you're murdered in America, there's a 1 in 3 chance that the police
won't identify your killer.").
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For instance, The National Academies of Sciences recently published a 326275
Clearance rates are mentioned exactly once in the
page report on policing.
276
There is a field of scholarship
body of the report-and only in passing.
dedicated to addressing the rights of victims of crime. Yet, this growing victims'
rights movement has not addressed low clearance or conviction rates at all, or
the large group of individuals affected by unsolved crimes. 277 Proportionately,
there are many more cases-more than double with some crimes-where the
victims never even contact police to get help. When you consider the number
of victims who never reach resolution (conviction or otherwise), in 2006,

275.

NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, ENGINEERING, AND MEDICINE, PPOACTIVE POLICING:

EFFECTS ON CRIME AND COMMUNITIES (David Weisburd & Malay K Majamundar eds., 2018).
276.

Id at 63.
1
277. The Victims' Rights Movement speaks to the (vital) rights of the small percentage of victims who
enter the criminal system. See generally Douglas E. Beloof, Constitutional Implications of Crime Victims as
Participants,88 CORNELL L. REV. 282, 283 (2003) (addressing the constitutional complications that come into
play when victims are granted rights during criminal trials); Jayne W. Barnard, Allocutionfor Victims ofEconomic
Crimes, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 39, 74 (2001) (discussing the complexity of involving victims of economic
crimes in receiving restitution); Susan Bandes, Victim Standing, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 331, 337 (1999) (addressing
the complexity of victims entering a criminal proceeding built for prosecution and defendant); Josephine
Girder, Expanding the Role of the Victim in a CriminalAction: An Overview of Issues andProblems, 11 PEPP. L. REV.
117, 121-23 (1984) (detailing the accomplishments of the Victims' Rights Movement and advocating for
victims to play a more active role in criminal trials beyond being a witness); Dena M. Gromet et al., A VictimCenteredApproach to Justice? Victim Satisfaction Effect on Third-PartyPunishments, 36 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 375, 37787 (2012) (examining studies of victim and third-party satisfaction with restorative justice processes); Arthur
Lurigio, Are all Victims Alike? The Adverse, Generalized, and DifrentialImpact of Crime, 33 CRIME AND DELINQ.
452, 453 (1987) (studying the differences between victims and non-victims when it comes to psychological,
behavioral, and attitudinal health); Vik Kanwar, CapitalPunishmentas "Closure": The Limits of a Victim-Centered
Jurisprudence,27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 215, 215-16 (2002) (arguing that a death penalty sentence
fails to provide closure to a victim's family and may even be more damaging); Ellen M. Bublick, Citizen NoDuty Rules: Rape Victims and ComparativeFault, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1413 (1999) (explaining that citizen
entitlements should be considered by courts as a compelling factor when considering defenses to rape victim
comparative fault equations); Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim' Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 938
(1985) (examining the impact that victims' rights procedures have had on the criminal process and the
potential impact of such rights on the goals of the justice system, such as crime prevention); Robert C. Davis
& Barbara E. Smith, The Effects of Victim Impact Statements on Sentencing Decisions: A Test in an Urban Setting, 11
JUST. Q. 453, 453 (1994) (examining the impact of victim statement on the sentences of offenders and trying
to determine if that impact has resulted in sentences more in line with the harm commi tted or not); Jongyeon
Tark & Gary Kleck, Resisting Crime: The Effects of Victim Action on the Outcomes of Crimes, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 861,
861 (2004) (assessing the impacts on crimes and outcomes of various types of victim self-protection); Douglas
E. Beloof, Weighing Crime Victims'Interests inJudicialy Crafted CriminalProcedure,56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1135, 1136
(2007) (detailing the manner in which victims' rights are being incorporated into the judicial process and the
challenges they present).
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20,749,770 victims (around 98.05%)278 received no resolution. 279 Yet none of
the victims' rights scholarship discusses the lack of criminal accountability; only
a few articles deal with the phenomenon of underreporting or underprosecution, 280 and the majority of the literature focuses on the rare case in
which a crime victim is served through the justice system.281
The amount of attention the media gives to crime clearance rates

constitutes a drop in the bucket compared to other criminal justice topics. For
instance, in the last ten years, there have been 8,000 articles in international

newspapers discussing mass incarceration and 29 articles discussing police
clearance rates. 282 There is very little attention on how low clearance and
conviction rates are and what this means for police and society.

278. See infra Appendix Table 2 - 2006 (Part III) for citations and sources, including the true percent
convicted. See RAND & CATALANO, supranote 147 at 3 tbl.2. Calculation: 100%-1.95% = 98.05% (percent of
victims who had no resolution/estimated percent not convicted). 21,162,438 was the number of known
crimes, so 20,749,770 is the estimated number of crimes where no one was held responsible - victims that
had no resolution). For information on State numbers, see Sean Rosenmerkel et al., BUREAU OFJUST. STATS.,
FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006 3 tbl.1.1 (Dec. 2009). For information on federal numbers, see
Mark A. Motivans, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2006 tbl.4.2 (May 2009),

https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/html/fljsst/2006/fjs06st.pdf.
279.

A large caveat here is that we have no record of crimes resolved without resolution. We know a

large number of motor vehicle thefts are resolved (i.e., the cars are returned) even though there is no
accountability for the crime (no arrest or conviction). This is important to consider with these numbers. It is
possible that some crimes were resolved independently without the help of police. See LANGTON ET AL., supra
40
note 41106, at 4 tbl.1 (noting that sometimes up to % of individuals resolve crimes without the help of
police).

&

280. Though no legal scholars have focused on the lack of criminal accountability as a problem in our
criminal justice system, a few scholars have noted the problem of underreporting and have noted that victims
should have rights before charges are filed. See In Re: Petition for Appointment of Prosecutor Pro Tempore,
No. 2018-0839, 2018 WL 6015550, at *1-2 (Utah Oct. 16, 2018) (advocating for the appointment of a special
prosecutor by the Supreme Court in order to pursue victim-initiated prosecutions for sexual assault victims
who have seen very low rates of prosecution); Paul G. Cassell et al., Crime Victims' Rights During Criminal
Investigations? Appying the Crime Victims' Rights Act Before Criminal Charges are Filed, 104 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY 59, 59 (2014) (advocating for victims to have CVRA rights during investigations before
charges are filed); Abraham S. Goldstein, Defining the Role of the Victim in CriminalProsecution,52 MISS. L. REV.
515, 515-518 (1982) (arguing that much of the phenomenon of underreporting has to do with the victims
perceived or actual separation from the criminal justice process); Paul Marcus & Tara L. McMahon, Limiting
Disclosure of Rape Victims' Identities, 64 So. CAL. L. REv. 1019, 1050 (1991) (arguing that, often, the
underreporting of rape and sexual assault is because of the lack of privacy that victims experience related to
this already invasive crime after reporting and charging); see also Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Utility
of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 461 tbl.1 (1997).
281. Often the Victims' Rights Movement remains focused on rights relevant after charging such as
trial rights and sentencing rights. See Margaret Garvin & Douglas E. Beloof, Crime Victim Ageng: Independent
Lawjersfor SexualAssault Victims, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 67 (2015) (presenting a case for victim's rights such
as right to counsel, right to a speedy trial, right to discovery, right to make a victim impact statement before
trial, and a right to be informed of release or probation); Douglas E. Beloof & Paul Cas sell, The Crime Victim's
Right to Attend the Trial: The ReaecendantNationalConsensus, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 481, 482-83 (2005).
282. An international search of all newspapers worldwide in Lexis-Nexis from Sept. 2009 to Sept.
2019 shows that "overcrowded jail" returned 8,964 articles; "overcrowded prison" 1,361 articles; "mass
incarceration" 9,479 articles; "police clearance" 2,756 articles; "crime clearance rates" 89 articles; and "police
clearance rate" 29 articles. And in the U.S., a similar newspaper search demonstrates the underemphasis on
clearance is even more stark: "overcrowded jail" 689 articles; "overcrowded prison" 1,171 articles; "mass
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Criminal accountability has been ignored in the literature, except for some
mention of the crime "funnel." The closest reference to the lack of criminal
283
The idea of a crime
accountability is reference to a crime "funnel" or "sieve."
funnel is that many crimes enter at the outset with a police report and very few
are resolved with a defendant being arrested, then convicted, then
imprisoned. 284 The crime funnel is different from the criminal accountability
numbers here in that it starts from a police report and tracks a crime to
imprisonment. By ignoring known crimes, it misses up-to-half of the crimes
committed. 285 Even with the existence and very brief mention of the crime
funnel, the implications of it for police effectiveness or criminal policy have not
28 6

been explored or discussed.
The crime funnels in Figures 4 and 5 demonstrate the consistently low rates
of criminal accountability and show that crime has gone down in America over
the last thirty years. Overall, many more people are victims of crime than report
to the police. A small fraction of police reports result in arrest, and a small
portion of those end in a conviction. Figure 4 below illustrates the criminal

incarceration" 2,857 articles; "crime clearance rate" 26 articles; "police clearance" 12 articles; and "police
clearance rate" 1 article. Certainly, this search could have missed articles, but the broader point likely stands.
283. For an especially thorough example of a crime funnel, see ELISE HANSELL ET AL., THE CRIME
FUNNEL, ROSE INSTITUTE OF STATE AND LOCAL GOV. (2016); Robinson, supra note 280.
Brian Forst, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., IMPROVING POLICE EFFECTiVENESS AND
284.
TRANSPARENCY: NATIONAL INFORMATION NEEDS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT 2 (2008), https://www.bjs

.gov/content/pub/pdf/bjsworkshop.pdf:
Most of us are familiar with elaborate diagrams of the criminal justice "funnel" depicting the
channeling of crimes through the criminal justice system. But when numbers are attached to the
diagram, it becomes clear that this is more of a sieve than a funnel. About 8 to 10 million felonies
are reported to the police each year, and the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) tells
us that about as many go unreported.
285.

See supra Part II.A for discussion of known crimes.

286.

One notable exception is Brian Forst, who remarks:

So we have something like 15 to 20 million felony victimizations annually in the United States,
and fewer than 1 million of these cases end in conviction. The police are precisely in the middle
of this extraordinarily leaky sieve. Yet, we have little by way of reliable empirical evidence on the
relationships between police operations, tactics, and policies on the one hand, and the leakages at
each stage, on the other-from victimization to reporting to recording to arrest to convictionwhich the police could conceivably do much more to close.
Forst, supra note 284. He also remarks:
In today's world of information and the ready availability of statistical tools to analyze it, one can
only marvel at how little we know about what the police could do to raise the rate at which
victimizations end in conviction from well below 10% to perhaps 20% or more. We rarely bother
even to consider the prospect. It seems somehow negligent that we have failed to seize
opportunities to learn what the police can do at each stage to reduce the enormous social costs
associated with this vast, largely ignored sequence of justice lapses between crimes and
convictions. BJS can help by providing statistical indicators of lapses at each of these stages, and
its data sets can be exploited creatively for another purpose: to permit in-depth research about
what works to reduce the leakages.
Id (footnote omitted).
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accountability rates for 2006 and 2018,287 or a more complete "crime funnel."
The general trend was the same for both years. Though, one positive note is
that there is much less known crime and reported crime in 2018, so even
victims' reports demonstrate that crime has gone down in America. 288 There
are many more crimes committed than reported, arrested, or cleared-and
much fewer convicted or imprisoned.289 These do not consider any alternatives
to resolving crime besides conviction and imprisonment; however, these are
important data points that police should consider. It is also significant to
emphasize here that Figure 4 is incomplete because we stopped tracking
national data of conviction and imprisonment rates after 2006.290 In order to
consider the full cycle of a crime, it is vital to have these data points.

Figure 4 - Criminal Accountability 2006 and 2018
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Figure 5 below considers criminal accountability from 1990 to 2006,
demonstrating a similar pattern to Figure 4.291 This Figure confirms, even with
known crimes, that crime has decreased in America in the last thirty years. 292

287.
288.
289.
290.

See infra Appendix Table 2 - 2006 and Table 3 - 2018 for sources and calculations.
See infra Figure 4, Appendix Table 2 - 2006, and Table 3 - 2018 for sources and calculations.
Note that we do not have the conviction or imprisonment data for 2018.
The last year that BJS tracked the data relevant for incarceration, prison, and conviction rates

nationally was 2006. See BUREAU OFJUST. STATs., FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE
cOURTS, 2006 5 tbl.1.2.1,

http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf.

291. See infra Appendix Table 1 - 1990 (Part I and III) and Table 2 - 2006 (Parts I and III) for sources
and calculations. See Appendix Table 1 - 1990, note 2 for a list of tables on file with the author.
292. This could mean that police are more effective at preventing crime than solving crime, but more
study is necessary on this issue.
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The Figure also demonstrates that at every stage in the life of a crime, police
and then prosecutors lose the ability to help victims.

Figure 5
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It will be difficult to improve police effectiveness if we continue to neglect
criminal accountability. The next Subpart provides some thoughts on police
effectiveness and considers the challenges to tracking and improving criminal
accountability.
B.

Thoughts and Counterthoughts on Police Effectiveness

293
Now that we know that police are not very effective at solving crime,
several questions remain. Some of these questions we pose and leave for
another day. We also discuss some potential reforms and counterarguments
against reform.
At the outset, it is important to acknowledge the criticism of including
known crime numbers in measuring police effectiveness. Perhaps it is unfair to
judge police based on known crimes because they may not be able to improve
these numbers, or clearance numbers, because of a lack of trust in their

293.

Only half of crimes are typically reported to police, and of those known, police clear about 10%

overall and then convict less than 2%. These numbers are very rough estimates based on numbers in Part II,

and do not consider cases that are resolved without arrest-which would hopefully demonstrate police
resolve many cases without arrest or conviction.
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neighborhood. Arguably, improving trust and legitimacy can take many years
or may be impossible in some neighborhoods. Yet, the research demonstrates

that police may be able to improve reporting without substantially improving
clearance or conviction rates. Indeed, research demonstrates that a police
department's response to a crime report and an individual's perception of how
police will respond to their report may be more important to reporting rates
than whether police can actually solve a crime. 294 The studies show that, to

improve reporting, police must improve relationships with the communities
they serve. 295 Indeed, several other countries have less disparity between
reporting and known crime rates, so this is something that could theoretically
improve in the U.S.296 Police may be able to improve reporting without
necessarily solving more crimes.
So, with that caveat, what would make police more effective? Certainly, we

need more research on this point. But the suggestions below are an important
first step to consider. These are improvements that can be made without
encroachments on civil liberties or increased surveillance that may threaten
privacy rights. 297

First, police departments and the federal government need to track national
conviction and imprisonment rates.298 This first step is simple but absolutely

294. In some ways, low criminal accountability can be a self-perpetuating problem. Police are not
effective at solving crimes, and therefore people feel like it is not worthwhile to report a crime to the police.
Indeed, one study shows that the ability of police to solve crime is directly linked to how good officers are at
solving crime and how well police interact with the public. See Kristina Murphy & Julie Barkworth, Victim
Willingness to Report Crime to Police: Does PmceduralJusticeor Outcome MatterMost?, 9 VICTIMS & OFFENDERS: AN
INT'L J. OF EVIDENCE-BASED RES., POL'Y & PRAC. 178, 194 (Apr. 1, 2014). See supra notes 100-01 for
discussion of Tom Tyler's research on this point. Low criminal accountability may not be critical to reducing
crime rates. It is unclear whether solving more murders deters future murders. The conventional wisdom
might predict that higher clearance rates would mean fewer future murders. However, one analysis of
clearance rates in 2015 and 2016 showed no correlation between murder clearances and future murders.
Asher & Horwitz, supra note 42 (analyzing FBI's Uniform Crime Reports for 2015 and 2016). In Charlotte,
North Carolina, murder rates actually increased with an increase in clearance rates. Asher & Horwitz, supra
note 42.
295. Bret D. Asbury, Anti-Snitching Norms and Communiy Loya/y, 89 OR. L. REV. 1257, 1311 (2011)
("Experiments in community policing over the past three decades have shown that community attitudes
toward police officers can change pervasively in a short period of time."); Jamie Masten, "Ain'tNo Snitches
Ridin' Wit' Us": How Deceptionin the Fourth Amendment Tnggered the Stop SnitchingMovement, 70 OH10 ST. L.J. 705,
755 (2009) ("Trust is paramount in any relationship, and this notion is no different when applied to the
intricate interplay between the public and the police.").
296.

SWEDISH NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CRIME PREVENTION, THE CLEARANCE RATE IN SWEDEN

AND IN OTHER COUNTRIES 8 (2015), https://www.bra.se/bra-in-english/home/publications/archive/
publications/2015-06-10-the-clearance-rate-in-sweden-and-in-other-countries.htrml (noting that in Sweden,
known crime rates and reporting rates are similar).
297. Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing by Numbers: Big Data and the FourthAmendment, 89 WASH. L. REV. 35, 38
(2014) (encouraging the drawing of 4th Amendment lines with growth of big data policing); Elizabeth E.jo,
Reciaiming Abandoned' DNA: The Fourth Amendment and Genetic Privacy, 100 Nw. L. REV. 857, 882-83 (2006)
(discussing the problem of loss of rights with abandoned DNA).
298. Rachel Harmon makes a compelling case that we should track police data more carefully. Rachel
Harmon, Why Do We (Still) Lack Data On Pokcing?, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 1119, 1124 (2012) ("If data about crime
rates and the costs and benefits of policing practices are crucial to voters, they are equally important to police
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critical. As a part of better criminal accountability, the federal government must
track data for national convictions and imprisonment numbers. The Bureau of

Justice Statistics stopped tracking national conviction and imprisonment data

2 99
in 2006, which makes it very difficult to determine the full course of a crime.
Pressure on the federal government to restore this program will allow us to
consider criminal accountability nationally.
Second, providing knowledge about how low criminal accountability
generally is-and how ineffective police are--could help improve policing.
This may be the major contribution of this Article, providing a national review
of police effectiveness for major crimes. The information in this Article is
surprising and may spark change. If police are compared to other emergency
services of fire and ambulance, it would be like the fire department only
responding to two out of ten fires that are reported and only putting out the
fire in two out of every 100 fires. The general public has no idea how ineffective
police are at solving crime. Police may be more likely to focus on improving
reporting numbers, for instance, if this were a national or state focus. Some

countries have higher rates of reporting because they allow police reports for
300
We could experiment with such
serious crimes via telephone or internet.
tactics if the rate of low accountability were a national concern.
One counterargument to providing this information broadly is that it may
incentivize more people to commit crimes. Is it possible that knowing how little
criminal accountability there is leads to chaos and lawlessness rather than police
reform? Will people be incentivized to commit more crimes because of how
many people get away with it? There is a risk in informing the public about low

accountability or demonstrating how easy it is to get away with crime. Given
that these threats already exist, many criminals often do not act rationally, and
301
the risk may be worth it.
the costs of crime are so great,

chiefs and other high-ranking department officials who develop and implement law enforcement strategies
and procedures.").
299. The FBI should also compare NCVS data on reported crime with reports to police departments
and provide information so that police departments can have easy access to this information.
300. SWEDISH NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CRIME PREVENTION, supra note 296, at 11 (providing an
example of high reporting numbers in Sweden and noting that individuals can file police reports in person,
via telephone, and on the internet); SWEDISH NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CRIME PREVENTION, supranote 296,

at 12 (noting that Norway allows reporting at the police station or on the internet); SWEDISH NATIONAL
at the police
COUNCIL OF CRIME PREVENTION, supra note 296, at 14 (noting that Denmark allows reporting
OF CRIME
COUNCIL
NATIONAL
SWEDISH
internet);
or
telephone
via
and
crime,
the
station, at the scene of

PREVENTION, supra note 296, at 20 (noting that England and Wales allow reporting at the police station and

via telephone or internet). Butsee SWEDISH NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CRIME PREVENTION, supranote 296, at

16-17, 19 (noting that Germany and the Netherlands only allow reporting at the scene of the crime, at a
Like
police station, and less commonly on the telephone and internet, and mostly for minor crimes).
File a
Germany, jurisdictions in the U.S. only allow online reporting of crimes for less serious crimes. See, e.g.,
Police Report Online, D.C. GOV'T, https://mpdc.dc.gov/service/file-police-report-online (last accessed Feb.
17, 2020) (noting that online reporting is allowed for minor thefts and lost property).
301. See, e.g., Shima B. Baughman, Costs of PretrialDetention, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1, 9 (2017) (discussing the
tangible and intangible costs of major crimes including murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault).
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Indeed, this information could lead to important discussions within
communities about how resources should be allocated to police. Some
jurisdictions may experiment with providing more police resources to improve
crime reporting, and others may allocate resources towards crime resolution
without arrest. Still, others might focus on improving arrest and conviction
numbers for violent crimes to improve safety. An integral part of tracking
criminal accountability may include prioritizing crimes that are important to the
community. If a police department's arrest rates in a given year include 50%
drug offenses and 10% violent crimes, a community may provide input and
refocus the police on areas they are most troubled by. Experimenting to

improve police effectiveness would be possible when police departments are
aware of the crimes occurring in their neighborhoods. An overall understanding
of how low accountability rates are in general could pressure police to refocus
their efforts to resolve the most harmful crimes in their particular communities.
Third, we must track the full course of a crime and consider whether police
are effective-nationally and locally. Crimes must be followed all the way from

incidence to victim report, police report, arrest, clearance, conviction or
resolution in another way, and imprisonment. Simply put, the criminal
accountability charts provided as samples in this Article should become a staple
in every jurisdiction (with added columns for alternative ways to resolve
crimes).
The first point of police effectiveness occurs when an individual decides
whether to report a crime to police. If police focused on improving this metric,
it could improve their effectiveness in helping solve crimes. Though, there is an
argument that focusing on known crimes is not a better measure of police
effectiveness than reporting. First, one may argue that what I refer to as true
clearance or true conviction is not any truer than the standard method of
measuring these rates. There is error in any reporting of crime-whether by
NCVS or FBI. There are potential fraud problems with NCVS or FBI reports,
and arguably this is worse for NCVS given that it is a self-reported survey where
no evidence is required. 30 2 Filing a police report requires evidence and signing
statements and may be a more reliable source. However, on the other side, if
the NCVS reports are accurate, more than half of the most serious crimes are
not reported to police. 303 Is it possible that over fifteen million people are
fabricating crimes in NCVS reports each year? Anything is possible, but given
the massive scope of known crimes, it seems wise to at least consider them. If
we could consistently track the reasons people are not reporting to police and
study this locally, we could get a targeted answer as to how to improve reporting

302.

See supra Part I.B and Part 11 for further discussion of this counterargument.

303.

See infra Appendix Table 4 for more detailed reporting for each crime and for various years.
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rates. 304 Police could study NCVS data on victim reporting for their particular
county to see where they could improve reporting numbers. Indeed, tracking
crimes from incidence to reporting is likely to help improve police effectiveness
over the current system.

Police must know their particular jurisdictions and compare known crimes
with reporting rates and the various ways cases are resolved. This will take local
305
This may seem
coordination with the FBI and NCVS, which can be difficult.

like a chicken and egg problem but measuring police effectiveness starting at
known crimes will help motivate police departments to track this metric. If
police are not aware of crimes occurring in their jurisdiction that are not

reported to police, they will never improve reporting rates or gain trust in the
community. Gaining trust in the community can in turn improve clearance
306
rates. This will further improve police legitimacy and perceptions of fairness.

This may be circular but improving in any one category can improve the others.
Knowing all of the criminal accountability data is the first step.
Tracking police effectiveness from incidence of crime to conviction or case

resolution avoids some incentives to falsely arrest or misrepresent clearance
numbers. With the current focus on clearance rates, police can arrest suspects
to improve clearance numbers, or rely on faulty evidence that does not result
in a conviction, with little measurable effect on their performance. This system,
as discussed in Part I.C, has led to many police departments falsifying or double

counting clearance and arrest numbers and unfairly counting too many crimes
as cleared by exceptional means. Motivating police to focus on case resolution
rather than clearance helps police to create the best cases possible for
prosecutors or to resolve the cases in other ways. The current silo effect, where
police are accountable only to the point of clearance and prosecutors are
is not helping police
until conviction/imprisonment,
accountable
effectiveness. 307 Having police accountable for the entire criminal cycle-from

occurrence to imprisonment-is the only way to avoid the current
compartmentalism of police and prosecutors. For instance, a police department

304. NCVS tracks the reasons people do not report to police, but these numbers are best studied by
police departments as they apply to local jurisdictions. Currently, police are not focused on tracking these
known crimes or improving reporting rates.
305. Obtaining data from local jurisdictions is extremely difficult. See, e.g., Sam Bass Warner, Crimes
Known to the Polce-an Index of Crime?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 307, 309 (1931) ("These statistics are not obtained
by the United States Department ofJustice by virtue of state or federal laws requiring city police departments
to send in such figures, but merely as the voluntary offering of the chiefs of police of various cities.").
See Sunshine & Tyler, supra note 100.
307. Kate Levine, Who Shouldn't Prosecute the Police, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1447, 1465 (2016) ("Police
officers investigate and arrest suspects, often without any input from the prosecutors who will eventually try
the case."); Daniel Richman, Prosecutorsand Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749,
758 (2003) (describing the relationship of federal prosecutors and police as a "bilateral monopoly");
STEPHANos BMBAs, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 32 (2012) ("Police decide whom, where, and
what to investigate; whether and whom to arrest or issue citations; and whether and which charges to file.
Sometimes they even decide whether to refer a case to federal or state prosecutors.").
306.
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would have less incentive to arrest individuals on faulty evidence or clear a case
by exceptional means when they are accountable in resolving cases rather than
simply clearing them. This could have incidental positive impacts such that
police might think twice before arresting and imprisoning individuals if they
have an option to safely resolve a case without arrest. Police can track whether
any community initiatives improve reporting or case resolution rates. Simply by
tracking case resolution on par with arrest and conviction numbers allows
police to change their focus (to restitution rather than conviction for instance)
without being penalized by the data. Right now, not arresting a person for a
reported crime is a failure, and police act accordingly. Criminal accountability
certainly does not require police involvement in terms of arrest.
In all of the suggested proposals above, there is a reliance on tracking data

and numbers-of crimes known, reported, arrested, convicted, and resolved.
Anytime there is a focus on numbers, there is a concern that behavior shifts in

order to improve perceptions of crime. Prior experience demonstrates that
when police departments focus excessively on clearance rates, it has led to
incentives to inaccurately report numbers, or worse yet, falsely arrest people. 30s
It is possible that false reporting would increase with a greater understanding
of how low criminal accountability is nationwide. There is an argument that the
temptation to fraudulently report arrests would increase if there was more of a
focus on clearance rates. Even with these issues receiving limited attention,
there have been reports of select police departments misrepresenting these
numbers. 309 Indeed, there will always be a desire for police departments to
protect local reputations by keeping crime-rate statistics low and clearance rates
high. 310 At the same time, we know that if additional time and resources are
dedicated to solving cases, the probability of an arrest increases. 311 How do we
place an appropriate amount of attention on the fact that so few crimes are
solved without creating improper police incentives to over-arrest or
fraudulently report numbers? The approach recommended here focuses on
many numbers-besides clearance-as criminal accountability tracks known
crimes to cases resolved. The hope is that, by tracking the entire cycle of a crime
(seven datapoints), we will be able to track police effectiveness without having

308.

See supraPart

309.

See supraPart

LB
LB

for further discussion.
for further discussion.

310. Donald R. Cressey, The State of Criminal Statistics, 3 NAT'L PROBATION & PAROLE ASS'N J. 230,
232 (1957) ("Police have an obligation to protect the reputation of their cities, and when this cannot be done
efficiently under existing legal and administrative machinery it is sometimes accomplished statistically.").
311. GREENE, supra note 15, at 184; see Steven G. Brand] & James Frank, The RelationshipBetween
Evidence, Detective Effort and the Disposition of Burglary and Robbery Investigations, 13 AM. J. OF POLICE 149, 163
(1994). For similar findings for homicide, see Charles Welford & James Cronin, An Anaysis of Variables
Affecting the Clearance of Homicides: A Multistate Study, Justice Research and Statistics Association, 243 NATIONAL
INST. JUST. J. (Apr. 2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/jr000243b.pdf. (finding that the numbers of
detectives assigned and the time taken to arrive at the scene and follow up on witnesses impacted clearance
rates).
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a single metric that police are punished for not improving. Police cannot increase
clearance numbers falsely because conviction rates will be unnaturally low.
Indeed, inflating numbers in one category will create problems in another
category and will be harder to achieve. Police have to constantly improve
reporting of crimes by improving their relationships with the community. The
hope is that the full picture will result in several other data points (known
crimes/conviction/case resolution) that will help improve police effectiveness

without incentivizing misrepresentation of one category.
Tracking the entire cycle of the crime will also allow police to "solve" or
resolve crimes without arrest. Police currently clear a case only by arresting

someone and turning them over to prosecution or by showing the presence of
exceptional means. We know that police use discretion in making arrests and
arrest only a small amount of the time. Currently, police departments do not
track cases that are resolved without an arrest, and this can reflect negatively
against a police department if a police officer decides not to arrest. Police
should be able to track other crimes and report when they resolve cases by
alternative means. These case resolution numbers are one way to incentivize
police to openly report the cases they solve without resorting to arrest. This
acknowledges that police can use mediation, restitution, referral to treatment,
31 2
or other methods to address a crime. The next step is settling on a measure
to determine how effective police are at resolving crimes. Indirect measures
including community and victim surveys and independent studies have been
313
If we stop measuring
used successfully and may be an approach to consider.
to arrest and convict
them
incentivize
may
we
rates,
police simply by clearance
only when necessary and use creativity to resolve crimes. Careful tracking of all
criminal accountability numbers-known crimes, reporting to police, arrest
rates, clearance, conviction, imprisonment, and crimes resolved at a local and
national level-is an important first step.

312.

See supra note 131 for further discussion.

313.

MASLOV, supranote 27, at 2:

Some indirect measures of police performance include surveys, direct observations of social
behaviour, situational studies and independent testing. Measurements of police performance
through public opinion polling include: 1) general questions on satisfaction with police and 2)
specific questions on police performance. The general questions on satisfaction with police asked
on surveys is supposed to be the simplest and quickest way to measure the overall level of
satisfaction of citizens with the police. It is important to ask these types of questions because: a)
they provide a quick indicator for the overall support for police among citizens; b) they carry
implications for the support constituents give to police work; and c) a decrease in the perceived
legitimacy of the police could potentially lead to non-compliance with the authority of the police
and increased crime rates (citation omitted).
A few departments now use citizen satisfaction surveys on a regular basis, but most do not. MASLOV, supra
note 27, at 2.
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CONCLUSION
How effective are police at solving crime? It turns out, unfortunately, not
very effective. 314 This is the first major contribution of this Article, providing a
national review of police effectiveness for major crimes. People turn to police
when they are victims of serious crime only about half the time, and much less
often for some crimes. 315 Of the crimes we know about, police are able to arrest
individuals on average about 10% of the time for major crimes committed, and
convict individuals less than 2 % of the time. 316 That is to say, police bring less
than 2% of criminal defendants to criminal accountability for major crimes. The
ranges of criminal accountability vary with the seriousness of the crime, with
murder having the highest rate of accountability. At police's best, in some years,
40 to 52% of murderers are getting away with their crimes. 317 With rape,
individuals are getting away with it up to 90% of the time. 318 And property
crimes are much worse with burglars getting away with it 97% of the time,
robbers 94%, and those who commit larceny 99% of the time. 319 This lack of
police effectiveness means people are getting away with serious crime, and
victims are suffering as a result.
This lack of criminal accountability can have devastating effects on victims
and their families. Just the sheer number of victims of crime revealed in this
Article should give us pause. In 2006, for instance, 20.7 million victims (98%
of all victims) 320 received no resolution for the crimes they endured. 321
Low criminal accountability can also lead to a lack of public security and
can threaten law and order. 322 This is certainly a concern of mine in revealing
the crime accountability rates in this Article. Now that the public is aware of
how easy it is to get away with crime, are they going to accept the dangerous
invitation to perpetrate crime with the promise of going unnoticed? Although
an attack on the conventional wisdom that police are largely effective in crime
solving might be viewed by some as a dangerous invitation to criminals to
attempt more criminality with the promise of going unnoticed, the reality is that

314. Police may certainly be effective at maintaining order and preventing crime, but these were not
measured here.
315.

See supra Part IL.B for further discussion.

316.

See supraPart II.A for further discussion.

317. See infra Appendix Table 6 for sources and calculations. This considers the percentage of murders
that do not result in a conviction.
318.

See infra Appendix Table 6 for sources.and calculations.

319.

See infra Appendix Table 6 for sources and calculations.

320. See infra Appendix Table 1-1990 (Part III) (exact calculation is 98.05% of victims and 20,749,770
million victims).
321. See infra Appendix Table 2- 2006 (Part III) (exact calculation is 98.05% of victims and 20,749,770
million victims).
322.

See Sparrow, supranote 26, at 20-21.
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these threats already exist, and continuing to ignore them is not good law or

good policy.
So, how can we improve police effectiveness? The solution is better
tracking throughout the full course of a crime-starting at reporting. First,
scholars and policymakers need to have critical conversations about the rates
of low criminal accountability in the U.S. and our overall failure at measuring
police effectiveness. Criminal accountability helps us track and consider the full
picture of crime. The full accounting of police data, as demonstrated above, is
disturbing, but considering these numbers is the first step in improving the
effectiveness of police. Second, police departments should individually study
why reporting rates are so low and explore ways to increase trust in the police.

It is possible that the punitive nature of some police departments may prevent
many from turning to police because they do not want to ruin the lives and
323
future job prospects of their family or friends. Third, the federal government
should work with local governments to create uniform national recording of all
crime metrics 324 and uniform definitions of all points of criminal
325
accountability-including clearance and crime resolution rates. This includes
tracking the entire cycle of a crime from when a crime is known through case
resolution-with all seven datapoints recorded for each jurisdiction. With a
focus on case resolution that does not involve arrest, police may focus on
obtaining results for victims that do not necessarily involve conviction and
punishment. Tracking the entire course of a crime helps us to better track police

performance in hopes of one day improving police performance.

323.

See supra Part I.C.4 for further discussion.

324. This includes recording of the entire cycle of crime-known, reported, arrests, clearance,
convictions, and case resolutions with uniform definitions of each category.
325.

See supra Part LC.4.
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APPENDIX
Table 1-19902 (Part I)
Type of Offense

(a)
Number
3
Known

(b)
Number of
Offenses
4
Reported

(c)
Percent
5
Reported
(% of
col. a)

(d)
Number
6
Arrested

Total

30,661,8609

14,475,630

47.21%

Murder and
Nonnegligent
Manslaughter10

N/A

23,440

N/A

Rape/Sexual
Assault"
Robbery

130,260

102,560

1,149,710

639,270

Aggravated
Assault
Larceny-Theft

1,600,670

2,313,247

(e)
Standard
Percent
7
Arrested
(% of
col. b)
15.98%

(f)
True
Percent
Arrested'
(% of
col. a)
7.54%

18,298

78.06%

78.06%

30,966

30.19%

23.77%

55.60%

136,300

21.32%

11.86%

1,054,860

65.90%

376,917

35.73%

23.55%

20,642,500

7,945,700

38.49%

1,241,236

15.62%

6.01%

Burglary

5,147,740

3,073,900

59.71%

341,192

11.10%

6.63%

Motor Vehicle
Theft

1,967,540

1,635,900

83.14%

168,338

10.29%

8.56%

78

3

.7 %

Table 1-199012 (Part II)
(b)
(g)
Number of
Number
5
Offenses
Cleared
4
Reported1
(col. h *
col. b)

Type of Offense

(a)
Number
3
Known

Total

30,661,8601

14,475,630

3,075,559.97

21.25%

(I)
True
Percent
Cleared17
(% of
col. a)
10.03%

Murder and
Nonnegligent

N/A

23,440

15,751.68

67.20%

67.20%

Rape/Sexual
20
Assault
Robbery

130,260

102,560

53,126.08

51.80%

40.78%

1,149,710

639,270

155,342.61

24.30%

13.51%

Aggravated Assault

1,600,670

1,054,860

595,995.90

56.50%

37.23%

Larceny-Theft

20,642,500

7,945,700

1,612,977.10

20.30%

7.81%

Burglary

5,147,740

3,073,900

414,976.50

13.50%

8.06%

Motor Vehicle
Theft

1,967,540

1,635,900

227,390.10

13.90%

11.56%

(h)
Standard
Percent
6
Cleared1

Manslaughter"
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Type of Offense

(a)
Number
Known22

Table 1-199021
(b)
Number of
Offenses
Reported23

(Part III)
(j)
Number
24
Convicted

Total

30,661,86027

14,475,630

Murder and
Nonnegligent
2
Manslaughter

N/A

Rape/Sexual
Assault29
Robbery

(k)
Standard
Percent
Convicted25
(% of col b)

(1)
True Percent
26
Convicted
(% of col. a)

379,292

2.62%

1.24%

23,440

11,028

47.05%

47.05%

130,260

102,560

18,173

17.72%

13.95%

1,149,710

639,270

48,783

7.63%

4.24%

Aggravated
Assault
Larceny-Theft

1,600,670

1,054,860

54,31630

5.15%

3.39%

20,642,500

7,945,700

94,738

1.19%

0.46%

Burglary

5,147,740

3,073,900

109,849

3.57%

2.13%

Motor Vehicle
Theft

1,967,540

1,635,900

21,340

1.30%

1.08%

Type of
Offense

(a)
Number
Known3'

Table 2-2006 (Part I)
(d)
(c)
(b)
Number
Percent
Number of
33
Arrested
Reported
Offenses
32
(% of
Reported
col. a)

Total

21,162,43834

10,092,450

47.69%

Murder and
Nonnegligent
Manslaughter

N/A

14,948

Rape/Sexual
36
Assault
Robbery

272,350

Aggravated
Assault
LarcenyTheft
Burglary

2,135,238

(e)
Standard
Percent
Arrested
(% of
col. b)
21.16%

(f)
True
Percent
Arrested
(% of
col. a)
10.090

N/A

13,435

89.88%

89.88%

80,440

29.54%

24,535

30.50%

9.01%

711,570

384,844

54.08%

125,605

32.64%

17.65%

1,354,750

760,753

56.15%

447,948

58.88%

33.06%

14,275,150

5,810,638

40.70%

1,081,157

18.61%

7.57%

3,539,760

1,956,175

55.26%

304,801

15.58%

8.61%

137,757

12.70%

13.86%

35

Motor
Vehicle Theft

993,910

1,084,652

109.13%37
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Type of
Offense

(a)
Number
38
Known

Total

21,162,43841

Table 2-2006 Part II
(b)
(g)
Number of
Number
Offenses
Cleared
39
Reported
(col. h *
col. b)
10,092,450
1,943,955.92

Murder and
Nonnegligent
42
Manslaughter

N/A

14,948

Rape/Sexual
43
AsSault
Robbery

272,350

Aggravated
Assault
Larceny-Theft
Burglary
Motor Vehicle

(h)
Standard
Percent
Cleared*

(i)
True Percent
Cleared
(% of col. a)

19.26%

9.19%

9,073.44

60.70%

60.70%

80,440

32,899.96

40.900/

12.08%

711,570

384,844

96,980.69

25.20%

13.63%

1,354,750

760,753

410,806.62

54.00%

30.32%

14,275,150

5,810,638

1,011,051.01

17.40%

7.08%

3,539,760

1,956,175

246,478.05

12.60%

6.96%

993,910

1,084,652

136,666.15

12.60%

13.75%

Theft_________________

Type of Offense

(a)
Number
Known"

Table 2-2006
(b)
Number of
Offenses
4
Reported 5

art II
(j)
Number
Convicted46

Total

21,162,43847

10,092,450

413,026

4.09%

1.95%

Murder and
Nonnegligent
4
Manslaughter 8

N/A

14,948

8,845

59.17%

59.17%

(k)
Standard
Percent
Convicted
(%of

col. b)

()
True
Percent
Convicted
(% of col. a)

Rape/Sexual
Assault"
Robbery

272,350

80,440

33,618

41.79%

12.34%

711,570

384,844

43,059

11.19%

6.05%

Aggravated Assault

1,354,750

760,753

101,108

13.29%

7.46%

Larceny-Theft

14,275,150

5,810,638

107,738

1.85%

0.75%

Burglary

3,539,760

1,956,175

99,964

5.11%

2.82%

Motor Vehicle

993,910

1,084,652

18,694

1.72%

1.88%

Theft

_____
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Table 3-2018 (Part I)

1,679,012

(e)
Standard
Percent
Arrested
(% of
col. b)
21.55%

(f)
True
Percent
Arrested
(% of
col. a)
10.57%

11,970

80.95%

80.95%

17.32%

25,205

19.81%

3.43%

260,709

45.49%

88,128

33.80%

15.38%

1,058,040

745,238

70.44%

395,800

53.11%

37.41%

10,329,210

4,812,405

46.59%

887,622

18.44%

8.59%

2,639,620

1,128,351

42.75%

178,611

15.83%

6.77%

534,010

701,248

131.32%57

91,676

13.07%

17.17%

Type of
Offense

(a)
Number
Known50

(b)
Number of
Offenses
5
Reported 1

(c)
Percent
Reported
(% of
col. a)

(d)
Number
52
Arrested

Total

15,883,39653

7,789,995

49.04%

Murder and
Nonnegligent
Manslaughter54

N/A

14,786

N/A

Rape/Sexual
5
Assault
Robbery

734,63056

127,258

573,100

Aggravated
Assault
Larceny-Theft
Burglary
Motor Vehicle
Theft

Table 3-2018 (Part II)
Type of Offense

(a)
Number
Known58

Total

15,883,396

(h)
Standard
Percent
Cleared60

()
True Percent
Cleared
(% of col. a)

7,789,995

(g)
Number
Cleared
(col. h *
col. b)
1,685,378.89

21.64%

10.61%

(b)
Number of
Offenses
59
Reported

61

Murder and
Nonnegligent
62
Manslaughter

N/A

14,786

9,211.68

62.30%

62.30%

Rape/Sexual
63
Assault
Robbery

734,63064

127,258

42,504.17

33.40%

5.79%

573,100

260,709

79,255.54

30.40%

13.83%

Aggravated Assault

1,058,040

745,238

391,249.95

52.50%

36.98%

Larceny-Theft

10,329,210

4,812,405

909,544.55

18.90%

8.81%

Burglary

2,639,620

1,128,351

156,840.79

13.90%

5.94%

13.80%

18.12%

Motor Vehicle
Theft

534,010

701,248

96,772.22
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Table 4-Percent of Crimes Reported to Police (FBI/NCVS)65
1995

47.21%

37.22%
6

Murder and
Nonnegligent
Manslaughter

1998

2004

37.15
%
N/A

46.44

N/A

N/A

Rape/Sexual
6
Assault 8

78.73%

24.25%

21.37
%

Robbery

55.60%

44.00%

Aggravated
Assault

65.90%

49.31%

39.59
%
44.41
%

LarcenyTheft
Burglary

38.49%

30.94%

59.71%

45.97%

Motor
Vehicle
Theft

83.14%

78.73%

2006

2009

2014

2018

47.69%

54.88%

49.59%

49.04%

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

31.65

29.54%

60.57%

35.09%

17.32%

54.08%

65.97%

44.84%

45.49%

56.15%

85.08%

61.78%

70.44%

40.70%

47.46%

45.08%

46.59%

55.26%

62.45%

52.57%

42.75%

101.45

109.13

97.06%

119.72

%69

%70

131.24
0/72

%

Total

1990

%

53.47

%

51.36

%

40.63
51.62
%

31.81
%
44.14
%
86.51
%

%

67

%71

Table 5-Percent of Crimes Known Where Police Make Arrests (True Percent Arrested) 73
1990

1995

1998

2006

2009

2014

2018

Total

7.54%

9.12%

9.55%

10.21

10.09%

13.46%

11.78%

10.57%

Murder and
Nonnegligent
Manslaughter

78.06%

115.86
%74

0 75
/

132.86

98.57

89.88%

93.78%

82.08%

80.95%

Rape/Sexual
Assault
Robbery

23.77%

10.18%

9.34%

10.19

9.01%

17.00%

7.39%

3.43%

15.05%

13.63

17.68

17.65%

23.74%

14.21%

15.38%

23.55%

30.19%

33.06%

51.16%

34.13%

37.41%

6.01%

6.95%

30.27
%
7.38%

8.05%

7.57%

11.40%

10.53%

8.59%

6.63%

8.01%

8.16%

8.19%

8.61%

9.55%

7.95%

6.77%

8.56%

11.600/

13.24
%

13.89

13.86%

11.12%

12.80%

17.16%

%

30.88
%

11.86%

%

Motor
Vehicle Theft

%

76
____%

Aggravated
Assault
LarcenyTheft
Burglary

2004
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Table 6-True Percent Convicted

(%

Held Responsible)77
200678

2004

1998

1990

1.24%

1.35%

1.81%

1.95%

47.05%

72.56%

62.88%

59.17%

13.95%

9.11%

13.14%

12.34%

Robbery

4.24%

4.57%

6.53%

6.05%

Aggravated Assault

3.39%

4.26%

6.69%

7.46%

Larceny-Theft

0.46%

0.53%

0.70%

0.75%

Burglary

2.13%

2.17%

2.61%

2.82%

Motor Vehicle
Theft

1.08%

1.28%

1.59%

1.88%

Total
Murder and
Nonnegligent
Manslaughter
Rape/Sexual
Assault

Type of Offense

Table 7-Criminal Accountability (FBI Reported), 2006
(d)
(c)
(b)
(a)
True
True
Percent
Number
7
Percent
Percent
Reported
Known 9
1
Cleared82
Arrested8
(FBI)80
(% of
(% of col. a)
(% of col. a)
col. a)

(e)
True Percent
Convicted83
(% of col. a)

Total

21,162,43884

47.69%

10.09%

9.19%

1.95%

Murder and
Nonnegligent
Manslaughter85

N/A

N/A

89.88%

60.70%

59.17%

Rape/Sexual
Assault86
Robbery

272,350

29.54%

9.01%

12.08%

12.34%

711,570

54.08%

17.65%

13.63%

6.05%

Aggravated Assault

1,354,750

56.15%

33.06%

30.32%

7.46%

Larceny-Theft

14,275,150

40.70%

7.57%

7.08%

0.75%

Burglary

3,539,760

55.26%

8.61%

6.96%

2.82%

Motor Vehicle
Theft

993,910

109.13%87

13.86%

13.75%

1.88%
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Table 8-Criminal Accountability (NCVS Reporting), 2006
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

Type of Offense

Number
Known"'

Percent

Total

21,162,43893

Serious Violent

N/A

True Percent

True Percent

Reported
(NCVS)89

Arrested
(% of col. a)

Cleared
(% of col. a)

Convicted92
(% of col. a)

N/A

10.09%

9.19%

1.95%

N/A

N/A

N/A

60.70%

59.17%

AA

56.43/

Crime
Murder and

Nonnegligent

(e)

True Percent

1

1

N/A

N/A

89.88%

272,350
711,570

41.40%

9.01%

12.08/u

12.34%

56.90%

17.65%

13.63%

6.05%

Aggravated Assault

1,354,750

59.20%

33.06%

30.32%

7.46%

Property Crime

N/A

37.70%

N/A

N/A

N/A

Larceny-Theft

14,275,150

31.70%

7.57%

7.08%

0.75%

Burglary

3,539,760

49.60%

8.61%

6.96%

2.82%

993,910

81.000%

13.860/

13.75%/

1.88%

Manslaugh ter"7
Rape/Sexual
Assault"
Robbery

Motor Vehicle

Theft

Figure 1 - Percentage of Violent Victimizations

Reported to Police 1973-2018 (NCVS)
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Figure 2 - Percent of Violent Victimization Reported
to Police (FBI)
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Figure 3

-
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1. See U.S. Dep't of Just., Bureau of Just. Stats., Data Collection: National Crime VictimiZation Survey
(NCVS), BUREAU OF JUST. STATS. (last visited Sept. 11, 2020), https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail
&iid=245. The NCVS changed its method of collection in 2006 and 2016, so it is hard to compare crime
estimates from year to year. Id. However, 2006 is also the latest year for state conviction data, so it is used to
get a general sense of criminal accountability over the years.
2. This chart is similar to that of Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U.
L. REV. 453, 461 (1997). Changes include: "Aggravated Assault" rather than "Assault" and the calculations
for the Aggravated Assault row and Larceny-Theft row. The 1990 Tables include examples of calculations in
footnotes, while 2006 and 2018 do not because the same method is used for all. Tables for 1995,
1998, 2004,
and 2014 are on file with author and available upon request.
3.

See BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1990 16 tbl.

(Feb. 1992), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvs90.pdf
4.

[hereinafter 1990 REPORT].

See BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1992 357 tbl.3.122

(1993), https://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/scjs92.pdf [hereinafter 1992 REPORT]. This paper mostly uses the
number of offenses reported to police from the FBI's Uniform Crime Report, Offenses Known data for
(b) Number of Offenses Reported, and (c) Percent Reported. The NCVS also has an estimated percent
reported to police measure. It will be noted when the NCVS data is used.
5. Example of Calculation: Robbery: 639,270 (Bureau of Justice Statistics Number of Offenses
Reported) / 1,149,710 (NCVS Number Known) = 55.6% (Percent Reported).
6.

BUREAU OF JUST. STATS. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1991 433 tbl.4.2
(1992),

https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/scjs9l.pdf

[hereinafter 1991 REPORT].

7. Example of Calculation: Robbery: 136,300 (Number Arrested) / 639,270 (Number of Offenses
Reported) = 21.32% (Standard Percent Arrested).
Example of Calculation: Robbery: 136,300 (Bureau ofJustice Statistics Number Arrested) / 1,149,710
(NCVS Number Known) = 11.9% (True Percent Arrested).
9. This number is the NCVS "Number Known" for Rape/Sexual Assault, Robbery, Aggravated
Assault, Larceny-Theft, Burglary, and Motor Vehicle Theft added together, plus the "Number of Offenses
Reported" for Murder because the NCVS does not measure murder.
10. The NCVS does not gather data for murder offenses. Murder percentages are calculated using
"Number of Offenses Reported" rather than "Number Known."
11. Definitions: The following sources do not use the term "Sexual Assault." Results from 1990 may
not be comparable to other years for the "Rape" offense.
- NCVS - Rape: "Camal knowledge through the use of force or the threat of force, including
attempts." 1990 REPORT, supra note 3, at 156 (used for Number Known).
- FBI (UCR) - Forcible Rape: "The carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will.
Include[s] . . . attempts .... " 1992 REPORT, supra note 4, at 711 (used for Number of Offenses
Reported).
- FJS - Rape: "[R]ape, assault with intent to commit rape, and camal knowledge of a female under
16 who is not one's wife." 1992 REPORT, supra note 4, at 740 (used for federal conviction data).
* NJRP - Rape: "Forcible intercourse (vaginal, anal, or oral) with a female or male... . Includes
attempts." 1992 REPORT, supra note 4, at 742 (used for state conviction data).
12. See supra note 2.
13.

See 1990 REPORT, supra note 3.

14.

See 1992 REPORT, supra note 4.

15. Example of Calculation: Robbery: (.243) (Standard Percent Cleared) * 639,270 (Number of
Offenses Reported) = 155,342.61 (Number Cleared).
Calculation for Total: 3,075,559.97 (Number Cleared for all individual crimes added together)
14,475,630 (Total Number of Offenses Reported) = 21.25% (Standard Percent Cleared).

/

16. See 1992 REPORT, supra note 4, at 450 tbl.4.19.

17. Example of Calculation: Robbery: 155,342.61 (Number Cleared) / 1,149,710 (Number Known) =
13.51% (True Percent Cleared).
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18. See supra note 9.
19.

See supra note 10.

20. See supra note 11.
21.

See supra note 2.

22. See 1990 REPORT, supra note 3.
23. See 1992 REPORT, supra note 4.
24. See id at 486 tbl.5.15, 527 tbl.5.49.
25. Example of Calculation: Robbery: 48,783 (Number Convicted) / 639,270 (Number of Offenses
Reported) = 7.63% (Standard Percent Convicted).
26. Example of Calculation: Robbery: 48,783 (Number Convicted) / 1,149,710 (Number Known) =
4.24% (True Percent Convicted).
27. See supra note 9.
28. See supra note 10.
29. See supra note 11.
30. See 1992 REPORT, supra note 4, at 486 tbl.5.15, 527 tbl.5.49. Table 5.15 is for federal convictions
and uses the term "Assault." Table 5.49 is for state convictions and uses the term "Aggravated Assault."
31.

MICHAEL RAND & SHANNAN CATALANO, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2006 3

tbl.2

(Dec. 2007),

6
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv0 .pdf.

32. FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2006 tbl.25 (Sept. 2007), https://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius
2006/data/table_25.html [hereinafter FBI, 2006]. This Article mostly uses the number of offenses reported
to police from the FBI's Uniform Crime Report, Offenses Known data for (b) Number of Offenses
Reported, and (c) Percent Reported. The NCVS also has an estimated percent reported to police measure.
This Article will note when using the NCVS data.
33. See id at tbl.29, https://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2006/data/table_29.html.
34. See supra note 9.
35. See supra note 10.
36. Definitions:
- NCVS-Rape/Sexual Assault (combined into one victimization measure): Rape includes
"[u]nlawful penetration of a person against the will of the victim." Sexual assault "[]ncludes
attacks or attempted attacks generally involving unwanted sexual contact between victim and
offender, with or without force." NCVS Victimizaton Analysis Tool (NVAT), Terms & Defniions,
BUREAU OF JUST. STATS. (Jan. 2019), https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=nvat (last visited Sept.
11, 2020) (used for Number Known).
- FBI-Forcible Rape: "The carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will. Assaults

and attempts to commit rape by force or threat of force are also included." FBI, 2006,
https://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2006/offenses/violent-crime/foriblerape.html
Number of Offenses Reported and Number Arrested).

(used

for

- NJRP-Sexual Assault (includes rape and other sexual assault): Rape: "forcible intercourse ...
with a female or male." Other sexual assault: "(1) forcible or violent sexual acts not involving
intercourse with an adult or minor, (2) nonforcible sexual acts with a minor (such as statutory
rape or incest with a minor), and (3) nonforcible sexual acts with someone unable to give legal or
factual consent because of mental or physical defect or intoxication .... [I]ncludes attempts."
SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., BUREAU OFJUST. STATs., FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS,

2006 33 (2009), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc6st.pdf (used for state conviction
data).
- FJSP-Sexual Abuse: "[R]ape, assault with intent to commit rape, and carnal knowledge of a
female under age 16 who is not one's wife, within the territorial and special maritime jurisdictions
of the U.S. Also includes cases of sexual abuse, including sexual abuse of a minor and cases of
sexual abuse in federal prisons." BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2006
6
0
22 (2009), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/html/fjsst/20 6/fjs0 st.pdf (used for federal
conviction data).
37. Definitions:
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- FBI-Motor Vehicle Theft: A motor vehicle "is a self-propelled vehicle which runs on land
surfaces and not on rails. Examples of motor vehicles include sport utility vehicles, automobiles,
trucks, buses, motorcycles, motor scooters, all-terrain vehicles, and snowmobiles." FBI, 2006,
https://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2006/offenses/property-crime/motor _vehicle_theft.html.
- NCVS-Motor Vehicle: "An automobile, truck, motorcycle, or any other motorized vehicle
legally allowed on public roads and highways." Terms & Definitions: Crime Type, BUREAU OF JUST.
STATS., https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?y=tdtp&tid=3 (last visited Feb. 11, 2020).
The number of offenses reported to the UCR was higher than the number the NCVS estimated for
offenses committed. This may be due to definitional differences between the FBI's UCR and the NCVS. Allterrain vehicles and snowmobiles are likely not counted by the NCVS and could account for the differences.
38. See RAND, supra note 31.
39. See FBI, 2006, supra note 32.
40. See FBI, 2006, supra note 32.
41. See supranote 9.
42. See supranote 10.
43.

See supranote 36.

44.

See RAND, supra note 31.

45.

See FBI, 2006, supra note 32.

46. This number is calculated by adding together state and federal conviction data. See SEAN
ROSENMERKEL ET AL., supranote 36, at 3 tbl.1.1 (used for state data); BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., supra note
36, at tbl.4.2 (used for federal conviction data).
47. See supra note 9.
48. See supra note 10.
49. See supra note 36.
50.

See RACHEL E. MORGAN & BARBARA A.

OUDEKERK,

DEPT OF JUST., CRIMINAL

VICTIMIZATION, 2018 4 tbl.l, 5 tbl.3 (Sept. 2019), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv8.pdf.
51. See FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2018 tbl.25, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-theu.s/2018/crime-in-the-u.s.-2018/topic-pages/tables/table-25 [hereinafter FBI, 2018]. This Article mostly
uses the number of offenses reported to police from the FBI's Uniform Crime Report, "Offenses Known"
data for "(b) Number of Offenses Reported," and "(c) Percent Reported." The NCVS also has an
estimated percent reported to police measure. This Article will note when the NCVS data is used.
52. FBI, 2018 tbl.29, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2018/crime-in-the-u s.-2018/topicpages/tables/table-29.
53. See supranote 9.
54. See supranote 10.
55. Definitions:

&

- NCVS-Rape: "Coerced or forced sexual intercourse. Forced sexual intercourse means vaginal,
anal, or oral penetration by the offender(s). This category could include incidents where the
penetration was from a foreign object such as a bottle. It includes attempted rape, threatened
rape, male and female victims, and both heterosexual and same-sex incidents." MORGAN
OUDEKERK, supranote 50, at 24.

- NCVS-Sexual assault: "A wide range of victimizations, separate from rape, attempted rape, or
threatened rape. These crimes include attacks or threatened attacks involving unwanted sexual
contact between the victim and offender. Sexual assaults may or may not involve force and
include such things as grabbing or fondling." MORGAN & OUDEKERK, supra note 50, at 24.
- FBI-Revised definition of rape: "[P]enetration, no matter how slight, of the vagina or anus
with any body part or object, or oral penetration by a sex organ of another person, without the
consent of the victim." FBI, 2018, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2018/crime-in-the-u.s.2018/topic-pages/rape (used for Number of Offenses Known, Number Arrested).
56. Note a significant increase in the number of victimizations. Sometimes NCVS adjusts numbers
when the next report comes out, but the 2019 report is not available yet.
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57. The number of motor vehicle offenses reported to the UCR was higher than the number the
NCVS estimated for offenses known. This may be due to two definitional differences between the FBI's
UCR and the NCVS. The first one deals with the definition of the motor vehicle, and the second is whether
the report is measuring the number of offenses, the number of households, or the number of victims. See
FBI, 2018, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2018/crime-in-the-u.s.-2018/topic-pages/motor-vehicletheft; BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., supra note 37; see a/so Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utiky of
Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453, 458-61 (1997).
Another explanation is that the difference is due to what is being measured. The FBI states that
"motor vehicle theft is defined as the theft or attempted theft of a motor vehicle." FBI, 2018,
2
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2018/crime-in-the-u.s.- 018/topic-pages/motor-vehicle-theft. In
contrast, the NCVS measures motor vehicle theft by "[n]umber .. . of property victimizations" (table 3),
"[n]umber of households victimized" (table 18), and "[n]umber ... of persons who were victims" (table
19-where "[t]his measure attributes a burglary to each person age 12 or older in the household.
Completed motor-vehicle thefts were attributed to persons only when they were the reference person for
their household or were age 12 or older and were related to the reference person." This appears to mean
that if a car were stolen from a household where there were three people over the age of twelve, that would
be three victims of motor vehicle theft). See MORGAN & OUDEKERK, supra note 50, at 5 tbl.3, 17 tbl.18, 18
tbl.19. In this Article's chart, we use the "number of property victimizations," which is the number of
offenses that occur. That appears to be what the FBI is also measuring, but there is ambiguity that could
account for the abnormal results.
58. See MORGAN & OUDEKERK,

supra note

50.

59. See FBI, 2018, supra note 51.
60. See FBI, 2018, supra note 51.
61. See supra note 9.
62. See supra note 10.
63. See FBI, supra note 55.
64. See supra note 56.
65. In general, percentages were calculated as follows: (FBI Number of Offenses Reported / the NCVS
Number Known) = Percent Reported. The footnotes to Tables 1-3 provide sources and calculations for
1990, 2006, and 2018. Tables for 1995, 1998, 2004, and 2014 are on file with the author and available upon
request.
66. There was a large drop in "Percent Reported" from 1990 to 1995. There were large changes in the
estimated number of rapes and sexual assaults and a higher number of thefts in 1995. That may account for
the change. The change in the estimated number of rapes and sexual assaults is likely due to a change in
definition. The 1990 NCVS did not measure rape and sexual assault together. See LISA D. BASTIAN, BUREAU
STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1990 16 tbl.1 (1992),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvus90.pdf; see also CRIMINAL VICIMIZATION IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1990 142 (1990), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvus90.pdf.
OF JUST.

67. The NCVS does not account for estimated murders.

&

&

68. Rape/Sexual Assault is a difficult category to compare across time. The NCVS and FBI have
changed their definitions, but at different times. There was also a jump in the estimated number known from
284,350 in 2014 to 734,630 in 2018. The NCVS did not give an explanation. See supra note 56; MORGAN
OUDEKERK, supra note 50, at 4 tbl.1.
69. The number of motor vehicle offenses reported to the UCR was higher than the number the NCVS
estimated for offenses known. This may be due to a difference in definitions. See supra note 37 for additional
explanation. Compare FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2004 (2006), https://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_04
(motor vehicle theft), with Terms
/offenses-reported/property-crime/motor-vehicle_theft.html
Defnitions: Crime Type, supra note 37.
70. See supra note 37.
71. The number of motor vehicle offenses reported to the UCR was higher than the number the NCVS
estimated for offenses known. This may be due to two definitional differences between the FBI's UCR and
the NCVS. See supra note 37 for additional explanation. Compare FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2014
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/offenses-known-to-law(2014),
enforcement/motor-vehicle-theft [hereinafter FBI, 2014] (motor vehicle theft), with Terms & Definitions: Crime
Type, supra note 37.
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Another explanation is that the difference is due to what is being measured. The FBI states that "motor
vehicle theft is defined as the theft or attempted theft of a motor vehicle." FBI, 2014,
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/offenses-known-to-law-enforcement/
motor-vehicle-theft (motor vehicle theft). In contrast, the NCVS measures motor vehicle theft by "Property
Victimization," JENNIFER

L. TRUMAN & LYNN LANGTON, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION, 2013 3 tbl.3 (2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv3.pdf, and "Number of

Victims" (which includes "number of households that experienced at least one victimization during the year
for property crime"), id at 5 tbl.4. In these charts, we use the "Property Victimization," which is the number
of offenses that occur. That appears to be what the FBI is also measuring, but there is ambiguity that could
account for the abnormal results.
72. See supra note 57.
73. See supraTables 1-3 for 1990, 2006, and 2018 sources and calculations. Tables for 1995, 1998, 2004,
and 2014 are on file with the author and available upon request.
74. A possible explanation for why the percent arrested is over 100% is that during the investigation,
more than one person was arrested in connection for the murder or multiple people committed one murder.
75. Supra note 74.
76. 1990 numbers included only rape and attempted rape, not sexual assault. See LISA D. BASTIAN,
supranote 66, at 16 tbl.1.
77. See supra Tables 1-3 for 1990 and 2006 sources and calculations. Tables for 1998 and 2004 on file
with author and available upon request.
78. 2006 was the last year the NJRP produced data on state court convictions. See Data Collection:
NationaljudidalReportingPmgram(NJRP), BUREAU OFJUST. STATS. (2006), https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty
=dcdetail&iid=241 (last visited Sept. 15, 2020).
79. See RAND, supranote 31 for the citation to the FBI table that includes the Number Known for each
offense.
80. See supraTable 2 - 2006 (Part 1) and note 5.
81. See supraTable 2 - 2006 (Part 1) and note 8.
82. See supraTable 2 - 2006 (Part II) and note 17.
83. See supraTable 2 - 2006 (Part III) and note 26.
84. See supranote 9.
85. See supranote 10.
86. See supranote 36.
87. See supranote 37.
88.

See RAND & CATALANO, supranote 31.

89. Id at 5 tbl.8.
90. See supra Table 2 - 2006 (Part 1) and note 8.
91. See supra Table 2 - 2006 (Part II) and note 17.
92. See supra Table 2 - 2006 (Part III) and note 26.
93. See supra note 9.
94. This was calculated by taking the (NCVS Percent Reported) * (Number Known) = (Number
Reported). The Number Reported for Rape & Sexual Assault, Robbery, and Aggravated Assault were added
together and divided by their total Number Known. After 2009 NCVS began calculating percent reported to
police for "[s]erious violent crime[s]" in their reports. See JENNIFER L. TRUMAN & MICHAEL R. RAND,
BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2009 1 tbl.1 (2010), https://www.bjs.gov/content/

pub/pdf/cv09.pdf.
95. See supra note 10. The NCVS does not gather data for murder offenses. Murder percentages are
calculated using "Number of Offenses Reported" rather than "Number Known." We use the UCR numbers
for the denominator of our Murder percentages (true and standard) because the NCVS doesn't estimate the
number of murder offenses committed.
96.

See ROSENMERKEL ET AL, supranote 36.

Other sexual assault includes (1) forcible or violent sexual acts not involving
intercourse with an adult or minor, (2) nonforcible sexual acts with a minor (such as
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statutory rape or incest with a minor), and (3) nonforcible sexual acts with someone
unable to give legal or factual consent because of mental or physical defect or
intoxication. Other sexual assault includes attempts.
Id at 33.
97. Calculation for Serious Violent Crime before 2009 (after 2009 reports include Serious Violent
Crime measure): (NCVS % Reported * Total Known) = Number Reported. Add Number Reported for
individual crimes together = Total Number Reported. Add Total Known for individual crimes together =
Total Serious Violent Crime. Total Number Reported / Total Serious Violent Crime = % of Serious Violent
Crime Reported to Police.
The same sources report violent and property crime for each year.
1973-92: See LISA D. BASTIAN BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE

UNITED STATES 1992 at 5 tbl.5 (1993), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv92.pdf. The percent
reported for personal larceny without contact for those years is: 1973: 22%; 1974: 24%; 1975: 26%; 1976:
26%; 1977: 24%; 1978: 24%; 1979: 24%; 1980: 27%; 1981: 26%; 1982: 27%; 1983: 26%; 1984: 26%; 1985:
27%; 1986: 28%; 1987: 27%; 1988: 27%; 1989: 29%; 1990: 28%; 1991: 28%; 1992: 30%. LISA D. BASTIAN,
supra note 66, at 5 tbl.5. See CRAIG A. PERKINS ET AL., BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1993 9 tbl.1 n.3 (1996), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf
cvus93.pdf (stating that in 1993 "Theft [under "Property crimes"] include[d] crimes previously classified as
'Personal larceny without contact' and 'Household larceny"'). Before 1993, personal larceny without contact
was listed under "[c]rimes of theft." LISA D. BASTIAN, supranote 66, at 4 tbl.4. The reporting rates were
very similar, but this Article just uses "Larceny" under "household crimes" for this Figure. Also,
[In 1993, the NCVS broadened] the scope of covered sexual incidents beyond the categories of
rape and attempted rape. These include: sexual assault (other than rape)[,] verbal threats of rape
or sexual assault[, and] unwanted sexual contact without force but involving threats or other harm
to the victim. These new categories, broadened coverage, and more extensive questions on sexual
victimizations have elicited information on about 3 to 4 times as many sexual crime victimizations
as in the past.
Id. at 3.
1993-2000: See CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION
10
tbl.7
(2001),
1993-2000
WITH
TRENDS
1999-2000
2000,
CHANGES
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv00.pdf.
2001: See CALLIE RENNISON, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION 2001 10 (2002),

https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv01.pdf.
2002, 2010: JENNIFER L. TRUMAN & MICHAEL PLANTY, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL

VICTIMIZATION, 2011 8 tbl.8 (2012), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvl1.pdf.
2003, 2011: JENNIFER L. TRUMAN ET AL., BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2012
4 tbl.4 (2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv2.pdf.
2004, 2012: See JENNIFER L. TRUMAN & LYNN LANGTON, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL

VICTIMIZATION, 2013 3 tbl.3 (2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv3.pdf.
2005, 2013: JENNIFER L. TRUMAN & LYNN LANGTON, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION, 2014 7 tbl.6 (2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv4.pdf.
2006:

MICHAEL

RAND

&

SHANNAN

CATALANO,

BUREAU

OF JUST.

STATS.,

CRIMINAL

VICTIMIZATION, 2006 5 tbl.8 (2007), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv06.pdf.
2007: MICHAEL R. RAND, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2007 7 (2008),

https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv07.pdf.
2008: MICHAEL R. RAND, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2008 6

tbl.4

(2009),

https://www.bis.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv08.pdf.
2009: JENNIFER L. TRUMAN

& MICHAEL

R. RAND, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL

VICTIMIZATION, 2009 8 tbl.1 1(2010), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv09.pdf.
2014: JENNIFER L. TRUMAN & RACHEL E. MORGAN, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION, 2015 6 tbl.4 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv15.pdf.
2015: RACHEL E. MORGAN & GRACE KENA, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION,

2016: REVISED 7 tbl.4 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvl6.pdf.
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2016: RACHEL E. MORGAN & JENNIFER L. TRUMAN, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION, 2017 7 tbl.6 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvl7.pdf.
2017: See RACHEL E. MORGAN & BARBARA A. OUDEKERK, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION, 2018 8 tbl.5 (2019), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv8.pdf.

2018: Id.
98. Example of Calculation: (Number Reported to FBI - Offenses Known) / (Number of Known
Crimes - NCVS) = Estimated % Reported to Police.
1990: See LISA D. BASTIAN, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED

STATES, 1990 16 tbl.1 (1992), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvus90.pdf; BUREAU OFJUST. STATS.,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1995 324 tbl.3.109 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore
eds., 1996), https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/socrijusl995&i=1.
1991: See JOAN M. JOHNSON, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1991 16 tbl.1 (1992), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvus9l.pdf; BUREAU OF JUST. STATS.,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1995 324 tbl.3.109 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore
eds., 1996), https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/socrijusl995&i=1.

1992: See LISA D. BASTIAN, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION 1992 3 tbl.2 (1993),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv92.pdf;

BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL

JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1995 324 tbl.3.109. (Kathleen Maguire
https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.joumals/socrijusl995&i=1.

&

Ann

L.

Pastore

eds.,

1996),

1993: See CRAIG A. PERKINS ET AL., BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1993 9 tbl.1 (1996), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvus93.pdf.
[Starting in 1993, the] NCVS broaden[ed] the scope of covered sexual incidents beyond the
categories of rape and attempted rape. These include sexual assault (other than rape)[,] verbal
threats of rape or sexual assault[, and] unwanted sexual contact without force but involving threats
or other harm to the victim. These new categories, broadened coverage, and more extensive
questions on sexual victimizations have elicited information on about 3 to 4 times as many sexual
crime victimizations as in the past.

Id at 3; see also BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1995 324 tbl.3.109
(Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1996), https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/socrijus
1995&i=1.
1994: See TINA DORSEY & JAYNE ROBINSON, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION

&

IN THE UNITED STATES, 1994 6 tbl.1 (1997), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvius94.pdf; BUREAU
OF JUST. STATS., SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1995 324 tbl.3.109 (Kathleen Maguire

Ann L. Pastore eds., 1996), https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.joumals/socrijusl995&i=1.
1995: See PATSY KLAUS & CATHY MASTON, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN

THE UNITED STATES, 1995 8 tbl.1 (2000), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvus95.pdf; FBI, CRIME
IN THE UNITED STATES 1995, SECTION III - CRIME INDEX OFFENSES CLEARED 199 tbl.25 (1996),
https://uc.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/1995/95sec3.pdf.
1996, 1997: See MICHAEL RAND, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION 1997,

CHANGES 1996-97 WITH TRENDS 1993-97 3 tbl.l, (1998), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv97.pdf;
FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1996, SECTION III - CRIME INDEX OFFENSES CLEARED 205 tbl.25

(1997), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/1996/96sec3.pdf; FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1997,
SECTION III - CRIME INDEX OFFENSES CLEARED 213 tbl.25 (1998), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-theu.s/1997/97sec3.pdf.
1998: See BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1998

STATISTICAL TABLES 2 tbl.1 (2000), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvus98.pdf; FBI, CRIME IN
THE UNITED STATES 1998, SECTION III - CRIME INDEX OFFENSES CLEARED 201 tbl.25 (1999),
https://ucr.fbi.gov/cime-in-the-u.s/1998/98sec3.pdf.
1999, 2000: See CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATIONS
2000, CHANGES WITH TRENDS 1999-2000 3 tbl.1 (2001), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvOO.pdf;
FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1999, SECTION III - CRIME INDEX OFFENSES CLEARED 203 tbl.25
(2000), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/1999/99sec3.pdf; FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2000,
SECTION III - CRIME INDEX OFFENSES CLEARED 207 tbl.25 (2001), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-theu.s/2000/00sec3.pdf.
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2001: See CATHY MASTON & PATSY KLAUS, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN

THE UNITED STATES, 2001 STATISTICAL TABLES 14 tbl.1 (2003), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
cvus0l.pdf; FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2001, SECTION III - CRIME INDEX OFFENSES CLEARED
222 tbl.25 (2002), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2001/01sec3.pdf.
2002, 2010: See JENNIFER L. TRUMAN & MICHAEL PLANTY, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION, 2011 2 tbl.1 (2012), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv11 .pdf; FBI, CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES 2002, SECTION III - CRIME INDEX OFFENSES CLEARED 223 tbl.25 (2003),
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2002/02sec3.pdf; FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES tbl.25 (2010),
2
0
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/l tbl 5.xls.
2003, 2011: See JENNIFER L. TRUMAN ET AL., BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION,

2012 2 tbl.1 (2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv2.pdf; FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES
2003, SECTION III-OFFENSES CLEARED 257 tbl.25 (2004), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-theu.s/2003/03sec3.pdf; FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES tbl.25 (2011), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-theu.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/tables/table_25.
2004, 2012: See JENNIFER L. TRUMAN & LYNN LANGTON, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION, 2013 2 tbl.1 (2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv13.pdf; FBI, CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES tbl.25 (2004), https://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_04/offenses_cleared/table_25.htm; FBI,
CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES tbl.25 (2012), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.2012/tables/25tabledatadecoverviewpdfs/table_25_percent ofoffenses-cleared-by_arrest_or
exceptionalmeans_by_populationgroup_2012.xls.
2005, 2013: See JENNIFER L. TRUMAN & LYNN LANGTON, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL

VICTIMIZATION, 2014 2 tbl.1 (2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv4.pdf; FBI, CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES tbl.25 (2005), https://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/05cius/data/table_25.html; FBI, CRIME IN THE
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.(2013),
tbl.25
STATES
UNITED
2013/tables/table-25/table_25_percentof-offensescleared_.by_arrest-by_population-group_2013.xls.
2006: See MICHAEL RAND & SHANNAN CATALANO, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL

VICTIMIZATION, 2006 3 tbl.2 (2007), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv06.pdf; FBI, CRIME IN
THE UNITED STATES tbl.25 (2006), https://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2006/data/table_25.html.
2007: See MICHAEL R. RAND, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY,

CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2008 1 tbl.1 (2009), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv08.pdf; FBI,
CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES tbl.25 (2007), https://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007/data/table_25.html.
2008: See JENNIFER L. TRUMAN & MICHAEL R. RAND, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS, CRIMINAL

VICTIMIZATION, 2009 1 tbl.1 (2010), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv09.pdf; FBI, CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES tbl.25 (2008), https://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/data/table_25.html.
2009: See JENNIFER L. TRUMAN, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2010 2 tbl.1

(2011), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvlO.pdf; FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES tbl.25 (2009),
https://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/data/table_25.html.
2014,2015,2016,2017,2018: See RACHEL E. MORGAN & BARBARA A. OUDEKERK, BUREAU OF JUST.
STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2018 4 tbl.1 (2019), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv18.pdf;
FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES tbl.25 (2014), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-theu.s.-2014/tables/table-25; FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES tbl.25 (2015), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-inthe-u.s/2015/cnme-in-the-u.s.-2015/tables/table-25; FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES tbl.17 (2016),
2
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/crime-in-the-u.s.- 016/tables/table-17; FBI, CRIME IN THE
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.(2017),
tbl.25
STATES
UNITED
2017/tables/table-25; FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES tbl.25 (2018), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-theu.s/2018/crime-in-the-u.s.-2018/tables/table-25.
99. Example of Calculation: (Number Reported to FBI - Offenses Known) / (Number of Known
Crimes - NCVS) = Estimated % Reported to Police.
1990: See LISA D. BASTIAN, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1990 16 tbl.1 (1992), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvus90.pdf; BUREAU OFJUST. STATS.,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1995 324 tbl.3.109 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore
99
5&i=1l.
eds., 1996), https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.joumals/socrijusI
1991: See JOAN M. JOHNSON, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1991 16 tbl.1 (1992), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvus9.pdf; BUREAU OF JUST. STATS.,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1995 324 tbl.3.109 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore
5
eds., 1996), https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/socrijus199 &i=l.
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1992: See LISA D. BASTIAN, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION 1992 3 tbl.2 (1993),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv92.pdf; BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1995 324 tbl.3.109 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1996),
https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/socrijusl995&i=1.
1993: See CRAIG A. PERKINS ET AL., BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1993 9 tbl.1 (1996), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvus93.pdf. "Theft includes
crimes previously classified as 'Personal larceny without contact' and 'Household larceny."' Id. at 9 tbl.1 n.3.
See BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1995 324 tbl.3.109 (Kathleen
Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1996), https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/socrijus
1995&i=1.

&

1994: See TINA DORSEY & JAYNE ROBINSON, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1994 6 tbl.1 (1997), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvius94.pdf; BUREAU
OF JUST. STATS., SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1995 324 tbl.3.109 (Kathleen Maguire
Ann L. Pastore eds., 1996), https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/socrijusl995&i=1.
1995: See PATSY KLAUS & CATHY MASTON, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN

THE UNITED STATES, 1995 8 tbl.1 (2000), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvus95.pdf; FBI, CRIME
IN THE UNITED STATES 1995, SECTION III - CRIME INDEX OFFENSES CLEARED 199 tbl.25 (1996),

https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/1995/95sec3.pdf.

1996, 1997: See MICHAEL RAND, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION 1997,
CHANGES 1996-97 WITH TRENDS 1993-97 3 tbl.l, (1998), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv97.pdf;
FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1996, SECTION III - CRIME INDEX OFFENSES CLEARED 205 tbl.25
(1997), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/1996/96sec3.pdf; FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1997,
SECTION III - CRIME INDEX OFFENSES CLEARED 213 tbl.25 (1998), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-theu.s/1997/97sec3.pdf.
1998: See BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1998

STATISTICAL TABLES 2 tbl.1 (2000), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvus98.pdf; FBI, CRIME IN
THE UNITED STATES 1998, SECTION III - CRIME INDEX OFFENSES CLEARED 201 tbl.25 (1999),
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/1998/98sec3.pdf.
1999, 2000: See CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATIONS

2000, CHANGES 1990-2000 WITH TRENDS 1993-2000 3 tbl.1 (2001), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf
/cv00.pdf; FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1999, SECTION III - CRIME INDEX OFFENSES CLEARED
203 tbl.25 (2000), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/1999/99sec3.pdf; FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES 2000, SECTION III CRIME INDEX OFFENSES CLEARED 207 tbl.25 (2001),
https://ucr.fbi.gov/cime-in-the-u.s/2000/00sec3.pdf.
2001: See CATHY MASTON & PATSY KLAUS, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN

THE UNITED STATES, 2001 STATISTICAL TABLES 14 tbl.1 (2003), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
cvus0l.pdf; FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2001, SECTION III - CRIME INDEX OFFENSES CLEARED
222 tbl.25 (2002), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2001/Olsec3.pdf.
2002, 2010: See JENNIFER L. TRUMAN & MICHAEL PLANTY, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS, CRIMINAL

VICTIMIZATION, 2011 2 tbl.1 (2012), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvl 1.pdf; FBI, CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES 2002, SECTION III - CRIME INDEX OFFENSES CLEARED 223 tbl.25 (2003),
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2002/02sec3.pdf; FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES tbl.25 (2010),
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10tbl25.xls.
2003, 2011: See JENNIFER L. TRUMAN ET AL, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION,
2012 2 tbl.1 (2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv2.pdf; FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES
2003, SECTION III-OFFENSES CLEARED 257 tbl.25 (2004), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-theu.s/2003/03sec3.pdf; FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES tbl.25 (2011), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-theu.s/2011/crime-in-the-uas.-2011/tables/table_25.
2004, 2012: See JENNIFER L. TRUMAN & LYNN LANGTON, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL

VICTIMIZATION, 2013 2 tbl.1 (2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv3.pdf; FBI, CRIME IN
THE UNITED STATES tbl.25 (2004), https://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_04/offenses_
cleared/table_25.htm; FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES tbl.25 (2012), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-

u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/tables/25tabledatadecoverviewpdfs/table_25_percentof

offenses_

cleared_by_arrestor_exceptionalmeansbypopulation-group_2012.xls.
2005, 2013: See JENNIFER L. TRUMAN & LYNN LANGTON, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION, 2014 2 tbl.1 (2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv4.pdf; FBI, CRIME IN THE
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UNITED STATES tbl.25 (2005), https://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/05cius/data/table_25.htm; FBI, CRIME IN THE
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.(2013),
tbl.25
STATES
UNITED
2013/tables/table-25/table__25_percent_of-offenses-cleared_by_arrest_by_populationgoup_2013.xts.
2006: See MICHAEL RAND & SHANNAN CATALANO, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION, 2006 3 tbl.2 (2007), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv06.pdf; FBI, CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES tbl.25 (2006), https://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2006/data/table_25.html.
2007: See MICHAEL R. RAND, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2008 1 tbl.1

(2009), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv08.pdf; FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES tbl.25 (2007),
https://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007/data/table_25.html.
2008: See JENNIFER L. TRUMAN & MICHAEL R. RAND, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION, 2009 1 tbl.1 (2010), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv09.pdf; FBI, CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES tbl.25 (2008), https://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/data/table_25.html.
2009: See JENNIFER L. TRUMAN, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2010 2 tbl.1
(2011), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv10.pdf; FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES tbl.25 (2009),
https://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/data/table_25.html.
2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018: 2017: See RACHEL E. MORGAN & BARBARA A. OUDEKERK, BUREAU
OF JUST. STATS., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2018 4 tbl.1 (2019), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv
18.pdf; FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES tbl.25 (2014), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crimein-the-u.s.-2014/tables/table-25; FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES tbl.25 (2015), https://ucr.fbi.gov/
crime-in-the-u.s/2015/crime-in-the-u.s.-2015/tables/table-25; FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES tbl.17
2
(2016), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/crime-in-the-u.s.- 016/tables/table-17; FBI, CRIME IN
THE UNITED STATES tbl.25 (2017), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.2017/tables/table-25; FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES tbl.25 (2018), https://ucr.fbi.gov/clime-in-theu.s/2018/crime-in-the-u.s.-2018/tables/table-25.

